Editorial on Third Plenum Outcomes - New Report on the Implementation Progress of the Global Security Initiative
The front page today is dedicated to the communique following the conclusion of the third plenary session. I covered this in a post yesterday.
I. Editorial on Outcome of Third Plenum
The editorial is available on Page 2. It says:
“The holding of the plenary session highlights the strong determination and strong sense of mission of the Party Central Committee, with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, to carry out reforms to the end. It is a reaffirmation of what flag to raise and what path to take in the new era and on the new journey. This is of great and far-reaching significance for advancing the construction of a strong nation and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation through Chinese-style modernization.” 全会的举行，彰显了以习近平同志为核心的党中央将改革进行到底的坚强决心和强烈使命担当，是对新时代新征程举什么旗、走什么路的再宣示，对以中国式现代化全面推进强国建设、民族复兴伟业具有重大而深远的意义.
“The Decision adopted by the plenary session outlines strategic measures for further comprehensive deepening reform, closely centering on the theme of promoting Chinese-style modernization. It is a programmatic document guiding further comprehensive deepening reform on the new journey, and fully reflects the historical initiative of the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core to improve and develop the socialist system with Chinese characteristics and promote the modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity. The Decision adheres to the correct political direction, focuses on grasping the major institutional and mechanism issues that need to be resolved in promoting Chinese-style modernization. It provides a clear theme and focuses on key priorities; the measures proposed are practical and feasible. It serves as a general mobilisation and overall plan for promoting comprehensive deepening of reform in the new era and on the new journey, and will undoubtedly provide strong momentum and institutional guarantees for Chinese-style modernization.” 全会通过的《决定》，紧紧围绕推进中国式现代化这个主题擘画进一步全面深化改革战略举措，是指导新征程上进一步全面深化改革的纲领性文件，充分体现了以习近平同志为核心的党中央完善和发展中国特色社会主义制度、推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化的历史主动。《决定》坚持正确政治方向，着力抓住推进中国式现代化需要破解的重大体制机制问题谋划改革，主题鲜明，重点突出，举措务实可行，是新时代新征程上推动全面深化改革向广度和深度进军的总动员、总部署，必将为中国式现代化提供强大动力和制度保障.
The next paragraph talks about the “great strides” taken through reform since the 18th Party Congress. The subsequent paragraph says:
“Promoting Chinese-style modernization is an entirely new undertaking, and all kinds of contradictions, risks, and challenges will inevitably be encountered on the way forward. Faced with a complex international and domestic situation, a new round of scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation, and the new expectations of the people, we must continue to push forward the reform. This is an inevitable requirement for upholding and perfecting the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics and promoting the modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity. It is an inevitable requirement for implementing the new development concept and better adapting to the changes in the main contradictions in our society. It is an inevitable requirement to uphold a people-centred approach, ensuring that the fruits of modernization benefit all people more widely and equitably. It is an inevitable requirement for responding to major risks and challenges and promoting the steady and long-term development of the cause of the Party and the country. It is an inevitable requirement to promote the building of a community with a shared future for mankind and win the strategic initiative amid the acceleration of the profound changes unseen in a century. It is an inevitable requirement for deepening the new great project of Party-building in the new era and building a stronger and more powerful Marxist political party. The whole Party must consciously put reform in a more prominent position and forge ahead with courage and determination to achieve the central task of the Party in the new era and on the new journey. 推进中国式现代化是一项全新的事业，前进道路上必然会遇到各种矛盾和风险挑战。面对纷繁复杂的国际国内形势，面对新一轮科技革命和产业变革，面对人民群众新期待，必须继续把改革推向前进。这是坚持和完善中国特色社会主义制度、推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化的必然要求，是贯彻新发展理念、更好适应我国社会主要矛盾变化的必然要求，是坚持以人民为中心、让现代化建设成果更多更公平惠及全体人民的必然要求，是应对重大风险挑战、推动党和国家事业行稳致远的必然要求，是推动构建人类命运共同体、在百年变局加速演进中赢得战略主动的必然要求，是深入推进新时代党的建设新的伟大工程、建设更加坚强有力的马克思主义政党的必然要求。全党必须自觉把改革摆在更加突出位置，为实现新时代新征程党的中心任务踔厉奋发、勇毅前行.
