Yin Yanlin Explains What China Means by 'Investing in People' - Ding Chun Diagnoses Europe's Malaise
Hi folks,
In this special edition of the newsletter, I am sharing two articles from the latest edition of Qiushi, along with my brief commentaries on the pieces. I hope you enjoy reading these.
First, there’s a piece by Yin Yanlin, Vice Chairman of the Economic Affairs Committee of the 14th CPPCC National Committee. The article is titled “Accurately understand and grasp the requirements of investing in people”.
My Take: This is an important piece if you want to understand what the Party leadership means when it calls to “invest in people”. The term and the concept is not new. But there’s sufficient ambiguity around it that Yin’s piece is attempting to clarify. The key point that he is making is that investing in people is not about expanding fiscal expenditure on welfare or demand-side support for the economy. In other words, it does not mean lowering taxes, greater social security or fiscal transfers to people.
Rather, how he is pitching it is that this means more capital investment in areas that can support livelihood needs, consequently easing some challenges for people and thereby expanding their consumption. In other words, he views “investing in people” as a supply-side concept, albeit by re-directing government capital in select areas, such as more hospital rooms, more high-school places, elder-care facilities, affordable housing, pipeline networks, commuter rail, tourism infrastructure, and dilapidated urban spaces, etc.
Here’s the full piece. Yin argues:
In 2023, at the first meeting of the 20th Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission, General Secretary Xi Jinping put forward the idea of “closely combining ‘investing in things’ with ‘investing in people’. At the second plenary session of the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Party Central Committee, the General Secretary again emphasized the need to ‘persist in closely combining benefiting people’s livelihoods and promoting consumption, and investment in things and investment in people.’ The Outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan makes important arrangements regarding investment in people from the perspective of the overall situation of Chinese-style modernization. Investing in people is a major strategic measure put forward by the Party Central Committee on the basis of accurately assessing the general trends of China’s economic and social development and focusing on resolving the problem of unbalanced and inadequate development; it provides an important guideline for implementing the strategy of expanding domestic demand and expanding effective investment during the 15th FYP period, and we must profoundly comprehend its important significance and requirements. 2023年，习近平总书记在二十届中央财经委员会第一次会议上提出，“把‘投资于物’同‘投资于人’紧密结合起来”。在党的二十届四中全会第二次全体会议上，总书记再次强调，要“坚持惠民生和促消费、投资于物和投资于人紧密结合”。“十五五”规划纲要立足中国式现代化建设全局对投资于人作出重要部署。投资于人，是党中央准确研判我国经济社会发展大势、着力解决发展不平衡不充分问题提出的重大战略举措，为“十五五”时期实施扩大内需战略、扩大有效投资提供了重要遵循，我们要深刻领会其重要意义和要求
Investment is an important engine driving economic and social development. The proposal of investing in people conforms to the new requirements arising from China’s economic and social development entering a new stage and reflects a major transformation in our Party’s investment philosophy. On the one hand, after several decades of rapid economic development, the peak of China’s traditional infrastructure investment has passed, manufacturing faces transformation and upgrading, some industries have excess capacity, and capacity-expanding investment in traditional industries is constrained. On the other hand, China has obvious shortcomings in social and livelihood fields such as education, medical care, elderly care, and childcare, and there is still great potential for expanding investment; moreover, if the shortcomings in these fields are not made up, they will not only become pain points for people’s livelihood, but will also constrain the release of the potential of domestic demand. Government investment should shift more from the economic sphere to the social livelihood sphere, increasing investment in social livelihood fields that are closely connected to people’s daily lives and continuously raising the accessibility and equalization level of basic public services. This is the inevitable choice for meeting the needs of a high-quality life and promoting the all-round development of people. 投资是推动经济社会发展的重要引擎。投资于人的提出，顺应我国经济社会发展进入新阶段的新要求，体现了我们党投资理念的重大转变。一方面，经过几十年的经济快速发展，我国传统基建投资的高峰已过，制造业面临转型升级，部分行业产能过剩，传统产业产能扩张性投资受阻。另一方面，我国教育、医疗、养老、托育等社会民生领域短板明显，扩大投资还有很大潜力，而且这些领域的短板不补上，不仅会成为民生痛点，还会制约内需潜力释放。政府投资要更多地从经济领域转向社会民生领域，加大对与人民生活息息相关的社会民生领域投资，不断提升基本公共服务可及性和均等化水平，这是满足高品质生活需要、推动人的全面发展的必然选择.
At present, the notion that ‘investment in things and investment in people should be closely combined’ is increasingly becoming a consensus. However, some localities still have certain unclear understandings regarding the relationship between investment in things and investment in people. In particular, there are still deviations in understanding investment in people, which could cause policy orientation to be insufficiently precise or even lead to errors, affecting the effective implementation of the Party Central Committee’s decisions and arrangements. At present, regarding investing in people, there are still the following points on which understanding needs to be deepened. 当前，“投资于物和投资于人紧密结合”日益成为共识。但一些地方对投资于物和投资于人的关系还存在某些模糊认识，特别是对投资于人的理解尚存在偏差，有可能使政策导向不够精准甚至出现偏误，影响党中央决策部署的落地见效。目前，对于投资于人，仍有以下几点需要深化认识.
First, investing in people is also investment, not merely ‘investment in people’. One view holds that investment in people is investment in human capital, mainly including education, skills training, and so on. In economic development, human capital is certainly important, but it does not constitute the entirety of investment in people, nor is it what is most urgently needed to address the current prominent contradiction of insufficient effective demand. To regard investment in things and investment in people as equivalent to the relationship between ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ is a misreading. In the section on ‘Building a Strong Domestic Market and Accelerating the Construction of a New Development Pattern,’ the Outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan clearly proposes adhering to the principle of ‘closely combining investment in things and investment in people’. The purpose is to use new demand to lead new supply and to enhance the endogenous driving force and reliability of the domestic great circulation. Investing in people is aimed precisely at expanding domestic demand. Investment, as distinguished from consumption, is a component of expanding effective investment and cannot be simply understood as ‘investment in people’. Investment in things and investment in people are an integrated whole and are unified within the concept of ‘investment’. Realizing the close combination of the two means emphasizing the optimization of the investment structure and increasing the proportion of government investment devoted to livelihood-related areas, so as to improve the overall effectiveness of investment and better bring into play the role of investment in meeting people’s livelihood needs. 其一，投资于人也是投资，而不单纯是“对人的投资”。一种观点认为，投资于人是人力资本投资，主要包括教育、技能培训等。在经济发展中，人力资本固然重要，但并非投资于人的全部内容，也并非解决当前有效需求不足这一突出矛盾之所急。把投资于物和投资于人等同于“硬件”和“软件”的关系是一种误读。“十五五”规划纲要在“建设强大国内市场 加快构建新发展格局”部分明确提出坚持“投资于物和投资于人紧密结合”，目的就是以新需求引领新供给，增强国内大循环内生动力和可靠性。投资于人针对的就是扩大国内需求，投资是相对于消费而言，是扩大有效投资的组成部分，不能简单地理解为“对人的投资”。投资于人本质上是投资，是“既要见物也要见人”的投资。投资于物和投资于人是一体的，统一于“投资”之中，实现二者的紧密结合，就是强调优化投资结构，提高民生类政府投资比重，以便提高投资综合效益，更好发挥投资对满足民生需求的作用.
