Gangs & 'Evil' Forces, Tibet White Paper, Employment Pressure, China-Pak Ties a 'Precious Treasure,' & 'Little Red Preachers' of the Long March
Here are the stories and pieces from the People’s Daily’s May 21, 2021, edition that I found noteworthy. In addition, I’ve done a breakdown of the new Tibet White Paper released by the State Council today.
Page 1: The Central Committee and State Council issued a new document on the struggle against the triads and “evil” forces. It calls for the Party to:
“accurately grasp the new trends of crimes involving black and evil, and constantly strengthen the supervision and special rectification of industry, combine this with anti-corruption campaign by swatting flies and strengthen the construction of grass-roots organizations, constantly improve the social governance system led by party committees…” 准确掌握涉黑涉恶犯罪新动向，不断加强行业领域监管和专项整治，与反腐“拍蝇”、加强基层组织建设结合起来，不断完善党委领导...
Here’s more:
“focus on tackling both the symptoms and root causes of outstanding problems and chaos in financial lending, engineering construction, transportation, market circulation, natural resources, ecological environment, cultural tourism, education and health, information network and social security, constantly consolidate grassroots organizations, and continuously prevent and rectify problems such as interference and erosion by evil forces such as ‘village tyrants’ and serious influence of family and clan forces.” 持续开展专项整治，全面加强行业领域监管，重点对金融放贷、工程建设、交通运输、市场流通、自然资源、生态环境、文化旅游、教育卫生、信息网络和社会治安等行业领域存在的突出问题和乱象进行标本兼治，不断夯实基层组织，持续防范和整治“村霸”等黑恶势力干扰侵蚀、家族宗族势力影响严重等问题。
The piece then talks about the need to ensure adequate reporting of the challenges at the grassroots levels. This is interesting in that it informs of the push-and-pull dynamic between central-local and even provincial-local Party groups. There’s also talk about reworking incentives to ensure that local officials actually prioritise this effort of tackling triads, criminal gangs and interest groups. In essence, it’s not all sticks.
The piece calls to “incorporate the fight against evil into the evaluation system for the construction of (Ping An) Safe China, as an important basis for the selection and recognition of the construction of Safe China; report and praise the regions, units and individuals with outstanding achievements, report and supervise the backward places that dare not fight, do not really fight and do not fight deeply; listen to the evaluation of the masses, strive to serve the people, and promote the establishment and improvement of the accountability and investigation mechanism for crimes committed by evil forces.” 将扫黑除恶斗争纳入平安中国建设考评体系，作为平安中国建设评选表彰的重要依据，对成绩突出的地区、单位和个人进行通报表扬，对不敢打、不真打、不深打的后进地方重点通报督办，倾听群众评价，致力问效于民，推动建立健全黑恶势力违法犯罪问责倒查机制。
In saying this, there is also a clear division of responsibility. So leading Party and government members should personally be engaged in supporting the fight and breaking “protective umbrella” networks. The “main responsible comrades of the political and legal organs at all levels are directly responsible for the fight against criminals and evil. The higher-level political and legal organs should strengthen supervision and inspection…” Also, “the main responsible comrades of the regulatory departments in various industries and fields are the first responsible persons for the governance of specific industries.”
An interview with an unidentified official from the National Anti-Vice (全国扫黑办) Office regarding this document is published on the second page. The official praises “unprecedented results” that have been achieved and terms the policy of the “special struggle against gangsters” as “completely correct.” But still with the international and domestic situation changing, the task of fighting these forces is termed as a “long and arduous task.”
Going forward the priorities will be:
Drawing from Xi’s ideas to ensure the “normalization” this fight against “gangs” and “evil” as “fundamental compliance.”
Maintain party leadership in this process of fighting gangs.
“Taking the protection of the fundamental interests of the people as the starting point and goal, mobilizing the masses to participate, accepting the supervision of the masses, and improving the evaluation system oriented by the people’s sense of gain, happiness, and security…”
Make sure that all of this, i.e., the fight against gangs is done by using legal instruments: “ensure that the fight against criminals and evil is always running on the track of the rule of law.”
