Cai Cuihong on the Nature & Harms of America's Digital Hegemony

In the latest edition of Qiushi, there’s an article by Cai Cuihong on the need to break “digital hegemony.” Cai is a Professor at the Center for American Studies at Fudan University.

Cai makes a really interesting case, arguing that the dominance of American companies across the entire technological spectrum is fundamentally adverse for countries around the world. This argument will likely travel well in the current geopolitical environment. Before I get to the piece, let me make two observations.

First, the article is in the CPC’s flagship journal. The primary audience is the domestic political and policy ecosystem. It is important to keep this in mind when one thinks about Chinese diplomacy with the US, the new framework of constructive strategic stability, and the wrangling over American chips. The timing is also interesting because this appears after the Trump-Xi summit in May and the establishment of the constructive strategic stability framework. Such pieces underscore that the new framework does not mean convergence, and tell us that the Chinese system is prepared for long-term struggle regardless of the mood in bilateral ties with the US. For those in Washington who believe that Beijing will welcome American chips or get hooked on any other American frontier technology if there are no controls, they should rethink any such assumption. From a policy perspective, Beijing appears invested in autonomy or digital sovereignty for itself, but is interested in expanding its stake and resilience in partnership with the Global South. Even if this runs counter to the near-term interests of Chinese companies. In that sense, the article is also mobilisational; it supplies the ideological justification for domestic-substitution spending and for the commercial costs this imposes on Chinese firms. This is not to say that the Chinese leadership is averse to leveraging any opportunities that might accrue in the short term; but these will be weighed against strategic costs.

Second, what’s central to Cai’s argument is that she makes really no distinction between the interests of private companies and those of the American state. In doing so, there is a fair bit of mirror-imaging that Cai is engaging in. There is, of course, state-capital linkage across the West, but she treats this as frictionless and total. This is not to say that the American state has not used the technological dominance that its companies enjoy to gain national security advantages, undercut competition, impose restrictions and influence political outcomes. However, there are evident frictions between the American state and American private enterprises, as we’ve seen in the case of Anthropic, Nvidia and others in the recent past. Nevertheless, I assume that Cai’s framing will land rather well across the developing world, and the fundamental reason for this is the nature of American policies over the past 10 years. Moreover, the nuance also falls flat when one reads the chief of one of the most influential American CEOs writing a manifesto that begins with this:

“Silicon Valley owes a moral debt to the country that made its rise possible. The engineering elite of Silicon Valley has an affirmative obligation to participate in the defense of the nation.”

Anyway, here’s the full piece:

Digital technologies, represented by AI, big data, and the internet, are reshaping the ways human society produces and lives with unprecedented breadth and depth, providing historic development opportunities for developing new-quality productive forces, unleashing greater potential for economic growth, promoting social fairness, and enhancing people’s wellbeing. At the same time, it must also be seen that the distribution of resources and the power to make rules in the digital space are currently highly concentrated; the dividends of technology have not benefited the whole world universally; and the development of the broad mass of developing countries in the digital domain is subject to interference, with their space for development being continually constrained. How to break down digital hegemony and make digital technology truly benefit all countries has become a question of our times that the international community must face squarely. 以人工智能、大数据、互联网为代表的数字技术，正以前所未有的广度与深度重塑人类社会生产生活方式，为发展新质生产力、释放更大经济增长潜能、促进社会公平、增进民生福祉提供了历史性的发展机遇。同时也要看到，当下数字空间资源分配与规则制定权高度集中，技术红利并未普惠全球，广大发展中国家在数字领域的发展受到干扰，发展空间持续受限。如何破除数字霸权，让数字技术真正惠及世界各国，已成为国际社会必须直面的时代命题.