Second, investing in people is “investment used for people’, not ‘expenditure used on people.’ One view holds that, at the policy level, the understanding of the concept and scope of investment has been substantially broadened, no longer confined to physical investment, and that livelihood measures previously regarded as ‘spending’—such as raising farmers’ pensions and improving public services—can all be brought within the scope of investment. This calling of all expenditure ‘used on people’ investing in people is an over-generalization of the category of investment. Investing in people refers to investment used for the well-rounded development of people, and not simply to expenditure on people. ‘Investment’ and ‘expenditure’ are two different concepts. From the perspective of economics, investment refers to economic activity in which an economic actor seeks future returns, the core of which is sacrificing current consumption in exchange for a greater value return in the future. Expenditure, however, may precisely include spending aimed at increasing individual consumption, such as fiscal transfer payments and increases in the basic pension standard for urban and rural residents. Looking at actual economic operations, government investment and government expenditure are also two different systems. Investment falls under the development and reform authorities, while expenditure falls under the fiscal authorities. Not all fiscal expenditure used for people constitutes investment in people. Increasing the proportion of government investment devoted to livelihood-related areas and increasing the proportion of fiscal expenditure devoted to people’s livelihoods are two different requirements. The former is about optimizing the structure of government investment, and the latter about optimizing the structure of fiscal expenditure within the government budget; they are both different conceptual categories and different policy requirements. 其二，投资于人是“用于人的投资”，而不是“用于人的支出”。一种观点认为，政策层面对投资的概念与范畴理解已大幅拓宽，不再局限于实物投资，提高农民养老金、提升公共服务等以往被视为“花费”的民生举措，都可以纳入投资范畴。这种把所有“用于人身上”的支出都称之为投资于人，是对投资范畴的过度泛化。投资于人是指用于人的全面发展的投资，而并非简单指支出于人。“投资”和“支出”，是两个不同的概念。从经济学概念上讲，投资是指经济主体为获得未来收益的经济活动，其核心是通过牺牲当前的消费，换取未来更大的价值回报。而支出，却恰恰可能包括用于提高个人消费的支出，比如财政转移支付、城乡居民基础养老金标准提高等。从实际经济运行来看，政府投资和政府支出也是两个系统，投资在发展改革部门，支出在财政部门，不是所有用于人的财政支出，都是投资于人。提高政府民生类投资比重和提高财政民生支出比重是两个不同的要求，前者是优化政府投资结构，后者是优化政府预算中财政支出结构，既是不同的概念范畴，也是不同的政策要求.
Third, investment in people is ‘investment in people’s livelihoods’, but it is not equivalent to livelihood spending. One view holds that investment in people means safeguarding people’s livelihoods, and that it means giving ordinary people money to spend. This is undoubtedly a misreading of the spirit of the central authorities. Investment in people is by no means simply livelihood spending. The 2026 Government Work Report clearly puts forward that ‘we should continually exert effort to optimize the expenditure structure, with greater emphasis on supporting such areas as boosting consumption, investing in people, and safeguarding people’s livelihood.’ Clearly, investing in people here is juxtaposed with boosting consumption and safeguarding people’s livelihood, and does not refer solely to projects that overlap with safeguarding people’s livelihood. In fact, since the 14th FYP, China has persisted in taking safeguarding and improving people’s livelihood as the priority direction of fiscal expenditure. Fiscal inputs in livelihood fields have accounted for more than 70% of national general public budget expenditure, and the scale of livelihood expenditure arranged in the national general public budget has been close to RMB 100 trillion. In some localities, especially at the grassroots level, the vast majority of fiscal resources are used for people’s livelihood; what is commonly called ‘eating-and-living finance’/subsistence finance (吃饭财政). Under the current conditions of a tight balance between fiscal revenue and expenditure, and especially the limited fiscal capacity of some localities, if all livelihood matters are treated as investing in people, and high standards are blindly pursued, this would be not only a deviation in understanding but would also lead to deviations in policy, and in the practice of development would further create unreasonable expectations, bringing undue pressure to bear on local public finances. 其三，投资于人是“投资于民生”，不等于民生投入。一种观点认为，投资于人就是保障民生，就是要给老百姓发钱花钱。这无疑是对中央精神的误读。投资于人绝非简单的民生投入。2026年政府工作报告明确提出，“要持续用力优化支出结构，更加注重支持提振消费、投资于人、保障民生等方面”。显然，这里的投资于人是与提振消费、保障民生并列的，而并非单指与保障民生相重叠的项目。事实上，“十四五”以来，我国坚持把保障和改善民生作为财政支出的优先方向，民生领域财政投入占全国一般公共预算支出70%以上，全国一般公共预算安排民生支出规模近100万亿元。有的地方，特别是基层财政绝大部分都用于民生，也就是俗称的“吃饭财政”。在当前财政收支紧平衡，尤其是一些地方财力有限的情况下，如果将所有民生事项都当成投资于人，并且盲目追求高标准，这就不仅是理解上的偏差，也会导致政策上的偏差，在发展实践中还会造成不合理预期，给地方财政带来不应有的压力.
