Employment for Graduates - Opening Up of Nansha District - China's Decade of Industrial & IT Development - Chen Xiaodong on BRICS Expansion - Le Yucheng Shifted to NRTA
Before we get to today’s edition, I’d like to share my piece published in the Times of India today - on the second anniversary of the Galwan Valley clash, which led to the first loss of life along the LAC in 45 years. You can read the final version on TOI’s website, linked in the tweet below. Since, the piece is paywalled, I am also sharing the draft article at the end of today’s edition.
Here are the stories and pieces that I found noteworthy in the Wednesday, June 15, 2022, edition of the People’s Daily.
Page 1: The top story on the page is about promoting employment for graduates. The piece begins with Xi’s recent visit to Yibin University in Sichuan, where he spoke about the issue. The article says:
“Especially since the COVID-19 pandemic, the employment situation of college graduates has been severe and complex. The number of graduates has increased from 8.74 million in 2020 to 9.09 million in 2021, and then to 10.76 million in 2022. The task of ‘stabilising employment’ and ‘ensuring employment’ is extremely arduous. General Secretary Xi Jinping has made a series of important instructions, stressing the need to ‘make overall plans for graduation, recruitment, examination and other related work, so that they can graduate smoothly and get employment as soon as possible’. Party committees, governments and all sectors of society at all levels should earnestly do a good job in the employment of college graduates, take effective measures to overcome the adverse effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, do everything possible to help college graduates find jobs, and enthusiastically support college graduates to make contributions to the party and the people in their respective jobs.’ General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important remarks have not only provided a fundamental guideline for employment but have also reassured graduates...Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the main responsibility of employment has been increasingly consolidated; high-quality college enrolment expansion has been carried out in a targeted manner; policy-based and market-based opportunities have been fully developed; employment guidance services have been meticulous and practical, and special assistance to those facing employment difficulties has been carefully and lovingly provided…Under the care and planning of General Secretary Xi Jinping, every effort has been made to help college graduates find jobs, bringing together the majestic joint force of the whole society.” 特别是新冠肺炎疫情发生以来，高校毕业生就业面临严峻复杂的形势，毕业生人数从2020届的874万人到2021届的909万人，再到2022届的1076万人，“稳就业”“保就业”任务十分艰巨。习近平总书记作出一系列重要指示批示，强调要“统筹做好毕业、招聘、考录等相关工作，让他们顺利毕业、尽早就业”。“各级党委、政府和社会各界要切实做好高校毕业生就业工作，采取有效措施，克服新冠肺炎疫情带来的不利影响，千方百计帮助高校毕业生就业，热情支持高校毕业生在各自工作岗位上为党和人民建功立业。”习近平总书记的重要讲话，不仅为就业工作提供了根本遵循，也让广大高校毕业生倍感温暖、内心坚定。志不求易者成，事不避难者进。新冠肺炎疫情发生以来，就业工作主体责任日趋压实，高质量升学扩招精准实施，政策性岗位和市场性岗位全力开拓落实，就业指导服务做细做实，对就业困难群体的特殊帮扶精心、暖心……一枝一叶总关情. 在习近平总书记的关心部署下，千方百计帮助高校毕业生就业，已汇聚起全社会的磅礴合力.
After this the piece talks about innovative actions taken to provide better employment opportunities. For instance, during the ‘Employment Promotion Week’ organised by the Ministry of Education in May this year, colleges and universities in various regions held more than 17,000 online and offline job fairs. Another example is that given that there will be 10 million plus graduates this year, the secretaries and principals at colleges and universities have been visiting enterprises to promote recruitment. So far, folks from “2,169 colleges and universities have visited 58,000 employers through field visits and video conferences, resulting in the creation of 1.149 million jobs and 440,000 internship opportunities for graduates.” 目前已有2169所高校通过实地走访、视频会议等方式，拜访5.8万家用人单位，为毕业生拓展岗位达114.9万个、实习岗位达44万个.