So-called digital hegemony refers to a small number of countries relying on their comprehensive advantages in key technologies, platform ecosystems, data resources, institutional rules, and discourse narratives to transform digital capabilities into a systemic force for dominating the global order. The United States, as the first-mover country in digital technology, is the principal representative of this form of hegemony. Its digital technology outwardly proclaims freedom, openness, and innovation, but in essence serves to maintain technological monopoly, seize economic benefits, consolidate dominance over rule-making, and expand strategic influence. The formation of American digital hegemony rests on four mutually reinforcing pillars: key technologies, platform ecosystems, data resources, and rules and standards. Technological superiority lays the material foundation; the platform ecosystem extends technological superiority into global markets; data resources continually accumulate in the operation of platforms and feed back into technological iteration; and rules and standards provide institutional constraints and discursive packaging. 所谓数字霸权，是指少数国家凭借其在关键技术、平台生态、数据资源、制度规则、话语叙事等方面的综合优势，将数字能力转化为支配全球秩序的体系性力量。美国作为数字技术先发国家，是这一霸权形态的主要代表。其数字技术表面上标榜自由、开放、创新，实质上服务于维护技术垄断、攫取经济利益、巩固规则主导和扩张战略影响。美国数字霸权的形成，依托关键技术、平台生态、数据资源、规则标准四个相互强化的支柱。技术优势奠定物质基础，平台生态将技术优势延伸至全球市场，数据资源在平台运行中持续积累并反哺技术迭代，规则标准则提供制度约束和话语包装.

Key technologies constitute the underlying support of American digital hegemony. Its advantages are distributed across the complete technology chain from underlying hardware to upper-layer applications. At the sensing and connectivity layer, Qualcomm’s mobile communication chips dominate the global smartphone baseband market, and SpaceX’s ‘Starlink’ satellite communication system is rapidly covering regions that traditional networks find difficult to reach. At the computing support layer, Nvidia’s GPUs dominate the computing power market for large language models; Intel and AMD command general-purpose processor design capabilities; and American companies also control the core electronic design automation toolchain for chip design. At the system software layer, the Android and Apple operating systems have a near monopoly on the global mobile operating system market, and Microsoft’s Windows system dominates the personal computer market. At the capability generation layer, American companies such as OpenAI, Google, and Microsoft maintain strong influence in large language models and AI development frameworks. 关键技术构成美国数字霸权的底层支撑。其优势分布于从底层硬件到上层应用的完整技术链条。在感知连接层，高通移动通信芯片主导全球智能手机基带市场，太空探索技术公司的“星链”卫星通信系统快速覆盖传统网络难以触及的区域。在计算支撑层，英伟达图形处理器主导大语言模型算力市场，英特尔、超威半导体掌握通用处理器设计能力，美国企业还控制着芯片设计的核心电子设计自动化工具链。在系统软件层，安卓和苹果操作系统几乎垄断全球移动操作系统市场，微软视窗系统主导个人电脑市场。在能力生成层，开放人工智能公司、谷歌、微软等美国企业在大语言模型和人工智能开发框架方面保持较强影响力.

Platform ecosystems determine the global reach of American digital hegemony. By means of different digital gateways, American platforms embed their own rules, interfaces, and revenue mechanisms into global digital activity. Platforms such as Google, YouTube, Facebook, and X influence the visibility and virality of information through search rankings, content recommendation, and account rules. Apple, Google, and Amazon control commercial gateways, such as app distribution, advertising traffic, e-commerce channels, cross-border sales, and digital payments, forcing app developers, merchants, and content producers in various countries to accept their access rules, pricing mechanisms, and commission arrangements. Amazon’s cloud, Microsoft’s cloud, Google’s cloud, and AI application interfaces are becoming important channels through which numerous actors obtain storage, computing, model invocation, and intelligent services. In the third quarter of 2025, Amazon, Microsoft, and Google together accounted for 63% of global cloud infrastructure spending. 平台生态决定美国数字霸权的全球触达能力。借助不同数字入口，美国平台将自身规则、接口和收益机制嵌入全球数字活动。谷歌、优兔、脸书、X等平台通过搜索排序、内容推荐、账号规则，影响信息可见度和传播热度。苹果、谷歌、亚马逊控制应用分发、广告流量、电商渠道、跨境销售、数字支付等商业入口，迫使各国应用程序开发者、商家、内容生产者接受其准入规则、定价机制和佣金安排。美国的亚马逊云、微软云、谷歌云以及人工智能应用接口，正在成为众多主体获取存储、计算、模型调用、智能服务的重要通道。2025年第三季度，亚马逊、微软、谷歌合计占全球云基础设施支出的63%.