Facing the prominent contradiction of insufficient effective demand and the mismatch of strong supply and weak demand, promoting the close combination of investment in things and investment in people is an important direction and strategic task for expanding domestic demand and building a strong domestic market during the 15th FYP period. This year is the opening year of the 15th FYP period. The Government Work Report has designated ‘the all-round development of people’ as one of this year’s three key areas of investment. In accordance with the arrangements set out in the Outline of the 15th FYP and the Government Work Report, it is necessary to properly grasp the points of entry for closely combining investment in things and investment in people, focusing efforts on pain points, difficult points, key points, focal points, and hot spots, and promoting the implementation of investment in people in relevant fields. 面对有效需求不足、供强需弱的突出矛盾，推动投资于物和投资于人紧密结合，是“十五五”时期扩大国内需求、建设强大国内市场的重要方向和战略任务。今年是“十五五”开局之年，政府工作报告将“人的全面发展”作为今年三大重点投资领域之一。要按照“十五五”规划纲要和政府工作报告的部署，把握好投资于物和投资于人紧密结合的切入点，着重在痛点、难点、重点、焦点、热点等方面发力，推动相关领域投资于人落到实处.
First, increase investment around the pain points in the social and livelihood fields.At present, it is necessary to effectively increase government investment in livelihood-related sectors in response to the pain points existing in social livelihood fields such as education, healthcare, and elderly care and childcare. For example, in response to the problems of regional imbalance and insufficient overall supply of senior secondary school places, it is necessary to increase the supply of places in general high schools, with a focus on improving the basic operating conditions of county-level general high schools, so as to alleviate the public’s anxiety over school selection. In response to the problem that hospital inpatient conditions struggle to meet patients’ needs, we should support hospitals in converting wards of four or more beds into two-to-three-bed rooms. In response to the growing demand for elderly care, public elderly-care institutions should be supported in upgrading quality and facilities, equipment renewal in elderly-care institutions should be implemented, and at the same time age-friendly and barrier-free renovations of public facilities should be strengthened. 一是围绕社会民生领域的痛点加大投资。当前，要针对教育、医疗、“一老一小”等社会民生领域存在的痛点，切实增加民生领域政府投资。比如，针对高中学位供给存在区域不均、总量不足的问题，要增加普通高中学位供给，重点改善县域普通高中基本办学条件，缓解群众择校焦虑。针对医院住院条件难以满足患者需要的问题，要支持医院将4人间及以上病房改造为2—3人间。针对养老需求日益增加的情况，要支持公办养老机构提质改造，实施养老机构设备更新，同时加强公共设施适老化和无障碍改造.
Second, increase investment around the difficult issue of the urbanization of the agricultural transfer population (i.e., rural migrants to urban centers). Scientifically and orderly advancing the urbanization of the agricultural transfer population is an important task during the 15th FYP period. At present, one difficult point in the urbanization of the agricultural transfer population is that many public services and social-welfare policies are directly tied to household registration; after agricultural transfer populations obtain urban residency, this will directly increase local government fiscal expenditure, especially the supply pressure in areas such as education and housing security. Efforts should focus on areas receiving population inflows by optimizing the supply of affordable housing; strengthening the construction of general high schools; increasing the supply of general high-school places; promoting the inclusion of eligible permanent residents who have not yet obtained local household registration within the scope of public rental housing protection in more cities; appropriately relaxing, in light of local conditions, the requirements for registering for the high-school entrance examination in destination localities; and better safeguarding the right of migrant workers’ accompanying children to receive basic education on an equal basis in their place of habitual residence. 二是围绕农业转移人口市民化的难点加大投资。科学有序推进农业转移人口市民化是“十五五”时期的重要任务。目前，农业转移人口市民化的一个难点，就是许多公共服务和社会福利政策与户籍直接挂钩，农业转移人口落户后，会直接增加当地政府财政支出，特别是教育、住房保障等方面的供给压力。应以人口流入地为重点，优化保障性住房供给，加强普通高中建设，增加普通高中学位供给，推动更多城市将符合条件的未落户常住人口纳入公租房保障范围，因地制宜放宽在流入地参加中考报名条件，更好地保障农民工随迁子女在常住地平等接受基础教育等权利.
Third, increase investment around the key point of cultivating and developing modern metropolitan areas. Cultivating and developing modern metropolitan areas is an important direction for deeply advancing people-centered new-type urbanization during the 15th FYP period. Building convenient and efficient commuting circles between cities is a prerequisite for forming industrial circles with tiered supporting functions and living circles with convenient sharing, and is a key focus in cultivating and developing modern metropolitan circles. Efforts should focus on improving commuting efficiency within metropolitan circles and accelerating the removal of unconnected intercity segments and bottleneck sections. For example, efforts should be made to accelerate the completion of intercity railways from Beijing-to-Binhai New Area and Shenzhen-to-Daya Bay, use existing railways to operate intercity and suburban commuter trains, and build a number of national-expressway metropolitan-area ring roads. 三是围绕培育发展现代化都市圈的重点加大投资。培育发展现代化都市圈，是“十五五”时期深入推进以人为本的新型城镇化的重要方向。构建城市间便捷高效的通勤圈，是形成梯次配套的产业圈和便利共享的生活圈的前提条件，是培育发展现代化都市圈的重点。应聚焦提高都市圈通勤效率，加快打通城际未贯通路段和瓶颈路段。比如，加快建成北京至滨海新区、深圳至大亚湾等城际铁路，利用既有铁路开行城际和市域（郊）列车，建设一批国家高速公路都市圈环线.
Fourth, increase investment around the focal point of advancing urban renewal with high quality. Urban renewal is an important measure for continually raising the quality of urbanization. Efforts should be accelerated to build urban infrastructure lifeline safety projects and to advance the renovation of aging pipeline networks and dilapidated housing, among other initiatives. During the 15th FYP, the tasks in this regard are arduous and the volume of work is very large. For example, in terms of old and aging pipe networks, we must build and renovate about 200,000 kilometers of urban gas pipe networks, about 175,000 kilometers of drainage pipe networks, about 175,000 kilometers of water-supply pipe networks, about 100,000 kilometers of sewage pipe networks, and about 120,000 kilometers of heating-supply pipe networks. In terms of renovating dilapidated old housing, we must renovate about 500,000 units (rooms) of urban dilapidated old housing and renovate about 115,000 old residential communities. At the same time, we should also steadily and orderly advance the renovation of urban villages, renewing and renovating about 1,500 old neighborhoods and factory districts. These renewal and renovation tasks have a large investment scale and are all major measures for improving people’s livelihood. 四是围绕高质量推进城市更新的焦点加大投资。城市更新是持续提高城镇化质量的重要举措。应加快城市基础设施生命线安全工程建设，推进老旧管网和危旧房改造等。“十五五”期间，这方面任务艰巨，工程量很大。比如，在老旧管网方面，要建设改造城镇燃气管网约20万公里、排水管网约17.5万公里、供水管网约17.5万公里、污水管网约10万公里、供热管网约12万公里。在危旧房改造方面，要改造城镇危旧房约50万套（间），改造老旧小区约11.5万个。同时，还要平稳有序推进城中村改造，更新改造约1500个老旧街区厂区。这些更新改造任务，投资规模大，都是改善民生的重大举措.