Anyway, there’s more in the piece along similar lines about campus recruitment, entrepreneurship promotion and supporting the most vulnerable, etc.
Next, there’s the Guangdong chapter in the series on following Xi’s footprints.
Third, a report (English report) about a new State Council issued plan to promote comprehensive cooperation among Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao by further deepening opening-up in Nansha district. The plan’s goals are:
By 2025, Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao joint scientific and technological innovation systems and mechanisms in Nansha will be further improved, industrial cooperation will be deepened and regional innovation and industrial transformation systems will be preliminarily established. High-quality public resources on education and medical care will be pooled at a faster pace, enabling Nansha to attract youth from Hong Kong and Macao to live and work.
By 2035, the regional innovation and industrial transformation system will become more mature, and the capability to transfer and transform international scientific and technological achievements will be significantly enhanced. World-leading public services will be achieved and the world-class business environment will be further improved so as to play a leading role in the Greater Bay Area’s participation in international cooperation and competition.
To achieve this, the plan outlines five tasks:
First, build industrial cooperation bases for science and technology innovation. This will entail:
Encouraging research institutions in Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao to organise and implement scientific and technological innovation projects and make breakthroughs in key and core technologies.
Eligible private equity funds from Hong Kong will be supported to finance Hong Kong-invested innovative technology enterprises founded in Nansha.
Major platforms on sci-tech innovation should be created with more world-class research universities and institutions in place.
Efforts will be made to foster high-tech industries including levying enterprise income tax at a reduced rate of 15 percent for enterprises in sectors encouraged
Second, create a youth entrepreneurship and employment cooperation platform. This entails:
Special support measures for talents from Hong Kong and Macao in talent introduction, equity incentive, technology investment, professional title evaluation, professional qualification recognition, children’s education and commercial medical insurance.
Cooperation platforms on startups and employment for youth will be established, and a slew of measures will be adopted to encourage existing business incubation bases to provide and expand room for entrepreneurship and employment specifically for young people in Hong Kong and Macao.
Businesses started by eligible residents from Hong Kong and Macao in Nansha can enjoy equal support policies such as start-up guaranteed loans and discounted interest as local businesses.
Third, pursue high-level opening-up. This entails:
Encouraging Chinese enterprises going global
Encouraging foreign economic and trade cooperation
Building an international shipping and logistics hub
Fourth, creating a world-class business environment. This entails:
Promoting connectivity in financial markets
Improving the coordination between public services and social management
Fifth, making Nansha a model for high-quality urban development.
Page 2: There’s a report drawing from a press briefing, which is among the many briefings on China’s Ten Years that have been arranged. This one had Xin Guobin, vice minister of industry and information technology, talking about achievements in industrial and information technology over the past ten years.
Global Times has an English report on this. It says:
“Xin noted that from 2012 to 2021, China's value-added industrial output grew from 20.9 trillion yuan ($3.1 trillion) to 37.3 trillion yuan, with an average annual growth rate of 6.3 percent, much higher than the 2 percent of the annual growth of global industrial added value during the previous period. Manufacturing value-added output increased from 16.98 trillion yuan to 31.4 trillion yuan, accounting for nearly 30 percent of total global output, according to the official. The country now boasts a complete industrial system, with 41 major industrial categories, 207 medium industrial categories and 666 small industrial categories. The resilience and competitiveness of China's industrial and supply chains continue to improve, effectively enhancing the ability of the national economy to cope with external shocks, Xin noted.”