“Summarize the proven effective practices and accumulated valuable experience in the special struggle against gangsters and evils, and promptly upgrade them to institutional norms to form a long-term mechanism to prevent the re-emergence of gangs.”
The official also tells us that the new guidelines that have been released have been in the works since April 2020. The official then explains what “normalization” of the fight implies.
“We must take governance at the source as a permanent solution, and continue to vigorously rectify the industries and rural areas, so that the evil forces have nowhere to take root.” So there needs to be special rectification and routine investigations. “Special rectification should be carried out in industries with more chaos, so as to effectively prevent problems such as extensive management of traditional industries, illegal monopoly of resource industries, illegal and uncivilised growth of entertainment industries, etc.” There’s also emphasis on consolidating grassroots organisations and strengthening them in dealing with problems.
There is a need to “establish and improve a smart and open reporting reward mechanism.” This talks about improving existing reporting systems, getting masses engaged in reporting, rewarding reporting and protecting whistleblowers. This part of the centre-local push and pull that I referred to earlier. “Clearly, it is necessary to strengthen the judgment of the overall situation, establish a three-level linkage mechanism for reporting clues in provinces, cities and counties, dynamically grasp the progress, regularly classify and analyze, dynamically track and dynamically monitor in a timely fashion, and accurately draw a ‘situation map’ for eliminating evils.
“The focus of the special struggle has been to eradicate the underworld forces that are now in full force, but this is not a one-time fight. The focus of the normalized fight against underworld and evil is to prevent new underworld forces from growing out of nothing and becoming bigger.” Part of this also entails, the official says, investigating and punishing Party members, cadres, and public officials engaged in criminal activity.
The next two points are related to improving supervision and creating a mechanism of incentives and punishments. In other words, it’s not just about sticks. This relates to the bit about evaluation of individuals within the broader context of the Safe China initiative that I’ve referred to earlier. “It is clearly necessary to carry out commendations and rewards, and use the situation of the fight against evil as an important basis for the selection and commendation of Safe China.”
The final point is about the organisational structure that needs to be cultivated to continue this fight.
Next, the piece on Xi’s red footprints today focuses on the Zunyi Conference. It begins by talking about Xi’s June 2015 visit to the conference site and exhibition hall in Guizhou. At that time, the piece says, Xi had said that “we must make good use of the historical experience of the Zunyi Conference to let the spirit of the Zunyi Conference shine forever.” The piece talks about Zhang Ruining, a sixth-grade student, who has become a “little red preacher.” It talks about Zhang putting on a “red scarf” and telling tourists “the story of the Red Army’s Long March.”
For those unfamiliar, the Zunyi Conference was a three-day meeting of the enlarged politburo, which ended with Mao emerging firmly in control, as the Party moved away from the Bolsheviks, beginning the process of ideologically consolidating behind Mao.
The piece talks about young Zhang’s journey as a “red preacher” and then tells us that in 2017, Zunyi city launched a project called the “Long March Stories into Campus.” The idea was to use “red resources” to pass on “red genes.” As part of this project, “over the past four years, the city has trained 640 principals and moral education teachers and trained more than 800 ‘little red preachers’.”
Another example cited is of the Loushan Pass Red Army Primary School, with comments by a teacher named Feng Xiaoli. It says: “In order to cultivate children's firm belief and the spirit of going forward, the school also compiled red memory textbooks for different grades, and organized the study of red songs and red poems.” Feng adds to this saying that their goal has been to "incorporate the red gene into the children’s spiritual blood, let the red culture take root…”
The piece then talks about Xi’s visit to Huamao Village, Fengxiang Town, Bozhou District, Zunyi City in 2015. He went to a “Red House” (basically a small guesthouse that’s also a restaurant) being run by Wang Zhiqiang. The story tells us that Xi was interested in the well-being of villagers, and then about how the visit has led to Wang’s business booming. There is more such talk about development, high-quality development, ecological preservation and remembering red roots.
Just a Thought: As much as these pieces are useful messaging about the ideological direction of the Party, Xi’s authority, drawing historical legitimacy for current priorities, I guess this is also a nod to the left-leaning elements in the Party and society that Xi remains their man despite all the talk about economic modernization and industrial upgrading and so on.