Fifth, increase investment around the hot spot of cultural and tourism consumption infrastructure. Vigorously developing the culture and tourism industry, so that the people can enjoy a higher-quality life, is an important direction of investing in people. We should accelerate the improvement of tourism public services and improve the tourism consumption experience. Accelerate the construction of tourism infrastructure, and further improve tourism public-service facilities, such as tourism service centers (consultation centers), tourist distribution centers, tourism public-service information platforms, and tourist toilets. Support high-quality outdoor sports destinations in improving supporting facilities such as public services and emergency rescue. Implement well the ‘three-year doubling’ action for charging facilities, and accelerate the construction of consumption infrastructure such as charging posts, parking lots, and tourism highways. 五是围绕文化旅游消费基础设施的热点加大投资。大力发展文化旅游业，让人民群众享受更高品质生活，是投资于人的重要方向。应加快完善旅游公共服务，改善旅游消费体验。加快旅游基础设施建设，进一步完善旅游服务中心（咨询中心）、旅游集散中心、旅游公共服务信息平台、旅游厕所等旅游公共服务设施。支持高质量户外运动目的地完善公共服务、应急救援等配套设施。实施好充电设施“三年倍增”行动，加快充电桩、停车场、旅游公路等消费基础设施建设.
The other article in the edition that I found worth spending some time on is by Professor Ding Chun, Director of the Center for European Studies and Professor of the Institute of World Economics, Fudan University and Vice President of the Chinese Association for European Studies. Ding writes about Europe’s economic challenges and political spectrum shift, which he argues “profoundly affect the prospects for global economic recovery and the evolution of the international order.”
My Take: Again, I found this to be an extremely interesting read. I am not European and neither do I pretend to understand the complexities of European politics and economic policy. But Ding’s diagnosis of some European maladies seems fairly sophisticated. In particular, I found the arguments that he presents to explain the rise of the far-right and right-wing populism, along with those about the impact of political fragmentation on policymaking and governance, to be persuasive. Part of why it works is the causal chain he builds, i.e., stagnant economy feeding livelihood anxiety and a ‘sense of being abandoned’, along with social tensions owing to migration and a shrinking population, which changes incentives and drives vote-switching towards populism or the far-right, which in turn pulls mainstream parties rightward as they chase those voters, which then produces coalition instability and governance paralysis.
That said, it’s worth keeping in mind that commentaries like this are not disinterested scholarship. They serve a specific political and narrative purpose. Consequently, it is not surprising that the big hole in Ding’s analysis is that he does not seem to think that Chinese policies, particularly Chinese economic policies, have any impact on Europe’s economy and consequently on European politics. As per this article, the only external actor that seems to have any adverse impact on Europe’s economic prospects is the United States. It’s also remarkable to read Chinese scholars being scathing in their criticism of protectionism, industrial policy and securitisation by other countries, when China has been implementing something called the Comprehensive National Security Concept since 2014.
Anyway, here’s the piece. Ding writes:
Europe’s economy is mired in a growth predicament. The American economist Paul Krugman once described this predicament as a ‘slow-motion disaster’, concentrated in three dimensions.
First, a continuous decline in economic standing. The EU’s total economic output as a share of the global total fell from a peak of 25.89% in 2004 to 17.57% in 2024; its exports as a share of the global total fell from a peak of 19.61% in 2003 to 16.99% in 2024; and the euro’s share of global reserve currencies slid from around 24.05% in 2009 to 18.92% in 2024. This decline is also directly reflected in the incomes of ordinary people. Calculated on a PPP basis, the EU’s per capita consumption level in 2022 was equivalent to only about 58% of that of the United States.
Second, a structural imbalance in growth drivers. Some European countries that excel in manufacturing have fallen into the predicament of losing momentum. As Europe’s largest economy, Germany experienced recession for two consecutive years in 2023 and 2024, with a full-year growth rate of 0.2% in 2025 and projected economic growth of only 0.6% in 2026. Germany’s long-standing growth model—relying on inexpensive external energy and raw materials, drawing on the technological advantages of traditional manufacturing, and being driven by exports to overseas markets—has encountered bottlenecks, turning it from the ‘locomotive’ of European economic growth into the ‘laggard’. Although southern European countries have performed relatively impressively in economic terms in recent years, their growth has mainly relied on the recovery of tourism and fiscal support such as the ‘Next Generation EU’ recovery fund; their manufacturing foundations are weak, and the sustainability of their growth faces challenges. Europe as a whole lacks new growth poles capable of replacing traditional manufacturing, and the switch from old to new growth drivers has not yet been completed.
Third, a decline in industrial competitiveness. Manufacturing’s share of the EU economy fell from 15.3% in 2016 to 14.3% in 2024, and jobs declined by a cumulative 2.3 million from 2008 to 2023. The Fortune Global 500 list shows that the number of European companies fell from 142 in 2015 to 123 in 2025. Since 2008, about 30% of the most innovative European companies have moved overseas, and homegrown innovative enterprises have struggled to grow into large enterprises that lead new industries.
欧洲经济陷入增长困境。美国经济学家保罗·克鲁格曼曾将这一困局形容为一场“缓慢发生的灾难”，集中体现在三个层面。一是经济地位持续下滑。欧盟经济总量占全球比重从2004年25.89%的峰值降至2024年的17.57%，出口占全球比重从2003年19.61%的峰值降至2024年的16.99%，欧元在全球储备货币中的份额从2009年的24.05%左右滑落至2024年的18.92%。这种下滑还直接反映到普通民众的收入中。按购买力平价标准计算，2022年欧盟人均消费水平仅相当于美国的58%左右。二是增长动力结构失衡。以制造业见长的部分欧洲国家陷入失速窘境。作为欧洲最大经济体，德国在2023年和2024年连续两年陷入衰退，2025年全年增速为0.2%，2026年预计经济增长仅为0.6%。德国长期依赖外部低价能源与原材料、依托传统制造业技术优势、面向海外市场出口驱动的增长模式遭遇瓶颈，从欧洲经济增速的“火车头”沦为“吊车尾”。南欧国家虽然近年来经济表现相对亮眼，但增长主要依托旅游业复苏和“下一代欧盟”复苏基金等财政支持，制造业根基薄弱，增长的可持续性面临考验。欧洲整体上缺乏能够替代传统制造业的新增长极，新旧动能转换尚未完成。三是产业竞争力衰退。制造业占欧盟经济比重从2016年的15.3%降至2024年的14.3%，就业岗位2008年至2023年累计减少230万个。《财富》世界500强榜单显示，欧洲企业2015年至2025年从142家降至123家。2008年以来，约30%最具创新力的欧洲企业出走海外，本土创新企业难以成长为引领新产业的大型企业。
Europe’s growth predicament is the result of the combined effect of internal structural chronic ailments and external geopolitical shocks. Sluggish internal economic reform has weakened its capacity for self-repair, while external geopolitical shocks have raised the cost of economic recovery.