Also:
“Over the past ten years, China has seen accelerated development of emerging industries, including service robots, intelligent wearable equipment and other products. The production and sales of new energy vehicles have ranked first in the world for seven consecutive years, and the output value of new materials industry doubled. According to Xin, the proportion of high-tech manufacturing and equipment manufacturing to industrial value-added rose from 9.4 percent and 28 percent in 2012 to 15.1 percent and 32.4 percent in 2021, respectively. China has built the world's largest and technologically advanced network infrastructure, with 5G cell phone users reaching 413 million over the past ten years, Han Xia, another official from the MIIT said, noting that 5G, big data, cloud computing, artificial intelligence and other advanced technologies have been deeply integrated with the manufacturing industry. Over the past decade, a number of super projects have emerged in China, such as the "Fuxing" high-speed trains, the Baihetan hydroelectric power station and the C919 large aircraft, which is an important symbol of a country's comprehensive strength and technological progress.”
He added: “The number of industrial enterprises listed in the world’s top 500 list has reached 73; the assets of industrial enterprises above designated size have doubled, and more than 40,000 ‘special, refined and new’ SMEs have been set up, 4,762 ‘little giant’ enterprises have been established, and there are 848 individual manufacturing champions. The total R&D investment intensity of industrial enterprises above designated size has doubled…” 入围世界500强企业的工业企业达到73家，规模以上工业企业资产规模实现翻番，已培育4万多家“专精特新”中小企业、4762家“小巨人”企业、848家制造业单项冠军企业。规模以上工业企业研发经费总额投入强度成倍提升，新产品销售收入占业务收入比重从11.9%提高到22.4%，570多家工业企业入围全球研发投入2500强.
Also, this datapoint is useful: “In 2021, the total number of private individuals employed in China reached 400 million, an increase of more than 200 million over 2012. Private enterprises, mainly small, medium and micro enterprises, are the largest foreign trade operators in China, and contributed more than 58.2% to the growth of foreign trade in 2021.” 2021年我国私营个体就业总数达到4亿人，较2012年增加2亿多人. 以中小微为主的民营企业是我国第一大外贸经营主体，2021年对外贸增长贡献度超过58.2%.
Page 3: The Yang Jiechi-Jake Sullivan conversation is covered on the page. I covered this in yesterday’s edition.
There’s a piece by Chen Xiaodong, China’s ambassador to South Africa. Chen talks about different aspects of BRICS cooperation.
On security, he emphasises “consolidating the BRICS strategic partnership, supporting each other on issues involving each other’s core interests, and jointly safeguarding sovereignty, security, and development interests.” He adds that “President Xi Jinping has put forward the Global Security Initiative, which calls for common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security and points out ways to bridge the peace deficit and solve the global security dilemma. This has been widely welcomed by the international community. The international community expects BRICS countries to deepen mutual political trust, expand security cooperation, strengthen international coordination, and jointly speak out against hegemonism and power politics, reject the Cold War mentality and bloc confrontation, and jointly build a community of security for mankind.” 当今世界各种传统和非传统安全威胁层出不穷，习近平主席提出全球安全倡议，强调要坚持共同、综合、合作、可持续的安全观，为弥补和平赤字、破解全球安全困境指明方法路径，受到国际社会广泛欢迎。国际社会期待金砖国家深化政治互信，扩大安全合作，密切国际协调，共同发出反对霸权主义和强权政治、抵制冷战思维和集团对抗、共建人类安全共同体的时代强音.
On development issues, Chen argues that “it is more important than ever to strengthen solidarity and cooperation among emerging markets and developing countries.” He then talks about the Global Development Initiative and that “China is ready to work with other countries, including BRICS countries, to accelerate the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development…”
This paragraph is important:
“With the key of multilateralism, we can solve the challenge of unilateralism and expand the BRICS ‘circle of friends’. In the face of complex and severe global challenges, the world needs to adhere to true multilateralism more than ever before. In responding to the call of the times, BRICS countries need to demonstrate their responsibility, hold high the banner of multilateralism, push all parties to abide by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, safeguard the UN-centered international system and the international order based on international law, and at the same time initiate the process of BRICS’ expansion as soon as possible, actively expand BRICS+ cooperation, establish broader and closer partnership, push the international order towards a more just and rational direction, and strive to build a community of shared future for mankind.” 以多边主义之钥，破解单边主义挑战，拓展金砖“朋友圈”。面对复杂严峻的全球性挑战，世界比以往任何时候都更需要坚持真正的多边主义。面对时代呼唤，金砖国家需要展现担当，高举多边主义旗帜，推动各方恪守联合国宪章宗旨和原则，维护以联合国为核心的国际体系和以国际法为基础的国际秩序，同时尽快启动金砖国家扩员进程，积极拓展“金砖+”合作，建立更广泛、更紧密的伙伴关系，推动国际秩序朝着更加公正合理的方向发展，努力推动构建人类命运共同体.