Data resources support the continuous iteration of American digital hegemony. On the one hand, data accumulation strengthens platform advantages. Large American technology companies, relying on search, social networking, cloud services, and intelligent applications, continually accumulate data on user behavior, commercial transactions, and content production on a global scale. The larger the scale of data, the stronger the algorithms and models, and the higher the stickiness of users and enterprises to the platforms. On the other hand, government-enterprise sharing amplifies the value of data. The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act passed in 2015 established the legal framework for cybersecurity information sharing and emergency coordination between the American government and enterprises. Data resources are transformed through government-enterprise coordination into national security capabilities and tools of strategic competition, becoming an important support of American hegemony. 数据资源支撑美国数字霸权的持续迭代。一方面，数据积累强化平台优势。美国大型科技企业依托搜索、社交、云服务和智能应用，在全球范围内持续积累用户行为、商业交易、内容生产等数据。数据规模越大，算法和模型越强，用户和企业的平台黏性越高。另一方面，政企共享放大数据价值。2015年通过的《网络安全信息共享法案》搭建了美国政企之间网络安全信息共享与应急协作的法律框架。数据资源经由政企协同转化为国家安全能力和战略竞争工具，成为美国霸权的重要支撑.

Rules and standards constitute the institutional lock-in mechanism of American digital hegemony. The United States has long dominated the agenda in WTO e-commerce negotiations, vigorously pushing rule arrangements that are favourable to the expansion of American digital enterprises, such as free cross-border data flows, prohibition of data localization, and protection of source code. Relying on government standards bodies, technology companies, and expert networks, the United States participates deeply in the formulation of technical standards at institutions such as the International Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission, while at the same time influencing enterprise access and cross-border business arrangements through security reviews, supply chain compliance, and cloud service certification requirements. In addition, the United States uses technical rules and standards to provide legitimizing packaging for its discourse narratives, defining its own platforms, technologies, and institutional preferences as ‘open and free’, while describing data localization and digital sovereignty as ‘trade barriers’. 规则标准构成美国数字霸权的制度锁定机制。美国在世界贸易组织电子商务谈判中长期主导议题，力推跨境数据自由流动、禁止数据本地化、保护源代码等有利于美国数字企业扩张的规则安排。依托政府标准机构、科技企业、专家网络，美国深度参与国际标准化组织、国际电工委员会等机构的技术标准制定，同时通过安全审查、供应链合规、云服务认证要求，影响企业准入与跨境业务安排。此外，美国利用技术规则标准为话语叙事提供合法性包装，将本国平台、技术和制度偏好定义为“开放自由”，把数据本地化和数字主权描述为“贸易壁垒”.

Relying on its comprehensive digital advantages, the United States has constructed a multi-layered, interlinked system of digital operations, advancing the systematic implementation of its digital hegemony strategy on a global scale.

• First, it suppresses global competitors through dual technological and legal controls. For example, the United States, on trumped-up charges, designated Huawei a ‘national security threat’ and added it to the Entity List, controlled exports of advanced chips to China, and pushed the Netherlands to restrict exports of advanced lithography equipment. Some trade in software and hardware products and digital technology services originally conducted according to market rules has also been brought under America’s unilateral licensing and review framework. At the same time, through legislation compelling the retrieval of data stored abroad, and by means of enforcement mechanisms such as the Office of Foreign Assets Control, it extends the effect of sanctions to third-party entities.