From the internal perspective:
First, innovation is insufficient. Europe has deep accumulated strengths in traditional manufacturing, but it started relatively slowly in new domains such as the Internet, the digital economy, and AI. It failed to cultivate new growth engines in a timely manner, leaving it unable to establish frontier advantages at the high end while lacking cost competitiveness at the lower end.
Second, institutional constraints persist. Market fragmentation within Europe remains severe, and firms seeking cross-border expansion must cope with multiple sets of rules. Administrative decision-making is cumbersome and inefficient, while major reforms are repeatedly delayed, causing firms to miss windows of opportunity for development. The costs of the welfare system remain high, constraining economic vitality, fostering the phenomenon of ‘supporting idlers’ (literally: raising lazy people-养懒汉), burdening public finances, and weakening impetus for reform.
Third, infrastructure is aging. Europe’s traditional infrastructure is generally aging, and investment in emerging energy and digital infrastructure is insufficient, which directly raises logistics, energy, and communications costs and has become a bottleneck constraining the long-term improvement of economic competitiveness.
Fourth, the population is aging and the labour force is shrinking. The share of the EU’s population aged 65 and over has already risen from 19.1% in 2015 to 22% in 2025. According to forecasts by the European Commission, by 2030 the EU’s working-age population will shrink by about 7 million people. The widening pension gap and climbing medical expenditure are increasing the fiscal burden on various countries, while the continuous shrinking of the labour force directly constrains the room for expanding production, and the problem of labor shortages for enterprises is becoming increasingly prominent.
From the external perspective, on the one hand, on the one hand, recent US tariff increases on key industries such as automobiles, steel, and aluminum have significantly affected European exports, corporate profits, and economic growth. The Kiel Institute for the World Economy in Germany estimates that, if the tariff threats materialize, output losses in the German automobile industry will reach €15 billion in the short term and could be as high as €30 billion in the long term. On the other hand, the protracted Russia-Ukraine conflict, overlaid with the US-Israel-Iran conflict, has caused Europe’s energy supply to remain under continuous pressure and prices to fluctuate at high levels. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said in April that since the start of this US-Israel-Iran conflict, the EU’s spending on imported fossil fuels has already increased by €22 billion. The costs to Europe’s economy and people’s livelihood, especially the production costs of energy-intensive industries, have soared, causing the momentum of economic growth to weaken further.
欧洲增长困境是内部结构性痼疾与外部地缘政治冲击共同作用的结果。内部经济改革迟缓削弱了自我修复能力，外部地缘政治冲击又抬高了经济复苏成本。从内部看，一是创新不足。欧洲在传统制造业领域积淀深厚，但在互联网、数字经济、人工智能等新赛道起步偏慢，未能及时培育出新的增长引擎，向上无法建立前沿优势、向下缺乏成本竞争力。二是制度掣肘。欧洲内部市场分割仍然严重，企业跨国扩张需应对多套规则。行政决策烦琐低效，重大改革久拖不决，使企业常常错失发展的时间窗口。福利制度成本居高不下，制约经济增长活力，助长了“养懒汉”现象，拖累财政且削弱改革动力。三是基础设施老化。欧洲传统基础设施普遍老化，能源和数字新兴基础设施投资不足，直接抬高物流、能源、通信成本，成为制约经济长期竞争力提升的瓶颈。四是人口老龄化与劳动力萎缩。欧盟65岁及以上人口占比已从2015年的19.1%升至2025年的22%。据欧盟委员会预测，到2030年欧盟劳动年龄人口将减少约700万人。养老金缺口扩大和医疗支出攀升加重各国财政负担，劳动力持续萎缩则直接制约生产扩张空间，企业用工短缺问题日益突出。从外部看，一方面，近期美国对汽车、钢铝等关键行业加征关税，显著冲击欧洲出口、企业利润与经济增长。德国基尔世界经济研究所测算认为，若关税威胁落地，德国汽车行业短期内产出损失将达150亿欧元，长期损失可能高达300亿欧元。另一方面，俄乌冲突延宕叠加美以伊冲突，导致欧洲能源供应持续承压、价格高位震荡。欧盟委员会主席冯德莱恩4月表示，此次美以伊冲突开始以来，欧盟进口化石燃料支出已增加220亿欧元。欧洲经济和民生成本尤其是能源密集型产业生产成本飙升，导致经济增长势头进一步弱化.
The economic growth predicament is profoundly reshaping Europe’s political landscape. Persistently low growth has not only given rise to the strong ascent of far-right and right-wing populist parties, but has also forced mainstream parties to passively follow suit in order to compete for votes, driving the overall political spectrum to shift to the right. The rightward shift of Europe’s political spectrum is the result of the combined effects of economic, social, and political factors.
First, livelihood anxiety is its economic root. In nearly two-thirds of EU member states, the size of the middle class is showing a shrinking trend. Real wage growth has stagnated, while the basic cost of living, housing, education, medical care, and so on, keeps climbing. According to survey data from the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, in 2025, 61% of respondents in low-income EU households said they found it difficult to make ends meet, a sharp increase from 40% in 2023. The substantive decline in living standards and the pervasive ‘sense of being abandoned’ constitute the deep soil of the populist narrative. This anxiety also has distinct geographical features. The development gap between large cities and small-to-medium towns, and between core regions and peripheral regions, keeps widening, and residents of industrially declining areas are particularly hard hit, thereby becoming an important vote bank for populism.
