Special Edition: How Chinese Analysts are Discussing India's Election Results
Hi folks,
I woke up today to see Hu Xijin’s video on Twitter commenting about the outcome of the Indian election. His basic argument is summarised in the tweet below.
So I thought I’d scan Chinese media and publications to read assessments of other analysts. This is, thus, a special edition, breaking down the early takes from Chinese analysts like Wang Shida, Lin Minwang, Zhang Jiadong, Qian Feng, Liu Zongyi and Mao Keji.
My key takeaways from their views are:
They believe that the need to rely on coalition partners will constrain Narendra Modi’s governance and foreign policy agenda. Everyone I’ve covered seems to think that the election has left Modi weaker. That said, they don’t think that the “tough” and “pragmatic” foreign policy, along with the approach of “multi-alignment” will fundamentally change. However, there seems to be a hint that with the BJP losing its individual majority makes India’s hand weaker in dealing with major powers.
Chinese analysts believe that the election has exposed structural economic problems, such as inequality and unemployment. The view is that these issues will continue to plague India’s economic rise. Moreover, the opposition is likely to be more vocal, resulting in greater resistance to economic reforms. One analyst was blunt saying that Indian politics is now back to its pre-2014 structure, characterised by “continuous internal friction and strife.”
Most analysts believe that the election is unlikely to result in any improvement in India-China relations. In fact, most seem to assume policy continuity in general. Some have expressed the fear that if Modi interprets the mandate as a product of him not being hardline enough in terms of “Hindu nationalism”, it could further worsen India-China ties.
Finally, most analysts argue that India will continue to work towards attracting global industrial and supply chains. The are critical of the limited growth in India’s manufacturing sector, in terms of its contribution as a percentage of GDP. But they still believe that India wants to compete with and/or replace China as the global manufacturing hub.
There will be more in the days to come. Do keep in mind that the elections have just ended, and the new government is yet to be sworn in. A lot is yet to happen. So I plan on revisiting these early assessments or more detailed writings by Chinese scholars in due time.
Cheers,
Manoj
I. Wang Shida from the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations:
He argues that the governance frameworks have been already established so there will not be any radical changes to the new government’s domestic and foreign policies. “Regarding relations with China, the new government will continue certain established positions and practices. However, we also have reasons to maintain cautious optimism about Sino-Indian relations.” 鉴于印度新政府执政脉络演变清晰，今后内外政策不会出现颠覆性变化。在对华关系层面，新政府将延续若干固有立场和做法，但我们也有理由对中印关系保持谨慎乐观.
Wang writes that there are three lenses through which one can look at the new Indian government’s foreign and domestic policies, and these will also influence the trajectory of Sino-Indian relations to varying degrees. The three lenses are, “desire to be a global manufacturing hub”, “Hindu nation/nationalism” and the “multi-alignment” foreign policy. 整体看，“全球制造业中心”“印度教国家”和“多向结盟”，可以作为观察印度新政府内外政策走向的三个视角。这些视角也将在不同程度上影响中印关系走向。
First, with regard to the global manufacturing hub desire, he writes that in its manifesto, the BJP promised that it will achieve high economic growth through low inflation and prudent fiscal management”, and promote initiatives such as “making India the world's third-largest economy” and “transforming India into a global manufacturing hub by 2030.” The call to make India a “global manufacturing hub” is in line with the “Make in India” initiative proposed by Modi during his first term in office. The goal of the initiative is to increase India's manufacturing industry contribution to GDP from 15% at the time to 25% in 2025. To achieve this goal, the Modi government launched the ‘Phased Manufacturing Program (PMP)’ in 2015, which imposed differentiated tariffs on products at various stages and sought to attract foreign investment and transfer industrial chains to India. In 2020, it also introduced the ‘Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) Scheme’ to support the development of the manufacturing sector by domestic companies. Clearly, India aims to change its current economic structure, which is overly reliant on the IT and other tertiary sectors, and lacks sufficient manufacturing capacity, by seeking to create more employment and economic opportunities. In this process, India both cooperates and competes with China. On one hand, India's development of manufacturing industries, such as automotive, pharmaceuticals, and mobile phones, creates a significant demand for, and even dependence on, the upstream and midstream sectors in China, which helps to strengthen Sino-Indian economic and trade relations. On the other hand, India has always wanted to compete with China to become the hub of the global manufacturing industrial and supply chains, and even desires to replace it. 一是“全球制造业中心”。印人党在选前发表竞选宣言“莫迪的承诺”，提出一系列发展愿景。例如将通过“低通胀、审慎财政实现经济高速增长”，推动“印度成为世界第三大经济体”“2030年将印度打造成全球制造业中心”等。有关将印度打造成“全球制造业中心”的提法，与莫迪首次执政期间提出的“印度制造”倡议一脉相承。该倡议目标是推动印度制造业占GDP比重由当时的15%提升至2025年的25%。为实现该目标，莫迪政府2015年推出“分阶段制造计划（PMP）”，通过对各阶段产品区别加征关税，吸引外资将产业链转移至印度本土；2020年又推出“生产关联激励计划（PLI）”，支持国内企业发展制造业。显然，印度此举旨在改变目前过度依赖IT等第三产业、制造业能力不足的经济结构，寻求创造更多就业和经济机会。在此过程中，印度与中国既有合作也有竞争。一方面，印度发展汽车、制药、手机等制造业，对于产业链中上游的中国存在巨大需求甚至依赖，这有助于密切中印经贸关系。但另一方面，印度始终想与中国竞争全球制造业产业链供应链的枢纽地位，甚至想取而代之.