Third, Li Keqiang’s conversation with Imran Khan (Xinhua English report). Today is the 70th anniversary of China-Pakistan ties. In his chat, Li described the China-Pakistan all-weather strategic cooperative partnership as a “precious treasure.” The rest of it is about working together to deepen the strategic partnership, but mostly about right now dealing with the pandemic.
Finally, as part of the centenary celebrations, PD reports that the Memorial Hall of the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China will open before July 1. The piece also contains much more about events planned to celebrate the centenary in Shanghai.
Page 2: First, China’s Covid-19 vaccination drive has hit 450 million doses so far. This is really extraordinary pace at which the drive’s picked up in the last few weeks. In fact, the story tells us that over the past week, there have been 100 million vaccinations. The piece also quotes spokesperson of the National Health Commission and Deputy Director of the Propaganda Department Mi Feng as saying that the recent cluster of outbreaks in Anhui and Liaoning have reminded the Party that efforts for prevention and control must be tight at all times. It also quotes the Chinese CDC’s Wu Zunyou as saying that given the available data and efforts taken, the clusters in those two regions “will not be very large.”
Second, Politburo member Wang Chen visited Zhangjiakou, where he talked about Xi's thoughts on the rule of law. The piece talks about him visiting schools and discussing strengthening rule of law consciousness among the youth. Do check out this bit, where he visits a school to observe what I believe is a moot court session; this is referred to as a “Red Scarf Law School” mock trial. 在经济开发区第一小学，调研学校法治园地活动情况，观看“红领巾法学院”模拟法庭，对提升青少年法治意识和法治素养采取的创新举措予以肯定。
The piece has Wang talking about how based on the new development stage, it is important to emphasise the “spirit of the constitution, promote the whole society to firmly establish the basic legal concepts such as the supremacy of constitutional law, equality before the law, the legal concept of the rule of law...continuously improve citizens’ legal literacy in the practice of the rule of law, so that working and living according to law can truly become a habit…”
Page 3: There’s a piece about the Asian Security Concept that Xi first spoke about at CICA in 2014. It talks about how the concept “reflects the true wishes of the Asian people” and how China has implemented it. Basically there are positive comments from foreigners - Singapore, Russia, Pakistan, France, Fiji and the UK - to emphasise the utility of the concept. The piece says:
“Standing on the right side of history, China actively implements a new security concept of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security, strengthens security dialogue and cooperation with all parties, maintains and practices true multilateralism, and effectively promotes the cause of human peace and progress.”
There’s also an essay by the new Chinese ambassador to Pakistan. Nong Rong writes how the two sides “broke through the ideological barriers and the ‘iron curtain’ of the Cold War and formally established diplomatic relations” on May 21, 1951. He then talks about the closeness of ties. He writes about Xi’s 2015 visit, which launched CPEC. And then talks about how Imran Khan “has visited China 3 times and met with President Xi Jinping 4 times to communicate in-depth on bilateral cooperation and international and regional issues of common concern. Thanks to the personal guidance of the leaders, China and Pakistan have given each other strong support on each other’s core interests and major concerns, and safeguarded the common interests of the two countries, regional peace and stability, and international fairness and justice.”
Some useful data here: “Among the 70 early harvest projects determined by the two parties, 46 projects have been initiated or completed, with a total investment of US$25.4 billion. Driven strongly by the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the economic and trade cooperation between the two countries has entered the fast lane, and the second phase of the China-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement has been reached and entered into force. China has become Pakistan's largest trading partner for 6 consecutive years and Pakistan’s largest source of investment for 7 consecutive years.”
He then talks about cultural cooperation, which is useful to note, and work done on combating COVID-19. He concludes by emphasising CPEC.
Page 4: Interesting that there’s a report about the Central Propaganda Department and officials from Guizhou launching a new drive “Promoting the Spirit of the Zunyi Conference and Taking the Long March Road in Guizhou's New Era.” The piece says that:
“The red blood has been passed on in the land of Guizhou. The spirit of the Long March and the Zunyi Conference have always inspired the children of all ethnic groups in Guizhou to stick to their original mission and march forward courageously on the new Long March, thus realizing the great historical changes from poverty and poverty to a well-off society in an all-round way, from lagging development to catching up and surpassing.”