Second, the refugee and immigration issue and conflicts over identity constitute its social origin. On the one hand, against the backdrop of sluggish economic growth, many European citizens tend to blame employment pressure and anxiety over community safety on incoming refugees and immigrants, and anti-refugee and anti-immigrant sentiment has thus become a prominent intermediary transmitting economic discontent into the political sphere. On the other hand, immigrants and refugees from the Middle East, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa have a gulf that is difficult to bridge with Europe’s mainstream society in terms of identity, religious belief, cultural customs, and ways of life, leading to the long-term segregation of some immigrant- and refugee-concentrated communities from local society and the formation of de-facto parallel societies. These deep-seated contradictions have provided real-world material for the anti-immigration narratives of far-right and right-wing populist parties.
Third, the governance failure of mainstream parties is its political cause. Center-left parties, constrained by economic sluggishness and fiscal austerity, have been unable either to deliver on redistribution promises or to put forward convincing growth plans. Center-right parties have found themselves at a loss between adhering to moderate positions and catering to populist demands, with their policy distinctiveness becoming increasingly blurred. These mainstream parties’ long-term inability to respond effectively to public concerns has ceded enormous political space to the expansion of far-right and right-wing populist parties. At the same time, some far-right and right-wing populist parties have consciously softened their radical labels and instead packaged their positions in more broadly acceptable language, such as anti-establishment rhetoric and the defense of national sovereignty. In doing so, they have successfully attracted large numbers of centrist voters who had drifted away from mainstream parties and have effectively advanced their own transformation toward moderation and mainstream acceptance.
经济增长困境正在深刻重塑欧洲的政治版图。持续的低速增长不仅催生极右翼和右翼民粹政党的强势崛起，更倒逼主流政党为争夺选票而被动跟随，带动政治光谱整体右移。欧洲政治光谱的右移，是经济、社会与政治等多重因素共同作用的结果。其一，民生焦虑是其经济根源。在近三分之二的欧盟成员国中，中产阶层规模出现萎缩态势。实际工资增长停滞，住房、教育、医疗等基本生活成本却不断攀升。根据欧洲改善生活和工作条件基金会调查统计，2025年，欧盟低收入家庭中有61%的受访者表示难以维持收支平衡，较2023年的40%大幅增加。生活水准的实质下降和弥漫的“被抛弃感”，构成了民粹主义叙事的深厚土壤。这种焦虑还具有鲜明的地理特征。大城市与中小城镇、核心地区与边缘地区之间的发展差距持续拉大，产业衰退地区的居民受冲击尤为严重，由此成为民粹主义的重要票仓。其二，难民和移民问题与身份认同冲突是其社会肇端。一方面，在经济增长低迷的背景下，不少欧洲民众倾向于将就业压力和社区安全焦虑归咎于外来难民和移民，反难民和移民情绪由此成为经济不满向政治领域传导的突出中介。另一方面，来自中东、北非和撒哈拉以南非洲的移民和难民，与欧洲主流社会在身份认同、宗教信仰、文化习俗与生活方式等方面存在难以跨越的鸿沟，导致部分移民和难民聚居区与当地社会长期隔离，形成事实上的平行社会。这些深层矛盾为极右翼和右翼民粹政党的反移民叙事提供了现实素材。其三，主流政党治理失效是其政治缘由。中左政党在经济低迷、财政紧缩的约束下，既无法兑现再分配承诺，又难以提出令人信服的增长方案。中右政党在坚守温和立场与迎合民粹诉求之间进退失据，政策辨识度日渐模糊。这些主流政党长期无法有效回应民众关切，为极右翼和右翼民粹政党扩张让渡出巨大的政治空间。与此同时，部分极右翼和右翼民粹政党有意识地软化激进标签，转而以反建制、捍卫国家主权等更易被接受的话语包装自身主张，成功吸引了大批从主流政党流失的中间选民，有效推进了自身的温和化与主流化转型.
The trend of far-right and right-wing populist parties rising by taking advantage of the situation and moving from the political margins toward the center of power is becoming increasingly pronounced. Sluggish economic growth has inflamed social discontent, and large numbers of voters hope to seek change by switching their political representatives, so the influence of such parties has continued to expand.
First, at the level of domestic politics, far-right and right-wing populist parties have won elections or participated in governing in multiple countries. As of May 2026, far-right and right-wing populist parties were participating in government in countries such as Italy, Finland, and Czech Republic.
Second, at the level of the European Parliament, such parties have likewise expanded substantially. In the 2024 European Parliament elections, the three major far-right and right-wing populist groups—the European Conservatives and Reformists, the ‘Patriots for Europe’, and the ‘Europe of Sovereign Nations’—won a combined 187 seats, accounting for 26% of the total seats in the European Parliament, and their influence over the EU policy agenda rose markedly.
Third, those far-right and right-wing populist parties not yet in government are also rapidly building up strength. Germany’s AfD and France’s National Rally rank at the top in numerous domestic opinion polls in their respective countries, with support rates continuing to climb. In the 2026 local elections, Britain’s Reform UK ranked first among all parties with a national equivalent vote share of about 27%, winning 1,454 seats and control of 14 local councils, demonstrating strong momentum to reshape the country’s political landscape.
极右翼和右翼民粹政党借势崛起，从政治边缘走向权力中心的趋势日甚。经济增长低迷激化社会不满情绪，大量选民希望通过更换政治代言人寻求改变，这类政党的影响力因而持续扩张。其一，在国内政治层面，极右翼和右翼民粹政党在多国赢得选举或参与执政。截至2026年5月，极右翼和右翼民粹政党在意大利、芬兰、捷克等国参与执政。其二，在欧洲议会层面，这类政党同样大幅扩张。2024年欧洲议会选举中，欧洲保守与改革党团、“欧洲爱国者”党团和主权国家欧洲党团三大极右翼和右翼民粹党团合计获得187个席位，占欧洲议会总席位的26%，对欧盟政策议程的影响力显著上升。其三，那些尚未执政的极右翼和右翼民粹政党也在快速积蓄力量。德国选择党和法国国民联盟在各自国内多项民调中高居榜首，支持率持续攀升。英国改革党在2026年地方选举中更以约27%的全国换算得票率位居各党榜首，赢得1454个议席和14个地方议会控制权，展现出重塑本国政治版图的强劲势头.
Far-right and right-wing populist parties have continuously eroded the voter base of mainstream parties, causing mainstream parties across Europe to fall into a predicament of losing votes. Under electoral pressure, some mainstream parties have passively chosen to engage and cooperate with such parties.