Second, on Hindu nationalism, Wang writes that:
“In the past 10 years of BJP rule, Hindu nationalism has gradually become the mainstream ideology of Indian society, and secularism and left-wing ideas have been marginalised. In the ‘Modi's Guarantee’ campaign manifesto, there are promises to implement a Uniform Civil Code, celebrate Hindu festivals globally, and expand tourism facilities at the Hindu holy city Ayodhya’s Ram Temple. Looking back at history, it is not difficult to see that catering to and even catalysing Hindu nationalism has been key to the rapid rise of the BJP. The BJP performed below expectations in this election, and it may double down on implementing Hindu nationalist policies in the future to secure the support of the Hindu majority. This could potentially ‘ideologize’ Sino-Indian conflicts and exacerbate some of the inherent differences between the two countries. Previously, media aligned with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) have repeatedly smeared China over border issues, exhibiting a strong ideological bias.” 印人党过去十年执政期间，印度教民族主义逐渐成为印度社会的主流意识形态，世俗主义、左翼思潮等遭到边缘化。在“莫迪的承诺”竞选宣言中，就有实施统一民法典、在全球范围庆祝印度教节日、扩建印度教圣城阿约提亚罗摩神庙的旅游设施等。回顾历史不难发现，迎合乃至催化印度教民族主义是印人党迅速崛起的关键。印人党在此次大选中表现低于预期，不排除以后加倍执行印度教民族主义政策，以争取占人口多数的印度教徒支持。这有可能将中印矛盾“意识形态化”，激化两国一些固有分歧。此前，“国民志愿团”喉舌媒体就曾多次就边界问题污蔑中国，表现出较强的意识形态色彩.
Third, he writes that:
“The BJP views India's diplomatic tradition of non-alignment as a legacy of the Indian National Congress and refrains from mentioning it. Its foreign policy is extremely pragmatic, and it claims to pursue a ‘multi-alignment’ strategy which entails ‘finding and utilising opportunities in global conflicts to achieve India's national interests.’ Going ahead, India is expected to continue developing diversified major power relationships simultaneously, positioning itself to hedge in various directions to seek advantageous positions. In the context of the US ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ and its efforts to enlist India to counter China, India aims to adopt a ‘cooperate but not conform’ policy, taking the opportunity to exchange for the United States' support for India to play a greater role in international and regional affairs, and to obtain practical benefits in areas such as economic security.” 三是“多向结盟”。印人党将印度“不结盟”外交传统视为国大党遗产而绝口不提，其外交政策的实用主义色彩强烈，宣称将采取“多面结盟”政策，“在全球矛盾中发现机遇并加以利用，实现印度国家利益”。接下来，印度料将继续同时发展多对大国关系，居中进行多向对冲，以寻求自身处于有利态势。对于美国出台“印太战略”并拉印制华，印度试图采取“迎合但不附和”政策，趁机换取美国支持印度在国际和地区事务中发挥更大作用，以及在经济安全等领域获得实际好处.