Chen Yiqin, Secretary of the Guizhou Provincial Party Committee, mentions Xi at least a couple of times and then talks about the province’s development record.
The two historical figures covered today are Luo Binghui and Peng Xuefeng. I am not going into details here due to paucity of time today and the fact that I want to focus on the Tibet White Paper below.
Page 6: A report with Li Zhong, Vice Minister of Human Resources and Social Security, talking about the challenges of employment. The piece says that:
“Last year, China launched a series of extraordinary and phased measures to reduce burdens, stabilize jobs and expand employment, and achieved the following results. A total of 1.5 trillion yuan was “reduced, exempted and delayed” in terms of social insurance burdens related to pensions, work-related injuries, and unemployment. There was an expenditure of 104.2 billion yuan worth for employment subsidies and special awards and subsidies exceeded 100 billion yuan. The country generated a total of 11.86 million new jobs in urban areas, exceeding the target. In April this year, the nationwide surveyed unemployment rate in urban areas was 5.1%, which dropped to the lowest level in recent years.”
Li says that this year “stabilizing employment still faces challenges. It is necessary to strengthen the employment priority policy, grasp the effectiveness of timeliness, and better stabilize expectations.” Doing this, requires focus on:
supporting market entities;
“promoting employment and entrepreneurship of key groups,” such as college graduates and entrepreneurs; and
“expanding unemployment insurance protection” and and provision of subsidies for those “who have not yet been employed after the expiry of receiving unemployment insurance benefits” and supporting migrant workers with living and training allowances.
He also talks about supporting flexible employment, providing funding for small and micro enterprises, reducing fees for entrepreneurs and supporting incubation of start-ups, etc.
For new graduates:
“this year’s support measures can be summarized as ‘four supports and one enhancement,’ that is, support for enterprises to absorb, support grassroots employment, support self-employment, support training and further studies, and strengthen employment services. The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security has established a normalized graduate employment service platform, posting nearly 300,000 jobs every day. At the same time, it has continued to hold city joint recruitment and other activities, and launched online and offline industry and regional job fairs. At present, 80 special recruitments have been launched, and the demand for graduates has exceeded 5 million.”
While speaking of employment, do check out this SCMP story. It talks about the return to prominence of the civil service as a job provider amid recent economic challenges:
“China’s overall job market has improved steadily as the economy has rebounded from the worst of the pandemic early last year, but young people, particularly fresh graduates from universities, are still having a hard time finding steady employment. As a result, a new wave of young Chinese talent is spurning the private sector and settling for jobs with the nation’s civil service. Their enthusiasm for the public sector has only grown in recent months after last year’s economic downturn, as well as the government’s decision to delay the retirement age and the high-profile regulatory difficulties of some private businesses. More than 1.58 million candidates registered for China’s national civil service exam this year, up sharply from 1.05 million in 2009 and 125,000 in 2003. They will compete for about 25,700 jobs at ministries and state agencies, putting the average chance of landing a government job at about one in 61. If provincial and municipal government exams are included, there are up to 9 million candidates – most of whom are fresh graduates – vying for civil service jobs each year, said Li Dongjie, who sees a growing market for his Dongliang civil servant training centre in Shenzhen.”
Page 13: On the Theory page today we have a piece authored by Lu Xinshe, Guangxi Party Secretary, and his deputy and region’s chairman, Lan Tianli. I am not doing a detailed breakdown, but they basically write about Xi’s instructions and the region’s development and progress in that context. Do note that Xi gets 15 mentions in the piece.
Tibet White Paper Breakdown
I guess this will be covered in tomorrow’s PD, but the State Council today released a new White Paper on Tibet.
My thoughts: This is an interesting document. Of course, it is the Party’s version of history and therefore it is problematic in that sense. But from today’s perspective, there are some useful bits to note. There is an emphasis on Western imperialism of the past, with the paper drawing a line between that and the role of the US today as attempts to destabilise China. There is an emphasis on economic development in Tibet, which is a source of confidence for the Party. The header for the ethnic and religious affairs section talks about “remarkable results” being achieved. This is likely an indicator of quiet confidence in the Party. The window for any compromise with the Dalai Lama or any section of the CTA is clearly tightly shut. Yet, there is a deep sense of anxiety with regard to social stability and ethnic minority cadre that persists. This is evident in the 10-point guideline for the new era at the end.