On the one hand, the taboo against cooperation between mainstream parties and far-right or right-wing populist forces has been broken. For a long time, mainstream European parties adopted a ‘firewall’ strategy of isolation toward far-right and right-wing populist parties—refusing cooperation, refusing coalition formation, and refusing reliance on them—thereby excluding them from the structures of power; but this bottom line is gradually being breached. Germany’s governing party, the Christian Democratic Union, voted the same way as the AfD on an immigration bill in the federal parliament in early 2025; although its intent was not to cooperate with the AfD, it nonetheless objectively broke the isolation principle that had continued for many years. Sweden’s Moderate Party, since 2022, has relied on the parliamentary support of the Sweden Democrats to sustain its governance, likewise breaking this political convention.
On the other hand, in actual practice, mainstream parties have, in disguised form, adopted and implemented some of the policy propositions of far-right and right-wing populist parties. On the immigration issue, center-right parties have taken the initiative to move closer to far-right and right-wing populist positions. France’s opposition party The Republicans has taken an increasingly hardline stance on immigration and security issues, and the policy boundary between it and the National Rally has grown increasingly blurry. Traditional center-left parties have also been forced to shift. Denmark’s Social Democrats have in recent years systematically adopted hardline immigration policies, including pursuing a ‘zero refugee’ target and an overseas asylum-processing mechanism; and after Britain’s Labour Party came to power, it too continued the basic direction of tightening immigration controls. 极右翼和右翼民粹政党不断蚕食选民基础，导致欧洲主流政党陷入选票流失困境。在选举压力下，一些主流政党被动选择了与这类政党展开接触合作。一方面，主流政党与极右翼和右翼民粹势力之间的合作禁区被打破。长期以来，欧洲主流政党对极右翼和右翼民粹政党采取不合作、不组阁、不依赖的“防火墙”隔离策略，将其排斥在权力体系之外，但这一底线正在被逐步突破。德国执政党基督教民主联盟2025年初在联邦议会就移民议案与选择党同向投票，其本意并非与选择党合作，但客观上仍然打破了延续多年的隔离原则。瑞典温和党自2022年起依赖瑞典民主党的议会支持维系执政，同样打破了这一政治惯例。另一方面，主流政党在实际操作中变相采纳实施极右翼和右翼民粹政党的部分政策主张。在移民议题上，中右政党主动向极右翼和右翼民粹立场靠拢。法国在野党共和党在移民和安全议题上立场日趋强硬，与国民联盟的政策边界日渐模糊。传统中左政党也被迫转向，丹麦社会民主党近年来系统性地采纳强硬移民政策，包括推行“零难民”目标和海外庇护处理机制；英国工党上台后也延续了收紧移民管控的基本方向.
The impact of the rightward shift of Europe’s political spectrum is in turn feeding back to the economic, social, and external-relations levels and continually spreading, profoundly changing Europe’s economic direction, governance model, and capacity for collective action, and on the whole increasing the difficulty of Europe extricating itself from its current predicament. 欧洲政治光谱右移的影响又反馈到经济社会和对外关系层面并不断扩散，深刻改变着欧洲的经济走向、治理模式和集体行动能力，总体上加大了欧洲走出当前困局的难度.
Politics is accelerating its fragmentation, and governance effectiveness is continually declining. The rise of far-right and right-wing populist forces has broken the pattern of alternation between the two major camps, i.e., the center-left and center-right, that had long taken shape in many European countries; the number of parties has surged, coalition combinations have become volatile, and governance effectiveness has declined accordingly.
First, frequent changes of government have already become the norm in many countries. A single party finds it difficult to obtain the majority of seats needed to form a government, and multi-party coalition governance has become a common phenomenon; interests within governing coalitions are dispersed and positions differ, and government stability has dropped substantially. Far-right and right-wing populist parties have long competed for votes with an anti-establishment posture, yet after entering government they need to compromise and cooperate with establishment forces, and the gap between promises and reality very easily triggers antagonism and stalemate within coalitions. This results in a large amount of political resources being consumed in coalition-formation negotiations and crisis response, while the substantive governance agenda is continually shelved.
Second, policy continuity is seriously insufficient, making major reforms difficult to advance. Major reforms bearing on Europe’s long-term competitiveness, such as energy transition, digital upgrading, and industrial-structure adjustment, require a stable policy framework spanning multiple electoral cycles, but parties, in order to compete for votes, often avoid deep reforms; electoral competition is hijacked by short-term interests, and a great many policies are discussed but not decided, or decided but not implemented.
Third, the growing polarization of discussion on social issues has intensified divisions in public discourse. The algorithmic recommendation mechanisms of social media tend to amplify confrontational emotions and extreme positions, while moderate voices are increasingly marginalized within the public sphere. Policy debates evolve into confrontations between opposing camps, making it increasingly difficult to forge social consensus.
政治加速碎片化，治理效能不断下滑。极右翼和右翼民粹势力的崛起打破了欧洲多国长期形成的中左、中右两大阵营轮替格局，政党数量激增、联盟组合多变，治理效能随之下滑。其一，频繁的政府更迭已成为多国常态。单一政党难以获得组阁所需的多数席位，多党联合执政成为普遍现象，执政联盟内部利益分散、立场各异，政府稳定性大幅下降。极右翼和右翼民粹政党长期以反建制姿态争取选票，进入政府后却需要与建制力量妥协合作，承诺与现实之间的落差极易引发联盟内部的对立与僵持，这导致大量政治资源消耗在组阁谈判和危机应对中，实质性的治理议程不断被搁置。其二，政策连续性严重不足，重大改革难以推进。能源转型、数字化升级、产业结构调整等事关欧洲长远竞争力的重大改革，需要跨越多个选举周期的稳定政策框架，但政党为争取选票往往回避深层改革，选举竞争被短期利益绑架，大量政策议而不决、决而不行。其三，社会议题讨论的极化倾向加剧公共讨论的撕裂。社交媒体的算法推荐机制倾向于放大对立情绪和极端立场，温和声音在舆论场中日益被边缘化，政策辩论演变为立场对峙，社会共识形成的难度不断上升.
Protectionism is increasingly on the rise, with frequent use of trade-remedy and industrial-protection measures The propositions of far-right and right-wing populist forces to protect domestic industry and employment have amplified the calls across the whole of Europe for strengthened protection. Under pressure arising from electoral considerations, the protectionist positions of mainstream parties and EU institutions have become increasingly pronounced.
