Hi folks,
I had the opportunity to attend the Munich Security Conference over the past few days. It was quite the whirlwind experience. Apart from the speeches and discussions on the main stage, there were several very interesting side-event conversations. These were, by far, much more candid. I am sharing below some reflections from the experience.
First, Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger characterised US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s speech as one of assurance for Europe. In one sense, this was a speech that did offer some succour for America’s European allies. Rhetoric about America and Europe’s intertwined destinies and America being “a child of Europe” drew applause in the main hall. But to me, this was largely because the bar seemed to have been set very low following JD Vance’s remarks last year. In the rooms that I was in, Rubio’s remarks offered little reassurance. Several of the attendees bristled at the historical and ideological narrative that Rubio offered. There were some broad areas of concern:
Rubio’s characterisation of Western civilisation as fundamentally Christian is divisive from a European perspective. It hits at political cleavages within European societies and the broader EU project. When it came to this issue, as one seasoned American participant remarked, the speech was “Vance without the beard.”
Rubio’s diagnosis for why America needs strong allies and what it means for the West to be strong carried a strong sense of colonial romanticism. For instance, he talked about the “great Western empires” of the past and how America does not “want our allies to be shackled by guilt and shame. We want allies who are proud of their culture and of their heritage, who understand that we are heirs to the same great and noble civilisation, and who, together with us, are willing and able to defend it.” Who is it that he wants to defend Western civilisation against? Within this context, Rubio also called for the US and Europe to “build a new Western century”, including pursuing “a unified effort to compete for market share in the economies of the Global South”. Such framing is likely to further erode US legitimacy across the developing world.
The above two points link to the agenda that Rubio outlined, i.e., one of rebuilding international order and institutions. This is what Rubio said America under President Trump wants to achieve, and it wants to do this with Europe. The challenge for many across the Atlantic is the values that must underpin this new order. That’s where there is a fundamental disagreement for the moment. For instance, these are the key “mistakes” that Rubio argued the West had made. Read these and then refer to the text from German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s speech that I have shared below.
“a dogmatic vision of free and unfettered trade”
outsourcing of sovereignty to international institutions
the appeasement of a “climate cult”
support for mass migration in “pursuit of a world without borders”
Second, along with the ideological divisions, the experience of American coercion appears to be leading to a strategic awakening in Europe. But there is a realisation that a new deal has to be struck with the US, one that is more transactional and interest-based. This was evident in the speeches by German Chancellor Merz, European Commission President Ursula von der Layen and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer. I am highlighting these three speeches particularly because while they all echoed an underlying message of European resolve, they also underscore challenges of the Brussels bureaucracy, uniting diverse systems and often competing economic interests, and with regard to standardisation and scaling of the defense industry.
Von der Layen said that:
“Europe must become more independent – there is no other choice. Independent in every dimension that affects our security and prosperity. Defence and energy. Economy and trade. Raw materials and digital tech. Some may say the word ‘independence’ runs counter to our transatlantic bond. But the opposite is true. And we’ve just heard it from State Secretary Rubio. An independent Europe is a strong Europe. And a strong Europe makes for a stronger transatlantic alliance. Today is the time for action and I want to focus on Europe’s plan for independence.”
She added that independence implies actions “to ensure that Europe can defend its own territory, economy, democracy and way of life at all times. Because this is ultimately the true meaning of independence.” In the rooms that I was in, this message was greeted with fairly robust applause.
Merz talked about the harsh realities of big power politics. He was blunt that “we have understood that in the era of big powers, our freedom is no longer a given.” He also talked about how he shared “uneasiness and the doubts” about the US as a partner. But he added that such “claims have not been fully thought through. They ignore hard geopolitical realities in Europe. And they underestimate the potential that our partnership with the US continues to have, despite all the difficulties that exist.”
In essence, Merz’s call appeared to be for a stronger Europe and new interests-based transatlantic relationship, rather than one driven by a congruence of values. Compare the text below from Merz to how Rubio framed the values pitch.
“Let me start with the inconvenient truth right from the start. A divide has opened up between Europe and the United States, and Vice President JD Vance said this very openly here at the Munich Security Conference a year ago, and he was right. The battle of cultures of MAGA in the US is not ours. Freedom of speech here ends where the words spoken are directed against human dignity and our basic law. We do not believe in tariffs and protectionism, but in free trade. We stick to climate agreements and the World Health Organization because we are convinced that global challenges can only be solved together. Now, the transatlantic partnership is no longer something we can just take for granted. First, it started in the United States, then here in Europe, but probably also here in this room. Ladies and gentlemen, if our partner is to have a future, we need to forge it and reason it in a new way. This reasoning must be hands-on and not esoteric. We need to realise on both sides of the Atlantic that we are stronger together.”
