Political Police Force, New Rules for Leading Cadres & Whose 'Democracy' is better?
Here are the stories and pieces from the People’s Daily’s March 29, 2021, edition that I found worth noting.
Page 1: Let’s begin with a new “trial regulation on organizational punishment” that has been issued by the Central Committee. Xinhua English has a short report on this. It says that “organizational punishment is an essential means to educate and administer cadres, as well as a significant measure to ensure full and strict governance over the Party.” So this is about Xi Jinping keeping Party cadre in line. The entire regulation has been published in today’s People’s Daily. Let me break it down here:
Article 2 says that this regulation “adheres to the guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era.” The article talks about the regulations covering areas like “infidelity to the party and political participation,” corruption, failure to act, and misconduct. A lot of the focus here is on “leading cadres,” with the Organisation Department being empowered under this regulation rather than any disciplinary organ like the CCDI or the National Supervision Commission.
Article 7 lists out a series of problems that need to be corrected. I am sharing these because it helps to understand the challenges of central-local relations in China. These include:
the need to be consistent in the context of the four consciousnesses, four self-confidences, and two safeguards.
Not maintaining belief in Marxist beliefs, and engaging in feudal and superstitious activities or participating in religious activities in violation of regulations, or believing in cults.
Inadequate implementation of the party's basic theories, basic lines, basic strategies.
Unwillingness to take responsibility amid major challenges or contradictions
Irresponsible work, improper performance of duties or neglect of management, major mistakes or major production safety accidents, mass incidents, public safety incidents and other serious accidents or incidents; inaction at work, perfunctory responsibilities, indolence and procrastination, failure to complete tasks for a long time, or serious delay in work;
Abandoning the original mission of the party, weak awareness of the masses, prevaricating on issues that have been strongly reflected by the masses.
Indulging in formalism and bureaucracy are prominent and pursuing ‘image projects’ and ‘achievement projects’ that are divorced from reality.
“Violating the principle of democratic centralism, individuals or a small number of people decide major issues, fail to implement or change collective decisions without authorization...” There’s irony lurking here somewhere.
Slander, intervention and nepotism in the appointments of people; engaging in gang formation, cultivating personal power, and disrupting the “political ecology.”
Violating the spirit of the eight central regulations, and the relevant regulations on clean government
So what’s the punishment for any of this? Article 11 of the regulation outlines these. It says that one could face adjustment of positions and ranks, such as removal and demotion. These actions will also have implications for their future growth in the Party. Disciplinary action could, of course, also be taken against these individuals. Article 12 outlines an appeals mechanism for those punished.
There are two other pieces on the page worth noting. First, this one about Xi’s exchange of letters with Raul Castro Ruz, first secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba Central Committee, and Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel. Next, this one about another book of Xi’s speeches being published. This one is a compilation of speeches on the importance of family, family education and virtues.
All this talk about family reminded me of the early days of Xi propaganda about how he was a family man who loves his wife. Here’s one example:
Page 2: There’s a long interview with someone from the Organisation Department, talking about the new regulations. The person remains unidentified. But here’s what he/she says:
“The Regulations are the first internal party regulations that specifically provide comprehensive regulations on organizational handling. They provide a strong guarantee for implementing the party's organizational line in the new era, strictly managing and supervising cadres, and building a loyal, clean and responsible team of high-quality cadres.”
“There are four main considerations in formulating the Regulations: First, it clearly reflects the requirements for strict party governance in an all-round way. Thoroughly implement the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important instructions on strict management and supervision of cadres, implement the party’s organizational line in the new era...The second is to highlight the key points, focus on leading cadres, and focus on solving the outstanding problems existing in the cadre team. The third is to adhere to precision, science, standardization and effectiveness, and strive to achieve clear definitions, clear requirements, and easy implementation. The fourth is to focus on system linkage and harmonize with relevant laws and regulations.”
The other details he/she covers is about who is covered by the regulations, what sort of punishments can be given, what does this aim to achieve, what’s the appeals mechanism and so on.
Next, the Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism of the State Council held a press conference on Sunday. It said that China’s vaccination drive has hit the 100 million mark. The officials talked about the need to continue vaccinations, the impact of Chinese vaccines on different COVID-19 strains, and the interval between doses.
Page 3: First, Wang Yi during his tour to the Mideast met with the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. PD says (Here is a CGTN English report) that Wang spoke about the UAE’s support for China’s core interests, the one-China principle, BRI, support for the UAE’s greater role in regional affairs, the two sides’ willingness to “adhere to the basic norm of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs in international relations, and to defend the principle of sovereign equality of nations as set forth in the United Nations Charter.”