“The ‘Decision’ adopted at this plenary session scientifically plans the overall arrangement for further and comprehensively deepening reform centred around Chinese-style modernization; defines the guiding ideology, general objectives and major principles for further and comprehensively deepening reform; and focuses on deploying major reform measures for the next five years. The overall goal of further comprehensively deepening reform is to continue to improve and develop the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics and promote the modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity. On the new journey, we will fully implement Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era; thoroughly study and implement General Secretary Xi Jinping’s new ideas, new viewpoints, and new propositions on comprehensively deepening reform; summarise and apply the valuable experience of comprehensively deepening reform since reform and opening up, especially in the new era; adhere to the overall leadership of the Party; adhere to the people-centred approach; adhere to the principle of maintaining integrity while making innovations; adhere to institutional construction as the main line; adhere to the comprehensive rule of law; and adhere to the system concept. We will certainly achieve the objectives for 2035, build a high-level socialist market economic system in an all-round way, improve the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, basically modernise the national governance system and governance capacity and basically realise socialist modernization, thereby laying a solid foundation for building a comprehensively modern socialist power by the middle of this century.” 这次全会通过的《决定》科学谋划了围绕中国式现代化进一步全面深化改革的总体部署，明确了进一步全面深化改革的指导思想、总目标、重大原则，重点部署了未来五年的重大改革举措。进一步全面深化改革的总目标是继续完善和发展中国特色社会主义制度，推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化。新征程上，全面贯彻习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想，深入学习贯彻习近平总书记关于全面深化改革的一系列新思想、新观点、新论断，总结和运用改革开放以来特别是新时代全面深化改革的宝贵经验，坚持党的全面领导，坚持以人民为中心，坚持守正创新，坚持以制度建设为主线，坚持全面依法治国，坚持系统观念，我们就一定能实现到2035年的目标，全面建成高水平社会主义市场经济体制，中国特色社会主义制度更加完善，基本实现国家治理体系和治理能力现代化，基本实现社会主义现代化，为到本世纪中叶全面建成社会主义现代化强国奠定坚实基础.
The leadership of the Party is the fundamental guarantee for further deepening reform and promoting Chinese-style modernization. It is necessary to maintain a high degree of consciousness of leading the social revolution with the Party’s self-revolution, adhere to the spirit of reform and strict standards for governing the Party, and ensure that the Party always remains the strong leadership core for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics. It is necessary to uphold the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee in further deepening reform, implement reform with the spirit of nails, and transform the strategic deployment of further deepening reform into a powerful force for promoting Chinese-style modernization.” 党的领导是进一步全面深化改革、推进中国式现代化的根本保证。必须保持以党的自我革命引领社会革命的高度自觉，坚持用改革精神和严的标准管党治党，确保党始终成为中国特色社会主义事业的坚强领导核心。要坚持党中央对进一步全面深化改革的集中统一领导，以钉钉子精神抓好改革落实，把进一步全面深化改革的战略部署转化为推进中国式现代化的强大力量.
The final paragraph reiterates the slogans of the Two Establishments, Two Safeguards, four consciousnesses and four self-confidences.
II. GSI Centre and Progress Report
On Page 3, there’s a report informing of the establishment of the new Center for Global Security Initiative Studies. Wang Yi sent his written remarks at this event. China established the Center for Global Security Initiative Studies, which is based on the China Institute of International Studies, to improve research in relevant fields, serve the initiative’s implementation, and contribute more to world peace and security, said Wang. More than 110 ambassadors and representatives from more than 80 countries and international regional organisations, as well as more than 70 representatives from various ministries and Chinese experts and scholars attended the event.
In addition, the China Institute of International Studies and the Center for Global Security Initiative Studies issued a new Report on the Implementation Progress of the Global Security Initiative. This is a rather long document. Let me try and do a detailed summation.