Here’s a breakdown of the key points that the paper makes:
It begins by saying that “Tibet has been an integral part of Chinese territory since ancient times, and one of the main Tibetan-inhabited areas in China. In the aftermath of the Opium Wars in the middle of the 19th century, the UK-led imperialist powers began to cultivate the idea of ‘Tibet independence’, intentionally undermining China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
The first section then talks about history, which I am not delving into, but let’s just say that there is tremendous revisionism. For instance, “On September 2, 1949, Xinhua News Agency, with authorization from the CPC, published an editorial under the headline, Foreign Aggressors Are Resolutely Not Allowed to Annex China's Territory – Tibet...All sectors of society of Tibet quickly responded and expressed support for the editorial and the hope that the PLA would enter Tibet as soon as possible.”
The next section talks about “peaceful liberation;” it covers the “17-Article Agreement” and a period till the mid-1950s. It talks about the agreements with India and Nepal too.
The next section talks about “historical changes.” It essentially talks about the Dalai Lama and those close to him being part of the elite, dominating the “serf,” and argues that the central government held off on “reforms” in Tibet as promised until there was an armed rebellion. These three paragraphs tell us what the government wants to convey. Again, this is basically a jaundiced view of history to favour the Party’s narrative.
“In old Tibet, polarization of the rich and the poor hindered development. The three major stakeholders and their agents, who made up less than five percent of the population, owned almost all of the land, pastures, forests, mountains, rivers and flood plains, and most of the livestock. Before the democratic reform in 1959, there were 197 hereditary aristocratic families, and the few top families each possessed dozens of manors and thousands of hectares of land. The family of the 14th Dalai Lama owned 27 manors, 30 pastures, and over 6,000 serfs. The Dalai Lama alone owned 160,000 taels (one tael = 30 grams) of gold, 95 million taels of silver, over 20,000 pieces of jewelry and jade ware, and more than 10,000 pieces of silk clothing and rare furs. Meanwhile the serfs and slaves, who accounted for 95 percent of the population, had no means of production or freedom of their own. They were subjected to the three-fold exploitation of corvée labor, taxes, and high-interest loans, and struggled for mere existence.”
“In consideration of Tibetan history and the region's special situation, the Central People's Government adopted a circumspect attitude of patient persuasion, waiting for the ruling elite to carry out reform, and giving them adequate time to do so. In 1956, still awaiting a change in the attitude of the ruling upper class, the Central People's Government made a decision that no reform should be carried out in Tibet for six years. During his visit to India in January 1957, Premier of the State Council Zhou Enlai handed a letter from Chairman Mao Zedong to the 14th Dalai Lama and 10th Panchen Lama, and the accompanying senior local Tibetan government officials. The letter informed them of the central government's decision that reform would be deferred for six years; whether reform should be carried out after six years would still be decided by Tibet in accordance with its own situation and the prevailing conditions. The Central People's Government showed the utmost patience and made every concession.”
“To preserve serfdom, the reactionaries from Tibet's upper class planned a series of activities to split Tibet from China, in blatant violation of the 17-Article Agreement. These led to a full-scale insurrection on March 10, 1959. The Central People's Government, together with the Tibetan people, took decisive measures to suppress the rebellion, and subsequently implemented a democratic reform in Tibet that brought feudal serfdom to an end.”
The next three sections talk about development, poverty alleviation, and culture. This is followed by a section on religious work. The culture section says that Chinese and Tibetan languages “are used in large meetings and major activities organized by local governments, enterprises and public institutions. In judicial proceedings, the Tibetan language is used to hear cases and make legal documents in accordance with the needs of Tibetan litigants, so as to guarantee the right of Tibetan citizens to use the language for litigation.”