Despite the coexistence of challenges and opportunities in Sino-Indian relations, the new Indian government fully recognizes the importance of these relations. Before the official start of the April elections, Modi emphasised the importance of Sino-Indian relations in a public statement, stating that maintaining peace in Sino-Indian relations is crucial for the entire region and even the world. He also mentioned that through constructive engagement on diplomatic and military levels, China and India have the ability to restore and maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas, thereby promoting the improvement of bilateral relations. 尽管中印关系挑战与机遇并存，但印度新政府仍充分认识到中印关系的重要性。在4月选举正式启动前，莫迪曾在公开表态中强调中印关系的重要性，认为中印关系保持和平对于整个地区乃至世界都非常重要，并称通过外交和军事层面的建设性接触，中印有能力恢复和维持边境地区和平与安宁，推动双边关系改善.
II. There’s an interview with Zhang Jiadong, director of the South Asia Research Center of Fudan University. His comments are largely explaining the electoral developments in India, rather than analysing India-China ties. For instance, he says that “political fatigue, rising inflation and massive unemployment” likely played a significant role in the BJP’s seat-share falling. 张家栋：印人党主导的全国民主联盟，此次虽在多数选区的得票数领先，但未能赢得议会压倒多数席位。政治审美疲劳、印度不断上升的通货膨胀和大规模的失业问题，相信是主要原因.
In terms of challenges that the new government with Modi as the PM faces, Zhang highlights the following:
Resistance from minority groups in India is also likely to rise. This may exacerbate ethnic divisions in India, bring new social and political contradictions, and present hidden dangers for future stability.
India’s seemingly impressive economic data also harbours hidden concerns. Over the past decade, India has failed to meet its expected targets in both manufacturing development and job creation. When Modi proposed the ‘Make in India’ strategy in September 2014, the goal was to increase the manufacturing sector's contribution to GDP from 16% in 2015 to 25% by 2022, aiming to position India as a global manufacturing hub. However, by 2023, this proportion had only reached 17%.
India's economic growth has not brought about equitable employment growth. Out of India’s approximately 1 billion working-age population, only about 100 million people have formal jobs, and the rest work in temporary jobs or are unemployed. In the next five years, Modi’s core task is still to promote economic development. The long-standing problem of ‘growth without employment’ in India's economy and the increasingly fierce farmers’ protests will test the new government.
张家栋：一方面，随着印度教民族主义的高涨，印度国内少数群体的反抗也有可能上升。这或将加剧印度国内族群的分裂，带来新的社会矛盾和政治矛盾，为未来的稳定埋下隐患。另一方面，印度看似亮眼的经济数据，其实也有隐忧。过去10年，印度在发展制造业、扩大就业两方面均未能达到预期目标。莫迪2014年9月提出“印度制造”战略时，目标是将制造业在GDP中的占比从2015年的16%提升至2022年的25%，将印度打造成全球制造业中心。但在2023年，这一比例只有17%。同时，印度的经济增长没能够带来同等的就业增长。在印度约10亿适龄劳动人口中，只有约1亿人拥有正式工作，其他人只能从事临时工作或失业。新的5年，莫迪的核心任务仍是推动经济发展。印度经济长期以来“有增长无就业”的顽疾，以及愈演愈烈的农民抗议活动，都将考验新一届政府.
III. A detailed report featuring views of Lin Minwang and Qiang Feng
Lin Minwang, Deputy Director of the South Asia Studies Center at Fudan University, assessed that “even though he (Modi) won, he still lost”. “It was unexpected that the BJP did not get more than half of the seats, which also means that Modi will face huge challenges.” “虽胜犹败”，复旦大学南亚研究中心副主任林民旺4日对《环球时报》记者如此评价称，印人党没有拿到半数以上席位比较意外，这也意味着莫迪将面临巨大挑战. He also believes that the election will result in Indian politics returning to the pre-2014 “old path” and “typical characteristic of Indian politics”, i.e., one characterised by continuous internal friction and strife amid multi-party politics, which makes it difficult for the ruling party’s domestic and diplomatic agendas to advance. 林民旺认为，本届大选后，印度政治又将回到2014年之前的“老路”和“常态”，即多党政治下内斗不断，执政党的内政和外交议程很难推进，这也是印度政治的典型特点.
On the issue of Hindu nationalism, Lin isn’t certain about future direction. “Modi's ‘Hindu nationalism’ agenda may be affected, but the direction it takes will depend on how he interprets the election results: he may think that the 80% of Hindus nationwide have not yet been fully mobilized (costing him the election), and so he may push for further polarization; or he may adopt a more moderate stance, similar to the first Prime Minister of the BJP, AB Vajpayee. 林民旺认为，莫迪的“印度教民族主义”议程会受到影响，但究竟走向何方取决于他如何理解此次选举结果：他可能会认为在全国占比80%的印度教教徒还没有被全部动员起来，从而推动“印度教民族主义”更加极化；也可能与印人党产生首位总理瓦杰帕伊一样，采取更加温和的立场.
