I do consider it: "The 21st Party Congress is scheduled for autumn 2027, at which point Xi will be 74. It is widely expected that he will seek a fourth term as General Secretary. If successful, he would effectively remain at the apex of the system until 2032. That outcome is entirely plausible. But it is not the only possibility."
A very thought-provoking analysis; one point worth lingering on is whether removing someone like Zhang actually makes a future transition harder to manage. Zhang, for all his seniority, also represented a form of institutional continuity, linking older military networks with officers who rose under him. If anything, removing figures like that may weaken the informal channels that have historically helped cushion leadership transitions and secure legitimacy for the successor. Even if Xi were to retain the CMC chair after stepping back, does weakening these stabilising networks risk making the succession more brittle rather than more controllable?
This, of course, assumes that Xi and Zhang were broadly aligned until a corruption scandal came to light; suggesting that Zhang’s fall may have had less to do with an emerging power struggle and more with the leadership’s intolerance for perceived disciplinary breaches at the very top.
My guess is they don't want to be like Russia, which only found out about how massive the corruption was in it's military service through the SMO/Civil War with/in Ukraine. War is no longer coming, it is already here when USA assassinates Chinese engineers working overseas. The military has to move beyond old thinking to meet these challenges, and just like (nuclear) physics only advances one funeral at a time, in a bureaucracy change starts at the top.
You missed the most likely scenario in which Xi doesn't step down and doesn't name/hint at any successor.
I do consider it: "The 21st Party Congress is scheduled for autumn 2027, at which point Xi will be 74. It is widely expected that he will seek a fourth term as General Secretary. If successful, he would effectively remain at the apex of the system until 2032. That outcome is entirely plausible. But it is not the only possibility."
At his age, it may not be an option. IMO!!!
A very thought-provoking analysis; one point worth lingering on is whether removing someone like Zhang actually makes a future transition harder to manage. Zhang, for all his seniority, also represented a form of institutional continuity, linking older military networks with officers who rose under him. If anything, removing figures like that may weaken the informal channels that have historically helped cushion leadership transitions and secure legitimacy for the successor. Even if Xi were to retain the CMC chair after stepping back, does weakening these stabilising networks risk making the succession more brittle rather than more controllable?
This, of course, assumes that Xi and Zhang were broadly aligned until a corruption scandal came to light; suggesting that Zhang’s fall may have had less to do with an emerging power struggle and more with the leadership’s intolerance for perceived disciplinary breaches at the very top.
My guess is they don't want to be like Russia, which only found out about how massive the corruption was in it's military service through the SMO/Civil War with/in Ukraine. War is no longer coming, it is already here when USA assassinates Chinese engineers working overseas. The military has to move beyond old thinking to meet these challenges, and just like (nuclear) physics only advances one funeral at a time, in a bureaucracy change starts at the top.