The document says that GSI has received support and appreciation from more than 100 countries as well as international and regional organisations. The initiative and its core concepts have been incorporated into more than 90 bilateral and multilateral documents on exchanges and cooperation between China and other countries and international organisations.
The second section identifies 20 areas where GSI has had an impact. These are the same 20 areas outlined in the GSI Concept Paper. However, the first point that the section begins with is how GSI has rallied “international consensus for safeguarding world peace and stability.” The text under this basically carries quotes from world leaders and prominent individuals. The import of this is discourse power or narrative building.
Anyway, the 20 areas mentioned are:
Supporting the UN in playing a greater role in global security affairs: This discusses China’s engagements at the UNSC; much of the text, however, discusses peacekeeping. It says that since the launch of GSI, China has deployed over 4100 troops in nine batches and more than 150 peacekeeping staff officers and military observers on 7 missions. It adds that as of 2023, China has allocated $8 million to the Peace and Security Trust Fund of the UN, launching 83 projects.
Major country diplomacy: Under this, the paper discusses ties with Russia, Europe and the US. On Russia, the conclusion is that engagements since 2022 exemplify “high levels of coordination.” With regard to Europe, the document says that the region holds “strategic significance” and “global influence”. It adds that the EU “seeks to be a trustworthy and reliable partner to China, eager to bolster mutual understanding and deepen collaboration across a range of sectors.” There is really no recognition of any frictions with Europe. On the US, the document says that China is committed to maintaining “healthy and stable” ties and acknowledges that there are “significant challenges” in the relationship. The text then talks about the two recent conversations between Xi and Biden and mentions resumption of multiple dialogues since the San Francisco meeting.
Maintaining strategic stability: In this, the document says that China wants to develop an “equitable, cooperative and mutually beneficial global nuclear security architecture to preserve strategic stability and mitigate risks.” It talks about China’s approach to the NPT. Then, this is an important point: “In recent years, China has continuously called on nuclear-weapons states to negotiate and conclude a treaty on mutual no-first use of nuclear weapons, and advocated negotiations of an international legal instrument providing negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapons states.” The document also criticises “detrimental practices” like “nuclear sharing”, “extended deterrence” and the AUKUS submarine deal. The final bit is about support for the creation of nuclear free zones. While on this subject, let me share this recent report: “China suspends nuclear talks with US over arms sales to Taiwan”. What this decision tells us is that Beijing’s approach on some of this is not principled but political.
Promoting global arms control and disarmament: Under this, the document talks about China’s positions on the BWC and CWC. It also talks about China’s engagement with regard to other international arms treaties and protocols. It also mentions the Pure Homeland-2023 exercise with ASEAN. Chinese troops in this regard were engaged in clearing a total of 3,000 ammunition debris and 13 pieces of unexploded ordnance.
Promoting political settlement of international and regional hotspot issues: This talks about China’s engagement with regard to the Ukraine war. It mentions the position paper, trips by Special Representative Li Hui, and China’s donation of 200,000 euros to IAEA to “bolster its technical assistance for safeguarding nuclear safety and security at Ukraine’s nuclear facilities.” Then the document talks about China’s diplomacy and engagement on the Gaza issue. On Afghanistan, it reiterated the importance of building a “broad-based and inclusive political structure” and to “remove the ground that breeds terrorism.” It also mentions the position paper on Afghanistan that was released and engagements by the special envoy. In addition, the document talks about China’s “dual-track approach and the principle of phased on synchronised actions” with regard to the Korean Peninsula issue; on Myanmar, it says that China’s diplomacy and mediation resulted in three armed groups in northern Myanmar holding peace talks in Kunming and agreeing to a ceasefire; and China’s engagement with regard to the JCPOA.