Two other reports on the page that are worth noting. First, a forum for trilateral cooperation among China, Japan and South Korea was held in Seoul. This was held by the Seoul-based Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat. Xinhua reports:
“Chinese Ambassador to South Korea Xing Haiming said in his address that China, Japan and South Korea are not only close neighbours facing each other across the sea, but also countries with important influence on the region and the world. Looking ahead, trilateral cooperation among the three countries, on the current basis, should be deepened and advanced in the direction of maintaining lasting peace, realizing common prosperity in the region and building a shared culture in East Asia, Xing noted.”
Second, comments (English report) by Li Chenggang, China’s Ambassador to the WTO, during the WTO's 12th Ministerial Conference. He talks about tackling plastic pollution.
Page 4: First, Wang Chen’s remarks at a seminar in Beijing on the in-depth study, research and interpretation of Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law.
Wang said that “It is necessary to deeply understand the scientific, truthful and pioneering nature of Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law, and the historical, theoretical and practical logic contained in it, so as to further strengthen confidence and determination to take the path of socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics.” 要深刻领悟习近平法治思想的科学性、真理性、开创性，深刻领悟其中蕴含的历史逻辑、理论逻辑、实践逻辑，进一步坚定我们走中国特色社会主义法治道路的信心和决心.
He called for more research based on Xi’s thought on rule of law, and added that it is necessary to integrate the idea of Xi’s thought on rule of law into legal research and school education, do a good job of incorporating it into textbooks, classrooms, and minds, and train more socialist rule of law professionals…” 要把法治思想融入法学研究和学校教育，做好进教材、进课堂、进头脑工作，努力培养更多社会主义法治人才，在全面依法治国新征程中展现新作为.
Second, there’s a report about Hu Chunhua’s comments calling for learning and implementation of Xi’s discourses on the three rural issues as being “a major political task.” Hu is referring to the new compilation of Xi’s discourses on the three rural issues - 论“三农”工作. Noting that Xi's discourses provide an action plan and fundamental guidance for work concerning agriculture, rural areas and farmers, Hu called for efforts to study them in various forms, at multiple levels and with full coverage.
Former Xinjiang Party chief Chen Quanguo was present at the meeting in the capacity of the new deputy head of the Central Rural Work Leading Group.
Third, there’s a report from yesterday’s briefing on the COVID situation in Beijing. A team has been formed comprising members from six departments to investigate the Heaven Supermarket Bar outbreak. Pan Xuhong, deputy director of the city's Public Security Bureau, said that police have also launched a criminal investigation into the person in charge of the bar on suspected interference with epidemic prevention.
Fourth, the situation in Shanghai is much better than Beijing. Zhao Dandan said yesterday that most designated COVID-19 hospitals in the city will revert to their normal operations after environmental disinfection and quarantine of medical staff are carried out.
Fifth, a report (English report) about changes in appointments by the State Council.
Le Yucheng was appointed deputy head of the National Radio and Television Administration and no longer serves as vice foreign minister.
Zhang Biyong was appointed president of Science and Technology Daily.
Qiu Qiwen was removed from the post of vice minister of ecology and environment, and Ren Hongbin no longer serves as deputy head of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council.
Tang Jun was removed from the deputy head of the State Administration for Market Regulation post, while Pei Jinjia no longer serves as deputy head of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council.