Finally, Starmer’s speech was interesting because it seemed far more conciliatory in terms of the relationship with the US in comparison to Ursula von der Leyen’s call for independence and Merz’s more interest-based perspective. For instance, he said that “the US remains an indispensable power. Its contribution to European security over 80 years is unparalleled. And so is our gratitude.” He further pushed back against Mark Carney’s framing of world order facing a “rupture”. Starmer added:
“I believe, we must make this a moment of creation. Instead of a moment of rupture, we must make it one of radical renewal. So, rather than pretending that we can simply replace all US capabilities, we should focus on diversifying and decreasing some dependencies. We should deliver generational investment that moves us from over-dependence to interdependence. I’m talking about a vision of European security and greater European autonomy. It does not herald US withdrawal, but answers the call for more burden-sharing in Europe and remake the ties that have served us so well. Because we know the value of our own power…”
Third, staying with the transatlantic relationship, it was interesting to listen to several US senators who traveled to Munich. In fact, there was quite a substantial Congressional delegation present. If I heard him correctly during his interaction with Politico, Senator Thom Tillis said that around 25% of the Senate had traveled to Munich. He interpreted this as an unprecedented expression of solidarity for the transatlantic relationship.
The reassurance that these individuals were offering was that despite the rhetoric from the administration, the broad American polity was still invested in the transatlantic partnership and the values that underpin it. There was also some rather frank acknowledgement from American participants within and outside the government about the damage that the Greenland issue had caused. The issue remains alive even today, if one goes by what Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said during the conference.
Fourth, there were some interesting conversations on Donald Trump’s use of military force in the first year of this term. Participants from the developing world were obviously extremely critical. European attendees were critical depending on where and how force was used. For instance, while the threat to use force to seize Greenland was simply unacceptable, the kidnapping and ouster of Nicolas Maduro was easily rationalised. Where there was debate was on the issue of Iran. This was not so much a debate about legality of the action and the impact on the “rules-based order”—one seldom heard this phrase, if at all. Rather, the discourse was around the nature and intensity of force that might be used and the dangers of the fallout of the use of military force.
In connection to Trump’s use of force and how one can think about it, let me summarise what I thought was an insightful analytical take was articulated during one of the panels. I am probably not going to articulate it as elegantly, but here goes:
First, despite the election rhetoric of Trump being anti-war and wanting to be the president of peace, American presidents tend to be much more proactive in terms of foreign policy issues and potentially use of force in their second terms. There’s a legacy angle associated to this.
Second, there are certain issues on which there is likely to be greater permissibility from the broader American political elite for Trump to use force. These are matters in which there is a historical or general consensus on the nature of regimes and actors. Venezuela and Iran fit this framework. This permissibility, however, does not mean blanket clearance to deploy troops or engage in large-scale conflict. That said, the use of force can create slippery slopes. And then there are certain areas that are no-go zones. These are domains wherein the broader polity has shown that it can function as a restraining force, i.e., Greenland.
Finally, two brief points of note.
First, there were several discussions on the role of middle powers and whether the world today provides a moment for middle powers to work together much more constructively and deeply. I think there were some interesting ideas on the table around de-risking from the US and China and pursuing new formats of plurilateralism. There is tremendous rhetorical energy and thinking that’s going into these conversations. But we’ll see if these are pursued among governments with greater purpose in the weeks and months ahead.
Second, the advancements in defense technologies, particularly unmanned systems, are truly breathtaking. There are tremendous opportunities for new, nimble and innovative actors to shape the future. In particular, there were several conversations around finding pathways for deeper civil-military defense linkages within Europe and the need to forge new partnerships.
One small addition: in the speech Merz ‘Basic Law’ should be capitalised, since it refers to Germany's de facto constitution. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basic_Law_for_the_Federal_Republic_of_Germany
Manoj, Thank you for a very helpful analysis of the current transatlantic debate.
Hope you will followup-- specifically on:
1. What Rubio meant by "rebuilding" multilateral institutions. What is the European view?Will they not be needed (for security, and management of the global commons) even by super-powers in a multi-polar world ? Though the divergence on underlying values between the US and everybody else makes this hypothetical at present.
2. Europe's apparent silence on "the rule of law" and the "use of violence" is concerning. Have they disowned Grotius and Erasmus ? Are their views, like the US, now basically pragmatic, conditioned by public consensus on the nature of regimes and their leaders ? What was your impression?
3. What ideas emerged on strategic hedging from third countries, as the US and China recalibrate their relationships for co-existence ?
P.Gopinath.<gopisaki@gmail.com>