I have been reading and thinking about the new US National Security Strategy over the past few days. It is quite a remarkable document, breaking from the past in significant ways. Much has already been written about what the strategy means for US policy toward Europe, alliances in general, states like China and Russia, and the broader Indo-Pacific.
As a broad general point, what sets this NSS apart from earlier documents is its ideological departure. It represents, in many ways, an ideological rupture with the past and reflects the MAGA zeitgeist. Yet the ideological battle within American politics remains unsettled: there is no clear winner, and political polarisation suggests the pendulum will likely continue to swing. The US is, in effect, undergoing an ideological revolution. Seen in this light, the NSS appears to have been used as a tool in that ideological battle, with its primary adversary being the establishment and liberal elite. The extension of this conflict to Europe is also evident in the deeply derisive language about Europe facing a threat of “civilisational erasure”, the need to restore its “civilisational self-confidence and Western identity” and in the challenge it mounts to the EU’s authority and legitimacy.
From an Indian perspective, however, there is still much more to unpack. The broader point about the US viewing the world through an increasingly transactional lens, and demanding more from allies and partners, is well made. It is also consistent with the experience of the Trump administration, thus far. But several specific implications for India require deeper examination. For starters, the document has a few mentions of India and none of those are antagonistic, albeit the reference to Trump negotiating peace between India and Pakistan will irritate Delhi. Apart from this, the NSS merely talks about improving commercial relations with India and the need to get Delhi to contribute more to security in the Indo-Pacific. Beneath these direct mentions, however, lie several deeper signals and consequences for the broader India–US relationship.
First, the document makes clear that the Western Hemisphere now supersedes the Indo-Pacific in American strategic priority. It explicitly calls for “a readjustment of our global military presence to address urgent threats in our Hemisphere.” It remains to be seen what this will mean in material terms. At the same time, the NSS still stresses the need for a “vigilant posture in the Indo-Pacific” to deter war, prevent the seizure of Taiwan, and ensure security in the South China Sea—all accompanied, of course, by calls for greater burden-sharing by allies and partners. At one point, it even demands more access to allied ports and facilities for the US military.
Second, the approach to China is transactional but competitive. It is true that the overall framing of the relationship is not as adversarial as in the previous two NSS documents. It is also true that China is discussed primarily in the context of economic rebalancing and transactional engagement. But competition runs deep throughout the document. This is reflected not only in the aforementioned security issues but also in the catalogue of concerns listed: “Predatory, state-directed subsidies and industrial strategies; Unfair trading practices; Job destruction and deindustrialization; Grand-scale intellectual property theft and industrial espionage; Threats against our supply chains that risk U.S. access to critical resources, including minerals and rare earth elements; Exports of fentanyl precursors that fuel America’s opioid epidemic; and Propaganda, influence operations, and other forms of cultural subversion.” Similar concerns reappear in the Western Hemisphere section, which references “non-Hemispheric competitors” and the challenge of “foreign influence.”
Third, in dealing with these challenges and demanding more from allies and partners, the NSS frames the US as moving toward an offshore-balancing role, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. The NSS talks about the US offering a “suite of inducements—for instance, high tech cooperation, defense purchases, and access to our capital markets” to “tip decisions” in its favour. It also pledges to act as a “convener” and “supporter” of a burden-sharing network. This need not be inherently at odds with Indian interests. But the contemptuously transactional US policy under Trump 2.0 does raise significant questions regarding the reliability of America down the road.
Fourth, the prioritisation of economic security will impose costs on India. We are already seeing this through tariffs and broader economic frictions. The NSS frames economic security as national security and signals not only a transactional but an extractive approach toward allies and partners. It quite explicitly says that “America’s economic partners should no longer expect to earn income from the United States through overcapacity and structural imbalances but instead pursue growth through managed cooperation tied to strategic alignment and by receiving long-term U.S. investment.” For India, this means the US will expect more, making it difficult to arrive at a new and mutually acceptable equilibrium.
Finally, the NSS’ emphasis on sovereignty and its hostility toward multilateral institutions may prove a double-edged sword for India. Coupling this with its de-prioritisation of the threat from transnational terrorism, a significant area of shared interest becomes diluted. The current NSS is astounding in that it barely references the threat of terrorism. Of course, one could argue that this is not surprising, given how the Trump administration has approached countries like Pakistan or the new leadership in Syria. From an Indian perspective, over the past decades, the US and India have worked together on listing Pakistan-based terrorists at the UNSC Sanctions Committee and have cooperated at the multilateral forums like the FATF to pressure Pakistan. If the US is now no longer interested in countering radical terrorism or in working with partners on shared security concerns at multilateral forums, then a key pillar of cooperation is weakened.
Good overview