• Second, it manipulates the distribution of global digital economy gains through platform ecosystem monopoly. America’s leading platforms control key links such as app stores, search engines, social media, cloud services, and AI interfaces, influencing the formation and distribution of digital value through commissions, rankings, access, and data and advertising rules. Digital gains that ought to be shared by app developers, merchants, content producers, and users are instead largely retained within the American platform system, with high value-added gains continually concentrated in American digital capital.

• Third, through digital communication operations, it dominates overseas public opinion. For example, by posing as local users or impersonating civil society organizations, it manufactures expressions of public opinion that appear to originate locally. By leveraging coordinated operations across multiple platforms, networks of accounts, and targeted issue promotion, it causes related information to continue spreading and gaining momentum among particular regions and groups. Digital communication capabilities have thus been transformed into an important instrument for shaping public perceptions, intervening in the public opinion of other countries, and maintaining American hegemony.

• Fourth, it strengthens geo-security intervention through commercial digital capabilities. The ‘Starlink’ commercial satellite system has undertaken functions of front-line communications, intelligence transmission, and combat support in regional conflicts, becoming one of the vehicles for overseas military intervention. The ‘Project Nimbus’ cooperation between American companies and the Israeli government shows that Google and Amazon provide cloud computing and AI technical support to the Israeli government and security departments, with related services reported to involve military and security use scenarios.

依托综合数字优势，美国已构建起一套多层联动的数字运作体系，在全球范围推进其数字霸权战略的系统落地。其一，以技术与法律双重管制，压制全球竞争者。比如，美国以莫须有罪名将华为列为“国家安全威胁”并加入实体清单，管制对华先进芯片出口，推动荷兰限制先进光刻设备出口。一些原本依据市场规则开展的软硬件产品与数字技术服务贸易，也被纳入美国单边许可和审查框架之下。同时，通过立法强制调取境外存储数据并借助海外资产控制办公室等执行机制，将制裁效力延伸至第三方实体。其二，以平台生态垄断，操控全球数字经济收益分配。美国头部平台控制应用商店、搜索引擎、社交媒体、云服务和人工智能接口等关键环节，通过佣金、排序、准入、数据及广告规则影响数字价值形成与分配。本应由应用程序开发者、商家、内容生产者、用户共享的数字收益，更多被截留在美国平台体系，高附加值收益持续向美国数字资本集中。其三，以数字传播运作，主导海外舆论。比如，通过假扮本地用户、冒充民间组织，制造看似来自当地的舆论表达；借助多平台联动、账号矩阵、定向议题推送，促使相关信息在特定区域和群体中持续扩散发酵。数字传播能力被转化为塑造民众认知、干预他国舆论、维护美国霸权的重要工具。其四，以商业数字能力，强化地缘安全干预。“星链”商用卫星系统在区域冲突中承担前线通信、情报传输和作战保障功能，成为境外军事干预载体之一。美国企业和以色列政府合作的“尼姆布斯计划”显示，谷歌与亚马逊向以色列政府及安全部门提供云计算和人工智能技术支持，相关服务被报道涉及军事和安全使用场景。

American digital hegemony has caused digital technology to gradually deviate from the direction of openness, sharing, and inclusive development, causing structural distortion of the global digital order, concentrated in the following aspects: constraints on sovereign autonomy, widening of the development divide, increasing trust deficits, imbalance in governance rules, and obstruction of exchanges among civilizations. 美国数字霸权使数字技术逐步偏离开放共享、普惠发展的方向，对全球数字秩序造成结构性扭曲，集中反映在主权自主受限、发展鸿沟扩大、信任赤字升高、治理规则失衡、文明交流受阻等层面.