Zhao Changhua no longer holds the post as deputy head of the National Immigration Administration.
Quick thought: There’s been a lot of buzz about Le’s future in the past few days. I don’t really have a serious view on this; my understanding of the personnel shifts across bureaucracies still leaves a lot to be desired. But, for what it’s worth, my instinct is that there is a lot of over-interpretation going on in terms of this being indicative of displeasure with Le’s foreign policy work. There has been no dissonance between his comments or engagements with what we have heard and seen from others in the foreign policy and propaganda ecosystem in the recent past. Also, I think that he is not that high up in the pecking order for his position career shifts to indicate a potential policy shift.
Anyway, here’s what SCMP’s report on this says:
“Career diplomat Le is seen as an unusual choice for the NRTA – which oversees state broadcasting in China – particularly as he had been tipped as a potential successor to Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Le had been in charge of daily operations at the foreign ministry, a role he has had since 2018. The appointment could also mean he has to retire when he turns 60 next year – the official retirement age for vice-ministerial roles…Le’s departure from the foreign ministry also raises the question of who will succeed Wang as foreign minister. Wang is expected to leave the ministry after two five-year terms. Liu Jieyi, a veteran diplomat and head of the Taiwan Affairs Office, and Ma Zhaoxu, who now ranks first among the foreign vice-ministers, are front runners, along with Liu Haixing, deputy director of the National Security Commission’s general office.”
On Le’s shift, the report adds: “His move to the NRTA comes as Beijing is trying to strengthen its position in a narrative war with Washington and its allies. Le does not have experience in media or propaganda, but in recent years he has more regularly made public statements on China’s diplomatic stance. That includes defending China’s position on the war in Ukraine – Beijing has refused to condemn Russia’s actions or to call it an invasion and has criticised Western sanctions on Moscow.
In Bloomberg’s report, Neil Thomas is quoted as saying “Beijing’s decision to remove Le from the foreign affairs system could reflect concern among Communist Party leaders that China has become too close to Russia, whose invasion of Ukraine has damaged ties with the West and weakened the global economy, and now needs foreign ministry leaders more adept at managing relations with the United States and European Union…However, the opacity of Chinese elite politics makes it impossible to know the exact reasons for Le’s move.”
The report adds: “Under traditional retirement rules, the country’s top diplomatic official, Politburo member Yang Jiechi, 72, would be expected to step down. That opens the possibility for Wang, who also holds the title of state counselor, to take up Yang’s more senior role leading the party’s foreign affairs commission. The move will increase scrutiny on other contenders, including Liu Jieyi, the head of the Taiwan Affairs Office, and Liu Haixing, an official with Xi’s National Security Commission. Earlier this month, Liu Jianchao, was named as the head of the party’s International Liaison Department, which interacts with overseas political parties.”
Sixth, the first plenary meeting of the 13th Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region Committee elected Liang Yanshun as the party secretary.
Page 9: On the theory page, the lead article is by the Shandong Research Center for Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. It talks about Xi’s thought being the crystallisation of the essence of Chinese civilization and Marxism.
Page 13: A report on measures announced in Hebei to support employment. Among other things, this includes a one-time job-seeking and entrepreneurship subsidy of 2,000 yuan per person to promote their employment and entrepreneurship. Another report that informs that Shanxi plans to build 55000 affordable housing units during the 14th FYP.
Page 15: On the international page, the lead story is critical about the recent Summit of the Americas. The piece calls the summit a “diplomatic nightmare,” and criticises US policies in Latin America.
Today’s Piece in TOI
Two years ago, the Galwan valley clash came amid a period of intense Chinese People’s Liberation Army activity across different theatres. In March 2020, as the WHO declared COVID-19 as a global pandemic, Chinese jets intensified drills along the Taiwan Strait. The Liaoning carrier conducted takeoff and landing exercises in the Bohai Strait and would later sail past Taiwan. The PLA Daily hailed the drills, boasting about war preparedness amid the pandemic. In late March, Chinese vessels would collide with a Japanese destroyer. This was followed by the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat near the Paracel islands. The Chinese government would then establish two new districts in Sansha City on Woody Island, and later, for the first time since 1983, Chinese authorities issued standard names for 80 features around the Spratly and Paracel Island chains.