Here we get state-approved data on monasteries, institutions and processes for approval of the Dalai Lama and living buddhas. But do note that Section 1 of the paper tells us this to set the stage:
“In 1793, after dispelling Gurkha invaders, the Qing government restored order in Tibet and promulgated the Imperially Approved Ordinance for Better Governance of Tibet (the 29-Article Ordinance), improving several of the systems by which the central government administered Tibet. The ordinance stipulated that the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and other grand Living Buddhas had to follow the procedure of “drawing lots from the golden urn”, and the selected candidate would be subject to approval by the central government of China.”
Then this current section tells us that:
“The reincarnation of Living Buddhas has been carried out in an orderly manner in accordance with laws, regulations, religious rituals and historical conventions. In 1995, with the approval of the State Council, the search for and identification of the reincarnation of the 10th Panchen Lama and the enthronement of the 11th Panchen Lama were completed by drawing lots from a golden urn. In 2010, the Sixth Living Buddha Dezhub was identified and enthroned through the drawing of lots from a golden urn and with the approval of the government of the Tibet Autonomous Region. By 2020, 92 reincarnated Living Buddhas had been identified and approved through traditional religious rituals and historical conventions. Traditional religious activities are carried out regularly in accordance with the law – activities such as studying scriptures and debate, initiation as a monk or nun, abhisheka (an empowerment ceremony), and self-cultivation. Examination on scriptures and subsequent promotion in academic degrees are also held in monasteries on a regular basis.”
Section 9 is then about national security and stability. It says that:
“Over the years, Western anti-China forces have used Tibet as a pretext to disrupt China and interfere with its development, and the 14th Dalai Lama and his supporters have continued to try to promote “Tibetan independence” by provoking incidents to jeopardize peace and stability in Tibet.” The section then briefly discusses the CIA’s actions in the 1950s, and then says that “since the 1980s, Western forces have played an active role in all the outbreaks of unrest that have taken place in Tibet.” It talks about the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002, the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018, and the Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020.
Also note this bit:
“In 1959, after the failure of their armed rebellion, the reactionaries of Tibet's ruling class fled to India. They subsequently began to campaign for “Tibetan independence” by force. Later, with the support of the US, they reorganized the ‘Four Rivers and Six Ranges; rebel organization, and set up a military base in Mustang, a county in Nepal, to engage in long-term attacks across the China-Nepal borders. In 1962, with support from external powers, they built a para-commando force composed of mainly Tibetan exiles to harass Chinese border troops and civilians along the China-India border. From the late 1970s, under pressure from significant shifts in the international landscape, the 14th Dalai Lama and his supporters began to alter their tactics. On the one hand, they continued to provoke incidents of violence to keep up pressure on the central government. For example, in 1987, 1988 and 1989 they planned and instigated multiple violent incidents. In 2008, they planned and executed violent riots in Lhasa on March 14 and launched a number of international incidents designed to sabotage the preparations for the Beijing Olympic Games. Since 2011, the 14th Dalai Lama and his supporters have incited Tibetan lamas and lay followers inside China to engage in acts of self-immolation, and released a Self-Immolation Guide on the internet, giving rise to a surge of self-immolation incidents in some parts of China. On the other hand, they proclaimed a commitment to ‘non-violence’ and the ‘middle way’...The ‘middle way; does not tally with China's history, national reality, state Constitution, laws and basic systems. Neither does it conform to Tibet's history, reality and ethnic relations. Moreover, it runs counter to the fundamental interests of all the people of China, including the Tibetans.”
And this:
“Since the 14th Dalai Lama fled abroad in 1959, the central government has exercised great restraint and done its best to provide solutions, for example preserving his position as a vice-chairman of the NPC Standing Committee until 1964. After reform and opening up, the central government offered the 14th Dalai Lama an opportunity to accept the policy that “all patriots belong to one big family, whether they embrace patriotism earlier or later,” and invited him to send representatives to return home for a visit. The central government received 13 visits by private representatives of the 14th Dalai Lama between 1979 and 2002, and granted approval to ten visits from 2002 to 2010. But to the disappointment of the central government, the Dalai Lama has refused to relinquish his political demands.”
The final section has guidelines for the new era under Xi. What’s noteworthy about these to me is that at least three of the 10 items refer to ensuring ethnic and Party unity.