Tsinghua University’s Qian Feng says that the results indicate the Modi “will be more constrained and there will be greater bargaining by other parties from the NDA when forming a coalition government and appointing cabinet ministers, and that he will need to consider the opinions of other allies more when implementing his domestic and foreign policies in the future. 清华大学国家战略研究院研究员、印度问题专家钱峰对《环球时报》记者表示，此次选举结果意味着莫迪在组建联合政府和任命内阁部长时，将受到联盟内其他党派的更多掣肘与“讨价还价”，也意味着在接下来在推行其内政外交政策时，需要更多考虑其他盟友的意见.
He adds that the results of the election would have been a “setback to the BJP’s morale and will pose certain challenges to India's continued implementation of economic reform measures”. “最终选举结果和人民党选前声称的‘压倒性胜利’反差较为明显，对该党的士气是一种挫败，也将对印度未来继续推行经济改革措施构成一定挑战。”他分析称.
The article also underscores that the real reason for the BJP’s electoral performance are challenges related to “real economy and people’s livelihood.” Qian Feng says that while India’s economic performance under Modi has been impressive, there are serious problems that persist. “For example, economic development has created one Indian tycoon after another, but the lives of many ordinary Indians have not improved much, and the gap between the rich and the poor is getting wider. As a result, some people no longer accept the grand narrative of India’s rapid economic growth, and these emotions have been expressed through votes.” “比如，经济的发展造就了一个又一个印度富豪，但许多印度普通民众的生活却没有得到太大改善，贫富差距越来越大。于是，一些民众不再接受印度经济快速增长的宏大叙事，这些情绪都会通过选票表达出来.”
Finally, both of them agree that the new government will continue to try to support manufacturing sector development in India.
“Qian Feng believes that from India’s own perspective, the Modi government’s series of diplomatic manoeuvres are commendable, using the available ‘cards’ to the fullest extent, greatly enhancing India’s ‘international visibility.’ However, ‘visibility’ does not necessarily equate to actual effectiveness. In an interview with a reporter from the Global Times, Lin Minwang gave a low rating to Modi's foreign policy towards major powers. He believes that the strategic choices made by the Modi government have expanded India's diplomatic space and increased its strategic leverage with China, Russia, and the United States, allowing India to continually benefit from competition and gamesmanship among various parties. ‘However, this has also led to New Delhi not only losing its traditional friendship and goodwill with China and Russia, but also not gaining strategic trust from the United States and its huge allies.’ Lin Minwang says that India has now become a ‘lonely rising power’. At the same time, India's neighbours such as the Maldives and Bangladesh have also developed antipathy towards New Delhi.” 钱峰认为，从印度自身的角度来看，莫迪政府的一系列外交操作可圈可点，可谓把手中的“牌”用到了极致，极大提升了印度的“国际能见度”。但“能见度”与实际效果并不能划上等号。在接受《环球时报》记者采访时，林民旺对莫迪期间的大国外交政策给予了较低评价。他认为，莫迪政府的战略选择使得印度外交活动的空间更大，对中国、俄罗斯和美国的战略杠杆更多，进而使得印度能够在各方竞争博弈的夹缝中不断获利。“然而，这也导致新德里不仅失去了同中国和俄罗斯的传统友谊和善意，另一方面却并没有收获来自美国及其庞大盟友阵营的战略信任。”林民旺说，印度现在成为了一个“孤独的崛起大国”。与此同时，印度的邻国马尔代夫、孟加拉等国也对新德里产生了反感情绪。
On India-China ties, the report says:
“Since the border conflict between China and India during Modi's second term, the relationship between the two countries has not been able to turn around. Lin Minwang believes that Modi did have the opportunity to mend bilateral relations with China, but he chose another path, sending a signal to China that New Delhi has placed its bet on the United States in the strategic competition between China and the US. However, in April of this year, Modi mentioned in an interview with the US magazine ‘Newsweek’ that the stability of India-China relations is crucial for the entire region and the