First, it erodes other countries’ digital sovereignty. All countries have the right to independently choose their digital development path and governance model, and to independently control and manage their own digital infrastructure, data resources, and network affairs. But American digital hegemony continually weakens other countries’ right of independent control over their own digital space. On the one hand, under the banners of open markets, free flows, and security reviews, the United States exerts pressure that makes it difficult for relevant countries to make decisions aligned with their own interests regarding digital market opening, data flow arrangements, platform regulatory approaches, and support for domestic industries. On the other hand, once American platforms and digital facilities are deeply embedded in the economic and social operations of other countries, they then influence key links such as those countries’ data storage and system updates, thereby weakening these countries’ actual capacity for control and governance. 一是侵蚀他国数字主权。各国均有权自主选择数字发展道路和治理模式，独立管控本国数字基础设施、数据资源和网络事务，但美国数字霸权持续削弱其他国家对本国数字空间的自主支配权利。一方面，美国以开放市场、自由流动、安全审查等名义施加压力，使相关国家对数字市场开放、数据流动安排、平台监管方式、本土产业扶持等，难以作出符合自身利益的决策。另一方面，美国平台和数字设施深度嵌入他国经济社会运行后，进而影响他国数据存储、系统更新等关键环节，削弱这些国家的实际管控能力.

Second, it widens the digital development divide. The digital economy ought to provide new development opportunities for all countries, but American digital hegemony is transforming development opportunities into new inequality. First, pathways for technological catch-up are being artificially obstructed. Through export controls, investment reviews, supply chain restrictions, standards barriers, and similar measures, the United States repeatedly blocks the normal circulation of critical technologies, core equipment, and high-end computing power. As a result, technological catch-up by late-developing countries is continuously delayed, and their existing disadvantages are persistently magnified. Second, the mechanism through which digital revenues flow back is being continuously distorted. Data, traffic, and users come from global markets, yet commercial returns increasingly flow toward a small number of American platforms and capital systems. The data resources and market scale of developing countries therefore struggle to be converted into domestic development dividends. Third, channels for moving up the value chain are being continuously compressed. The United States confines developing countries to low value-added positions such as API usage, traffic provision, and market consumption, making it difficult for them to enter high-return segments involving rule-making, technological definition, and other aspects of value distribution. 二是扩大数字发展鸿沟。数字经济本应为各国提供新的发展机遇，但美国数字霸权正将发展机会转化为新的不平等。首先，技术追赶路径被人为设障。利用出口管制、投资审查、供应链限制、标准壁垒等，美国将关键技术、核心设备、高端算力的正常流通层层阻断，后发国家的技术追赶被不断延缓，既有劣势被持续放大。其次，数字收益回流机制被持续扭曲。数据、流量、用户来自全球市场，商业回报却更多流向少数美国平台和资本体系，发展中国家的数据资源和市场规模难以转化为本土发展红利。再次，价值链上升通道被不断压缩。美国将发展中国家限制在接口调用、流量供给、市场消费等低附加值位置，令其难以进入规则制定、技术定义等高端收益分配环节.

Third, it aggravates the international security trust deficit. First, technological cooperation is securitized. Chips, software, cloud services, data centers, communication systems, and AI models are endowed by the United States with strategic significance, and normal technological exchanges and commercial dealings are regarded as potential risks. Second, security concerns are being institutionalized through rules. Cross-border scientific research cooperation, product procurement, platform services, and data flows are increasingly subject to American security reviews, conditional screening, and market-access restrictions, causing the costs of open cooperation to continue rising. Third, digital relations are being divided into rival blocs. All parties are compelled to increase their defensive expenditures, while the global digital ecosystem is shifting away from openness and interconnectedness toward fragmentation and confrontation. 三是加剧国际安全信任赤字。首先，技术合作被安全化。芯片、软件、云服务、数据中心、通信系统、人工智能模型被美国赋予战略含义，正常技术交流和商业往来被视为潜在风险。其次，安全疑虑被规则化。跨境科研协作、产品采购、平台服务、数据流动，越来越多地受到美国安全审查、条件筛选和准入限制，开放合作成本持续攀升。再次，数字关系被阵营化。各方不得不增加防御成本，全球数字生态由开放互联滑向分割对立.

