Thinking about What Zhang's Purge Could Mean for China's Leadership Succession

I know it is still very early, and far more information is needed to fully understand what led to the fall of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. That said, it is worth thinking aloud about what Zhang’s purge, in particular, might mean for the politics of leadership succession. It would be worthwhile to have a forward-looking conversation on the developments that have taken place.

(Important caveat: Please treat the arguments below as thinking aloud rather than definitive claims.)

The PLA Daily editorial published today frames the action against Zhang and Liu squarely as a case of political corruption rather than professional or operational failure.

According to the editorial (using Bill Bishop’s helpful translation), they:

“seriously trampled upon and undermined the CMC Chairman Responsibility System, seriously fueled political and corruption issues that affect the Party’s absolute leadership over the military and endanger the Party’s ruling foundation, seriously affected the image and prestige of the CMC leadership team, and seriously impacted the political and ideological foundation of the unity and forge-ahead spirit of all officers and soldiers. They have caused immense damage to the military’s political construction, political ecology, and combat capability construction, and have had an extremely vile influence on the Party, the state, and the military. Investigating and handling Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli in accordance with discipline and law will inevitably further ​​rectify the roots and clarify the origins from a political perspective, eliminate toxins and malpractices from an ideological perspective, and remove rot to promote healing from an organizational perspective. It will consolidate and deepen the results of political rectification, promote the rebirth of the people’s army, and inject powerful momentum into the development of the cause of strengthening the military.”

In essence, the charge is that Zhang and Liu challenged Xi Jinping’s authority over the PLA. Embedded in the language is also an accusation of faction-building, i.e., of exercising leadership through the cultivation of a political network that excluded or marginalised other groupings.

Seen in this light, I am trying to think about what Zhang Youxia’s removal means for the politics of leadership succession. The 21st Party Congress is scheduled for autumn 2027, at which point Xi will be 74. It is widely expected that he will seek a fourth term as General Secretary. If successful, he would effectively remain at the apex of the system until 2032. That outcome is entirely plausible. But it is not the only possibility. Other scenarios remain conceivable:

• Xi could remain in power, but have a successor who takes over the vice-presidency and is tipped to take charge in 2032;

• He could anoint a successor and step out of the PBSC but retain a paramount, “chairman-like” role;

• He could step down from the presidency while remaining General Secretary and CMC chairman;

• He could step down as General Secretary and President but retain the CMC chair role;

• or Some other form of hybrid arrangement could emerge.

The point is not to predict which scenario will occur, but to examine how recent developments shape the available options.

Zhang Youxia’s dismissal has, in effect, wiped the slate clean at the very top of the CMC. What will follow are new, younger appointees. Crucially, these officers are unlikely to have had the kind of personal connection with Xi that Zhang did. The social and political distance between Xi and the next generation of CMC leaders is, therefore, likely to be much greater.

This has two implications. First, these new appointees are far less likely to question Xi’s authority, resist his agenda, or pose an independent political challenge. Zhang, after all, was a peer in some ways. He was older than Xi. He had combat experience, and possessed the stature and institutional weight that come with that status. Second, while a younger and more deferential leadership may deliver compliance, it may also weaken policy debate and distort information flows upward. Xi may get decisiveness and loyalty, but potentially at the cost of candour and institutional feedback.

From a succession perspective, however, this trade-off may be precisely the point. If we assume that Xi begins to think seriously about managing a transition around or after 2027, the existence of a powerful peer-like at the top of the PLA would complicate that process. A figure like Zhang could, at least in theory, shape elite consensus, question a successor choice, or act as a focal point for alternative preferences within the system.

By removing Zhang, Xi may have significantly reduced that risk. A newly constituted PLA leadership that is loyal to Xi personally, lacking peer status, and fragmented in terms of independent power would be far less capable of contesting his decisions. In that sense, Zhang’s purge may not simply be about consolidating control in the present, but about preemptively managing the politics of succession in the future, such that when the time comes, the choice of successor, the terms of transition, and the sequencing of roles remain firmly in Xi’s hands.

Whoever Xi’s eventual successor may be, that individual is almost certain to be politically far weaker than Xi himself. In that context, a politically powerful military leadership could pose a serious constraint; not just on the successor, but indirectly on Xi’s ability to shape outcomes after stepping back. From this perspective, clearing the slate at the top of the PLA may serve a longer-term purpose of ensuring that the military does not emerge as an independent pole of power during or after a leadership transition. Seen this way, Zhang’s removal may be an early signal that Xi is preparing the ground for a tense succession process.