world. He believes that the two countries urgently need to address the long-standing border situation through diplomatic and military contacts. Lin Minwang predicts that in Modi's possible third term, there is little likelihood of either improvement or further deterioration in Sino-Indian relations. ‘Various past developments have shown that Modi lacks the willingness to improve Sino-Indian relations, and in his potential third term, neither Modi nor the BJP may have the capacity to improve this important bilateral relationship,’ said Lin Minwang. However, Modi also cannot bear the responsibility for allowing Sino-Indian relations to continue to deteriorate. Compared with political and security relations, Modi's plan to promote the transfer of industrial chain and supply chain from China to India is likely to continue to advance. According to previous reports by Reuters and other media outlets, in order to fulfil his election promise of transforming India into a global manufacturing hub, Modi plans to implement a series of pro-business policies in the next five years. Modi's move aims to position India as an ‘alternative choice’ for global companies seeking to diversify their supply chains and reduce dependence on supply chains from China.” 自中印两国在莫迪第二任期内发生边境冲突后，两国关系始终没有实现转圜。林民旺认为，莫迪并非没有机会与中国修复双边关系，但他却选择了另一条道路，这给中国释放的信号是——新德里已经在中美竞争的战略博弈中下注了美国。不过，今年4月，莫迪在接受美国《新闻周刊》专访时提到，印度和中国关系的稳定对整个地区和世界来说都很重要。他认为，两国迫切需要解决边境的长期局势，通过外交和军事层面进行接触。林民旺预测，在莫迪可能的第三任期中，中印关系改善和继续下行的可能性都不大。“此前种种情况证明莫迪没有改善中印关系的意愿，而在其可能的第三任期，莫迪和印人党甚至可能都不具备改善这一重要双边关系的能力”，林民旺说，但莫迪同样也无法承担让中印关系继续恶化的责任。相比于政治和安全关系，莫迪推动产业链供应链从中国向印度转移的计划大概率会继续推进。据路透社等媒体此前报道，为实现将印度转变为全球制造中心的竞选承诺，莫迪计划在下一个5年任期内采取一连串亲商政策。莫迪此举旨在寻求把印度打造为全球企业实现供应链多元化、摆脱对中国供应链依赖的“替代选择”.
Qian Feng chimes in that “the Indian elite generally believes that the strategic rivalry between China and the United States presents an opportunity for India. Therefore, India will continue to strive to narrow the economic gap with China and seek to achieve ‘economic substitution’ with China to a certain extent, although this goal is not easy to achieve. He believes that in his third term, Modi is expected to continue his ‘tough but pragmatic’ policy towards China. However, Modi's diminishing influence in the new government may pose more challenges for Sino-Indian relations. “打造‘印度制造’以替代中国，已是目前印度执政精英的普遍共识。”钱峰对《环球时报》记者表示，印度的精英阶层普遍认为，中美博弈是印度的战略机遇期，因此，印度接下来也将继续致力于缩小和中国的经济差距，寻求在一定程度上实现对华“经济替代”，尽管这一目标并不容易实现。他认为，在其第三个任期，莫迪预计将延续对中国“强硬但务实”的政策。不过，莫迪本人在新政府中话语权的下降，或将为中印关系带来更多挑战.
IV. Xinhua’s analytical report
In this report, Liu Zongyi, director of the South Asia Research Center of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, says that the NDA’s win was a product of three factors:
Modi and the BJP were good at leveraging Hindu nationalism to win over Hindu voters
The BJP used its ‘ruling advantage’ to suppress the opposition
The BJP and the RSS have strong organisational and mobilisation capabilities
刘宗义认为，印人党最终赢下选举，除了莫迪的个人影响力因素外，还有以下几个原因：一是莫迪及印人党善于利用意识形态，不断使印度教民族主义在全国渗透，拉拢印度教选民；二是印人党运用执政优势打压反对派，包括开展针对反对派主要人物刑事调查、冻结反对派竞选资金等；三是印人党组织能力相对较强，能发动基数庞大的基层人员挨家挨户动员印度教徒出门为印人党投票。
Mao Keji, from the International Cooperation Center of the National Development and Reform Commission, says that in a coalition government “related parties not only have the leverage to negotiate for more influential cabinet minister positions but are also likely to bargain on specific policy formulation, imposing multifaceted constraints on Modi's governance.” 舆论普遍认为，莫迪3.0时代必然面对一条充满困难和挑战的执政之路，反对党联盟拿下超过230个议席，势必会在议会制约莫迪。中国国家发展改革委国际合作中心助理研究员毛克疾说，由于此次大选中印人党所获议席不足半数，不得不与执政联盟中其他政党组成联合政府，相关政党不仅可以对印人党“坐地起价”，争取更多有实权的内阁部长职位，大概率还会在具体政策制定上讨价还价，对莫迪执政形成多方位的掣肘.