Supporting and improving ASEAN-centred regional security cooperation: This says that the two sides have “made progress” in security cooperation, through joint drills and expert exchanges in counter-terrorism, military medicine, peacekeeping, humanitarian and disaster relief and cyber security, etc. It adds: “China has also provided assistance to ASEAN countries in areas such as military medicine services, military education, material and equipment aid, and demining…” Other areas that are mentioned are food security, health, non-traditional security (there’s a 2024-28 plan on this), telecom frauds and illegal gambling. It then mentions the South China Sea issue, without pointing to any substantive progress. After this, it mentions LMC cooperation, specifically highlighting criminal activities, like telecom fraud and illegal gambling, and disaster management, climate change response, etc. It also says that starting from 2023, police across China, Thailand, Myanmar and Laos launched a joint operation, targeting cross-border crime, particularly dealing with telecom fraud and online gambling rings.
Maintaining and promoting security in the Middle East: It says that China wants to “contribute positively and constructively to the development of a new security framework in the Middle East.” This was more clearly articulated by Wang Yi at the Second Middle East Security Forum in 2022. He made four proposals: “First, uphold the new vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. We should uphold the vision of common security, pay attention to the reasonable security concerns of all countries, and should not seek unilateral absolute security. Second, clarify the dominant position of the Middle East countries. The people of the Middle East are the masters of the future and destiny of the region, and the Middle East security affairs should be in the hands of the Middle East countries. Third, abide by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Fourth, strengthen dialogue on regional security.” In essence, this architecture should embody the spirit of independence and self-reliance for Middle East countries while aligning with regional realities and accommodating the interests of all stakeholders. The document also talks about China’s regional diplomacy, and the “China-facilitated” improvement of ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It says that this kick-started a “wave of reconciliation” in the region, with Syria returning to the Arab family and Egypt normalising ties with Turkey, Qatar doing so with Bahrain and UAE and Iran doing so with Sudan. On the Gaza issue, it mentions China’s diplomacy and the adoption of the UNSC resolution when China was the chair.
Supporting African countries in strengthening their own capacities for maintaining peace: Under this, the document talks about the nine programs under FOCAC. It also mentions China hosting the China-Africa Peace and Security Forums in 2022 and 2023, which boosted defence communication. It says that the implementation of the Outlook on Peace and Development in the Horn of Africa has yielded “significant results”. It also mentions Chinese provision of equipment, training and supplies to countries in Africa along with peacekeeping operations. This is very low on specifics. For instance, there are no details on arms sales or security infrastructure building.
Supporting Latin American and Caribbean countries in maintaining regional peace and security: This talks about China’s opposition to the US’ external interference in Venezuela and its sanctions and the “bullying” of Cuba. It mentions the signing of defense exchanges in the context of China-CELAC Forum. Even in Latin America, the document talks about establishing a “new security framework.” It says that in 2023 the defence departments of the 24 Latin American and Caribbean countries gathered together at a forum to agree to implement GSI. In July 2023, the first-ever China-Latin America and Caribbean Forum of Directors of National Defense Universities and Institutes was held. In December 2023, the first-ever China-Latin America and Caribbean Military Medicine Forum was held. In April 2022, a decision was taken to establish a new China-Caribbean Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Fund. In August 2022, the first China-CELAC Ministerial Forum for Disaster Management and Cooperation was held. In March 2023, the groundbreaking ceremony for the China-Aid Centre for Food and Entrepreneurship Project was held in Barbados.
Supporting Pacific Island Countries in addressing global challenges: This says that the China-PIC Centre for Disaster Risk Reduction Cooperation was opened in February 2023. It also mentions cooperation in the blue economy, disaster prevention and mitigation, climate change related issues and medical cooperation. What is interesting is that there is no mention of law-enforcement or hard security cooperation in this section. One can only imagine that this was a deliberate decision, given the controversies that this has generated.
Supporting maritime and cross-border river exchange and cooperation: This says that China has established maritime consultation mechanisms with countries like US, France, ROK, Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. It also talks about China’s engagement with regard to the issue of privacy through sending missions to the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia. It mentions a seminar held on security issues related to the Gulf of Guinea and several other Chinese initiatives, which aren’t necessarily new.