Fourth, it distorts global digital governance. Global digital governance ought to embody broad representativeness, equal consultation, and shared benefit; however, American digital hegemony tilts the governance process toward the interests of a small number of developed countries. Issues such as AI safety and cross-border data enforcement are accorded priority, while the demands of developing countries for participation in rule-making and capacity building struggle to enter the agenda. On key issues such as data flows, AI governance, and digital infrastructure, developing countries lack sufficient discursive power and occupy primarily the position of rule-takers, often being compelled to bear higher compliance costs. 四是扭曲全球数字治理。全球数字治理本应体现广泛代表性、平等协商和共同受益，然而美国数字霸权使治理过程偏向少数发达国家的利益。人工智能安全、跨境数据执法等议题被置于优先位置，但发展中国家关于规则参与和能力建设的诉求难以进入议程，在数据流动、人工智能治理、数字基础设施等关键议题中缺乏足够话语权，更多处于规则接受者位置，往往被迫承担更高的合规成本.

Fifth, it compresses the space for exchanges among diverse civilizations. The digital space ought to provide a new arena for different countries to display their history and culture, social concepts, and development paths on an equal footing, but American digital hegemony has shaped Western values and narrative modes into the default standard. Non-Western countries’ expressions of their own history, culture, and development paths often struggle to obtain opportunities for presentation equal to those afforded to Western narratives. The visibility, reach, and reception of relevant content on global platforms is easily influenced by American platform rules, algorithmic rankings, and labeling mechanisms. Non-Western countries’ governance experience and demands for digital sovereignty are often interpreted within Western discourse frameworks, and are even distorted and stigmatized. 五是压缩多元文明交流空间。数字空间本应为不同国家平等展示历史文化、社会理念和发展道路提供新场域，但美国数字霸权将西方价值观和叙事方式塑造成默认标准，非西方国家关于自身历史、文化、发展道路的表达，往往难以获得与西方叙事同等的呈现机会。相关内容在全球平台上的可见度、传播范围、接受程度，易受美国平台规则、算法排序、标签机制影响。非西方国家的治理经验和数字主权诉求，常被置于西方话语框架下解释，甚至被曲解和污名化.

Digital technology should benefit humanity and must not be reduced to a tool of hegemony. The essence of American digital hegemony is to practice monopoly in the name of so-called freedom, and to seek the gains of global domination through technological superiority. The international community should be highly vigilant against its expansionist conduct. Facing the harms of digital hegemony, the international community should uphold the principle of sovereign equality and work to safeguard digital rights and interests in five respects: defend digital sovereignty, ensuring that all countries independently choose their development paths; promote universal benefit and inclusiveness, helping the Global South bridge the digital divide; adhere to open cooperation, opposing the pan-securitization of digital issues; improve global governance, strengthening the representativeness and voice of developing countries; and advocate mutual learning among civilizations, making the digital space a common stage for the equal exchange of diverse cultures. Breaking down digital hegemony is, in the final analysis, for the purpose of making digital technology benefit humanity. Guided by the building of a community with a shared future for mankind, the international community should, on the basis of mutual respect, fairness and justice, and win-win cooperation, jointly create a more just, inclusive, and prosperous global digital future. 数字技术造福人类，不应沦为霸权工具。美国数字霸权的实质，是以所谓自由之名行垄断之实，以技术优势谋全球支配之利。对其扩张行径，国际社会应高度警惕。面对数字霸权之害，国际社会应坚持主权平等原则，从五个方面着手维护数字权益：捍卫数字主权，确保各国自主选择发展道路；推动普惠包容，助力全球南方跨越数字鸿沟；坚持开放合作，反对将数字问题泛安全化；完善全球治理，增强发展中国家的代表性和话语权；倡导文明互鉴，让数字空间成为多元文化平等交流的共同舞台。破除数字霸权，归根结底是为了让数字技术造福人类。国际社会应以构建人类命运共同体为引领，在相互尊重、公平正义、合作共赢的基础上，共创更加公正、普惠、繁荣的全球数字未来.