Within this backdrop, the PLA’s decision to forcefully alter the status quo along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India in late April wasn’t an aberration. It was likely part of a coordinated effort to push the envelope on territorial disputes. Whether this effort was driven by insecurity owing to domestic challenges amid the pandemic or opportunism stemming from the myopic hubris of having successfully contained COVID-19 remains unclear. Perhaps, it was a mix of both. Chinese foreign and security policies often are products of a rather peculiar interplay of insecurity and confidence. Either way, it is evident that the aggression, which has sustained along its periphery, has not necessarily engendered stability in China’s external environment nor has it enhanced the leadership’s sense of security. In fact, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that it has resulted in the opposite.
For starters, despite 15 rounds of commander-level talks, the standoff in Eastern Ladakh persists. Both India and China have significantly stepped up deployment across the LAC. Beijing has also increased investments and accelerated military infrastructure development in the Western Theatre. While this militarisation of the LAC disproportionately burdens India, there is a significant cost for China to bear too. Tensions in Eastern Ladakh have cast a shadow over all aspects of the India-China relationship. While bilateral trade has continued to sustain, strategic and security concerns have gained much more weightage in India’s economic and technology policies. New Delhi’s deepening engagement with the Quad along with its participation in the new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework are examples of this.
Across the Indo-Pacific, meanwhile, Chinese official statements and media commentaries suggest that there is greater anxiety in Beijing about the threat of containment. China views the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy as a trap aimed at accelerating bloc confrontation. However, in this very narrow, US-focussed approach, it has failed to reflect on and adjust its own policies that have led to resentment across the region. This was evident in South Korea’s growing interest in the Quad, as it was in remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at the Shangri-La Dialogue, expressing concern over the “severe” security environment surrounding the country and committing to expanding defence capabilities. At the same event, Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles called for “reassuring statecraft” from China and respect for rules on norms in its exercise for power.
However, Beijing’s actions do not suggest that it is paying heed to these concerns. The opacity surrounding the recent China-Solomon Islands security agreement, dangerous provocations by Chinese jets in the South China Sea, amplification of Russian disinformation amid the Ukraine war and reported assertion that the Taiwan Strait should not be treated as international waters are indicative of this. Instead, China appears to be intensifying its diplomacy towards the developing world, particularly in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Global Development Initiative and new Global Security Initiative are steps in that direction. Whether these will materialise into tangible successes remains to be seen. However, it is worth noting that China’s abandonment of Sri Lanka in its present hour of need is likely to hurt its credibility with the developing world.
So what is driving this evidently strategically counter-productive behaviour? To understand this, one perhaps has to return to the framework of the interplay between insecurity and confidence. Foreign policy is not divorced from domestic political priorities; rather it is an extension of the latter. Xi Jinping’s rise came amid increasing concern about existential challenges facing the Communist Party. In response, he not only concentrated power and securitised all key policy domains but has also infused the Party and society with ideological vigour. Such an environment engenders a siege mentality, policy rigidity and restricts experimentation and adaptability. The strict adherence to the zero-COVID policy regardless of the economic costs is an example of this. In addition, under Xi, the Chinese leadership increasingly believes that while ideological contestation and great power rivalry is deepening, China’s enhanced comprehensive national power still provides it significant opportunities and options to pursue national interests. In other words, the so-called window of strategic opportunities has narrowed but it’s not entirely shut. More importantly, the belief appears to be that the window would narrow far more quickly unless Beijing actively exercises power to shape the external environment.
For India, this means that stability in the relationship with China will remain difficult to achieve.