Fostering and engaging in global counter-terrorism collaboration: China supports the UN’s “pivotal and coordinating” function on the issue of dealing with terrorism. The document mentions a September 2023 counter-terrorism capacity building course launched in Togo. This was funded by the China-UN Peace and Development Fund. In September 2022, China and the UAE held the first meeting of their consultation mechanism on counter-terrorism and deradicalisation cooperation. In June 2023, the first trilateral counter-terrorism dialogue was held between China, Pakistan and Iran. It was decided to institutionalise this mechanism. The document also talks about China’s diplomacy on the issue at BRICS, SCO, etc. It also informs that in December 2023, the Southern Theatre Command of the PLA hosted the first China-Arab Countries Special Forces Counter-terrorism Seminar in Guangzhou.
Deepening international collaboration in the field of information security: Well, as per the document, China wants a “peaceful, secure, open and cooperative” cyberspace and is against “militarisation, fragmentation and polarisation.” The National Computer Network Emergency Response Technical Team (CNCERT) has engaged with 289 organisations across 83 countries and regions, signing cyber security agreements with 33 institutions. The document also mentions the Global Initiative on Data Security, which has eventually resulted in data security cooperation deals with Arab and Central Asian countries.
Strengthening biological security risk management: This mentions China’s position on the BWC, the adoption of the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Code of Conduct for Scientists, and China’s building of a biosafety facility in Sierra Leone and a facility at the African Centre for Disease Control and Prevention. In November 2023, the Wuhan Institute of Virology hosted the 7th International Training Course of Biosafety Laboratory Management and Technology.
Enhancing international security governance in AI and other emerging areas: This basically mentions the Global AI Governance Initiative and China’s engagement at multilateral forums.
Strengthening international cooperation in outer space: China has so far signed 170 international space cooperation agreements with more than 50 countries. It mentions the ILRS and says that China’s space station is open to participation from all UN members. It also says that China “opposes the weaponisation of and an arms race in space”.
Actively participating in global public health governance: This mentions China’s pandemic diplomacy and some bilateral health diplomacy initiatives.
Maintaining global food and energy security: This says that China has proposed the International Food Security Cooperation Initiative. One goal of this is to “avoid politicisation and weaponisation” of food security issues. It also mentions the BRICS Strategy on Food Security. It says that China provided emergency food assistance to 17 African countries in 2022. In 2023, another round of emergency food assistance covered 25 countries, with China supplying 40,000 tons of various types of food. There’s also mention of energy security in this, but it is short on details.
Combating transnational crime: It says that starting from 2024, China will increase its contribution to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to $2 million. It says that China has established annual meeting mechanisms on anti-drug cooperation with 13 countries and 5 multilateral mechanisms. It also mentions law-enforcement cooperation and the establishment of hotlines, along with some specific operations.
Promoting sustainable security through sustainable development: This covers a range of issues, from GDI cooperation, to supply chain agreements and even China’s position on peaceful use of nuclear energy.
The third section of the document talks about the platforms and mechanisms for implementing GSI. The first two points of this cover the UN, SCO, BRICS, CICA and China-Central Asia Summit. One interesting tool noted in this is the Group of Friends in Defense of the Charter of the United Nations. This came to be in 2021. Other forums mentioned are the Boao Forum for Asia, the Beijing Xiangshan Forum, the Lianyungang Forum, China-Africa Peace and Security Forum, and the Middle East Security Forum. The document offers a decent wrap of what happened at the meetings of these forums.
The fourth point in this section informs that in the past two years, China has carried out training of over 2,000 officials from developing countries on issues related to non-traditional security. Under BRI, a new cooperation mechanism has been established on disaster prevention, mitigation and emergency management. In addition, a host of different dialogues, ranging from counter-terrorism, data security, technology governance are mentioned. China has also signed 50 South-South cooperation documents on climate change with 41 countries, carried out more than 70 projects on climate mitigation and adaptation, and held 58 South-South cooperation training courses on climate change, training 2400 officials and technical personnel from 140 countries.