First, the policy goal has shifted from open competition to security first. In 2023 the EU introduced the ‘European Economic Security Strategy’, listing supply-chain dependence and the like as key risk areas, and politicizing and instrumentalizing economic and trade issues.
Second, the policy tools have shifted from rule-based constraints to administrative intervention. The ‘Industrial Accelerator Act’ announced in 2026 aims, through arrangements such as public-procurement preferences, to strengthen administrative guidance over industrial layout and resource allocation; many of its provisions have obvious protectionist features and may be said to be tailor-made for enterprises of certain specific countries outside the region.
Third, the policy targets have shifted from universal governance to targeted precautionary restrictions. In the recently revised EU ‘Cybersecurity Act’ and related certification arrangements, so-called ‘non-technical risks’ have been incorporated into the assessment framework, linking factors such as an enterprise’s national background and control structure to cybersecurity, which in effect sets up institutional barriers aimed at high-tech enterprises of specific countries. Although the Foreign Subsidies Regulation does not, in its text, target specific countries, since its implementation almost all in-depth investigations have involved enterprises of certain specific countries, displaying obvious features of targeted enforcement.
保护主义日益抬头，贸易救济和产业保护政策措施频出。极右翼和右翼民粹势力维护本土产业和就业的主张，放大了整个欧洲加强保护的呼声。在选票得失的考量下，主流政党和欧盟机构的保护主义立场愈发增强。突出表现在：其一，政策目标由开放竞争转向安全优先。2023年欧盟出台《欧洲经济安全战略》，将供应链依赖等列为重点风险领域，把经贸问题政治化、工具化。其二，政策工具由规则约束转向行政干预。2026年公布的《工业加速器法案》，旨在通过公共采购优先等安排，强化对产业布局和资源配置的行政引导，其中不少条款保护主义特征明显，可谓是为域外特定国家企业量身定制。其三，政策对象由普遍治理转向针对性设防。在近期修订的欧盟《网络安全法》及相关认证安排中，将所谓“非技术风险”纳入评估框架，把企业国别背景、控制权结构等因素与网络安全挂钩，实际上是针对特定国家高科技企业设置制度性障碍。《外国补贴条例》虽在文本上不针对特定国家，但自实施以来几乎所有深度调查均涉及某些特定国家企业，定向执法特征明显.
The capacity for collective action is declining, and internal divisions are increasingly coming out into the open. At present, the EU has basically converged on the broad direction of strengthening security capacity-building and reducing the impact of external risks. However, far-right and right-wing populist forces generally advocate giving priority to national sovereignty, and their Eurosceptic tendencies have significantly increased the difficulty of forging consensus within the EU on external affairs.
In the defense and security domain, divisions among member states are prominent. With regard to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, countries hold differing positions on the scale of military assistance to Ukraine, the scope of sanctions against Russia, and pathways for resolving the conflict. Disputes over the fiscal burden-sharing of defense investment continue unabated, while disagreements between Northern and Southern Europe, and between Eastern and Western Europe, over burden-sharing proportions and priority areas are increasingly coming out in the open.
In the field of external economic and trade relations, when confronted with pressure from US tariff increases, member states have found it difficult to formulate a unified approach regarding negotiating positions and the strength of countermeasures because of differences in industrial structure and trade dependence. As a result, the EU’s bargaining power as a whole has been weakened.
In the global governance domain, Europe has long styled itself as an advocate of multilateralism and a rules-based order, but the rise of far-right and right-wing populist forces has shaken this positioning, leading to rising skepticism in Europe toward the multilateral trading system, weakened force in implementing global climate commitments, declining willingness to invest in development aid, and a corresponding weakening of its credibility when it comes to practicing international norms. The interweaving and superposition of multiple divisions has both compressed the room for maneuver of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and, even more, made its strategic choices on the international stage appear increasingly passive.
集体行动能力下降，内部分歧日益公开化。当前，欧盟在加强安全能力建设、减少外部风险冲击的大方向上已基本趋于一致，但极右翼和右翼民粹势力普遍主张国家主权优先，其疑欧倾向使欧盟在对外事务中凝聚共识的难度显著上升。在防务与安全领域，成员国分歧突出。围绕俄乌冲突，各国在对乌军事援助力度、对俄制裁范围和冲突解决路径上立场各异。防务投资的财政分摊争议不断，南北欧与东西欧在承担比例和优先方向上的分歧日益公开化。在对外经贸领域，面对美国加征关税的压力，各成员国因产业结构和贸易依存度不同，在谈判立场和反制力度上难以形成统一方案，欧盟作为整体的议价能力因此被削弱。在全球治理领域，欧洲长期以多边主义和规则秩序的倡导者自居，但极右翼和右翼民粹势力的兴起动摇了这一定位，导致欧洲对多边贸易体制的质疑升温，对全球气候承诺的执行力度减弱，对发展援助的投入意愿下降，践行国际规范的公信力相应削弱。多重分歧交织叠加，既压缩了欧盟共同外交与安全政策的回旋空间，更使其在国际舞台上的战略选择愈显被动.
At present, Europe is standing at a critical crossroads. The superposition of internal troubles and external threats has plunged Europe into a predicament in which the more anxious it becomes, the more inward-looking it turns; and the more inward-looking it turns, the more passive it becomes. However, protectionism has never been the prescription for getting out of a predicament. European integration has come this far by relying on openness and cooperation, not on confrontation and exclusion. The key to Europe extricating itself from its economic and political predicament lies in forging internal consensus on reform, stimulating the momentum of innovation-driven growth, adhering to the direction of openness and cooperation, and raising its own competitiveness in a market environment of fair competition—rather than allowing protectionism and unilateralism to erode the hard-won foundations of cooperation. Whether Europe can achieve self-renewal amid a changing international environment bears not only on its own future and destiny, but will also profoundly affect the stability of the multilateral trading system, the direction of the international order, and the configuration of major-power competition.
当下，欧洲正站在关键的十字路口。内忧外患叠加，使欧洲陷入越焦虑越内顾、越内顾越被动的困局。然而，保护主义从来不是走出困境的药方。欧洲一体化走到今天，靠的是开放与合作，而非对抗与排斥。欧洲走出经济政治困局，关键在于凝聚内部改革共识、激发创新增长动能、坚持开放合作方向，在公平竞争的市场环境中提升自身竞争力，而非让保护主义和单边主义侵蚀来之不易的合作根基。欧洲能否在变局中实现自我革新，不仅关乎自身前途命运，也将深刻影响多边贸易体系稳定、国际秩序走向及大国博弈格局.