Next, there’s a commentary on Chinese democracy. One big chunk from this is worth reproducing in full:
“Why does Chinese-style democracy work? This issue is increasingly attracting attention from the world. A large number of practices at home and abroad have shown that it is very important to ensure and support the people to be the masters of the country, to participate in the management of national life and social life through elections in accordance with the law, and to allow the people’s representatives to participate in the management of national life and social life through systems and methods other than elections. Management is also very important. It is not difficult to find that in the democratic practice of some Western countries, people only have the right to vote but not the right to participate widely. Only when they are awakened during voting, they enter a dormant period after voting. The limitations of national governance caused by this formalist democracy are obvious and even inevitable. The crux of the problem is that we must insist on relying on and for the people in everything. Facts have proved that Chinese-style democracy not only guarantees and supports the people to be the masters of the country, but also effectively transforms the people's wisdom and power into governance efficiency, so that the people's sense of gain, happiness, and security are more substantial, more secure, and more sustainable. International observers have pointed out that Chinese-style democracy has overcome the shortcomings of Western democracy and is the most extensive, true and effective democracy that safeguards the fundamental interests of the people.
Page 4: Today’s Party history focus is on the return of Hong Kong and Macau. But the only piece worth noting on the page is about the crackdown on criminal gangs and “evil forces.” It says that:
“As of the end of December 2020, 3,644 gang-related organizations and 11,675 criminal gangs have been eliminated nationwide; courts across the country have concluded 32,943 gang-related and evil-related cases in first instance, and sentenced 53405 criminals with serious penalties for more than 5 years.”
Page 9: On the theory page today, there’s a piece by the Party Committee of the Ministry of Public Security. Here are some of the key takeaways from the piece. First, there’s an acknowledgement of Xi’s control and commitment to maintain it.
“Public security organs are an important tool of the people’s democratic dictatorship and a ‘knife in the hands of the party and the people’. We must persist in building and controlling public security organs politically, unswervingly uphold the party’s absolute leadership over public security work, and earnestly implement the party Central Committee's major decisions and deployments on comprehensively governing the country according to law.”
Maintaining party’s full control, the piece says, is a “fundamental political principle that must be firmly grasped in the construction of public security under the rule of law.” Here’s a pledge that follows this:
“We must persist in taking the party’s banner as the banner, taking the party’s direction as the direction, taking the party’s will as the will, and sticking to the ‘two safeguards’ as the highest political principle and implementing it as the most fundamental task of political police construction. Ideologically and politically, they are highly consistent with the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core.”
So if this is the commitment, then what is the primary task of the public security system? Here’s the answer that the piece provides: “Defending the party's long-term ruling position is the primary task of public security under the rule of law.”
Here’s more: “We must adhere to the overall national security concept, insist on overall development and security, always put the prevention of political security risks in the first place, and strictly prevent and crack down on hostile forces infiltration, subversion, and sabotage activities, fully implement the Party’s strategy of governing Xinjiang and Tibet in the new era, firmly grasp the implementation of various measures in the fight against separatism and terrorism, promote the rule of law and normalization of anti-terrorism and maintenance of stability, strengthen the prevention and control of cyber security risks, and resolutely safeguard the security and system of state power, and ideological security.”
This is then followed by keeping people’s needs upfront. Here too the task is defined in a rather interesting manner, i.e., it’s primarily about dispute resolution and settlement in order to ensure stability. After this, we have things like dealing with crimes of all kinds, such as gangs, cybercrimes, adulteration, fraud, etc. Then there’s talk about legal and judicial reform to ensure that people feel that justice is being done.
Finally, we come to the supervision of the public security apparatus. This talks about two broad themes; first, carrying out the education and rectification campaign that’s underway. Second, ensuring the “political construction of police and comprehensive and strict police management” of the apparatus.
Page 16: On the international page today, there’s a long piece by-lined 傅 铸. I am not sure who this is, but the piece basically pushes back against the use of the term “genocide” to describe Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang. It refers to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, to make the following core arguments:
“First of all, objectively, it is necessary to prove that the perpetrator has performed the relevant acts stipulated in the Convention.”
Second, “there must be a specific intent to ‘completely or partially destroy a specific group’, which is a key element in determining the crime of genocide.”
“The Convention stipulates that genocide cases are either under the jurisdiction of the competent court of the country where the act occurred, or by the international criminal court of which the State party accepts its jurisdiction. Since the birth of the Convention, most of the major genocide cases have been determined by the International Court of Justice and special tribunals authorized by the United Nations Security Council. The courts of individual countries have also tried genocide cases within their own borders. In addition to this, no country, organization or individual has the qualification and power to arbitrarily convict other countries as guilty of ‘genocide’.”
The label of ‘genocide’ “is a slander on China's ethnic policy.”
Finally, this: “The establishment of a system of accountability for genocide in international law reflects the progress of human civilization and the international rule of law, and demonstrates the common will of all countries to maintain international peace and security. Maliciously fabricating facts, abusing the law, and politicizing and weaponizing the crime of genocide in international relations are blatant violations of international law and the basic norms of international relations, and run counter to the efforts of the international community to punish the crime of genocide.”