Special Edition: Indian Foreign Policy as Viewed from China
A translation of the views of Hu Shisheng via the Sinification newsletter
This is a special edition of the Tracking People’s Daily newsletter, featuring a cross-publication with Thomas des Garets Geddes’ excellent Sinification newsletter, which translates and summarises writings by Chinese analysts on a range of subjects. Thomas is not only the founder and editor of Sinification, he is also an Associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).
The post today offers a detailed summary of a recent article by Hu Shisheng on Indian foreign policy and India-China relations. Hu is the Director of the Institute for South Asian Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.
Introduction by Manoj Kewalramani
Historically, the relationship between the modern Indian and Chinese states has been characterised by strands of cooperation, competition and even conflict. These continue to co-exist, although increasingly both countries seem to be viewing each other through the threat rather than opportunity prism. This has meant that contestation and volatility have become the defining characteristics of the relationship. In this regard, I concur with Hu’s assessment that ties are likely to be characterised by “cold hostility.” Despite the outcomes of the recent elections in India, this situation is likely to persist for the foreseeable future, owing to the following structural factors.
First, both India and China are rising powers and major economies. Over the past three decades, both have witnessed simultaneous expansion in their respective interests and capabilities to pursue those interests. This has engendered greater friction between the two sides. Unfortunately, in the article below, Hu characterises this situation as India “pushing the boundaries” on China-related issues. This belies an appreciation of India’s genuine interests in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, for example.
Second, while both countries have experienced a simultaneous rise, the pace of this growth has been sharply uneven, favouring China. Consequently, structurally, there now exists a deep power asymmetry between the two countries. It is worth highlighting that with enhanced capability and acknowledging the asymmetry, Beijing appears to have grown less risk-averse when it comes to deploying force. In response, India appears to have not only sought to invest in its expanding economic development and defence capabilities but has also pivoted towards greater external balancing, with partners like the US, France, Australia and Japan. Chinese analytical writing on the issue has rarely been introspective of the implications of Beijing’s actions on India’s choices. The present article by Hu also fails to engage in this.
Third, the shifting balance of power between the United States and China and the changing nature of their bilateral engagement are impinging on Sino-Indian ties. One key aspect of this is Beijing’s myopic and US-centric worldview. Often, Chinese discourse and analyses tend to discount the agency of actors like India, viewing them primarily from the perspective of the China-US strategic competition. This is also evident in Hu’s analysis below. However, Hu does seem to view the India-US relationship as deeply transactional and not without friction, acknowledging India’s desire to maintain its strategic autonomy.
— Manoj Kewalramani
Key Points
Indian foreign policy has flourished under Modi, but its “adventurism”, “opportunism” and double-dealing have been sources of growing diplomatic tensions.
Furthermore, the “inclusive” and “reformed” multilateralism that New Delhi advocates contradicts the “exclusive multilateralism” that it practises.
India’s diplomatic dynamism and assertiveness have been enabled by four main factors: indulgence by the West; India’s growing economic might; rising Hindu nationalism and strongman politics; as well as a belief that “destruction enables construction”.
New Delhi’s new-found confidence and determination to position itself as the leader of the developing world risk making multilateral organisations like the SCO and BRICS dysfunctional.
India’s “Neighbourhood First” policy is essentially an “India First” policy in disguise.
Coupled with its “divide and rule” and arm-twisting tactics in the region, anti-India sentiment is on the rise and New Delhi’s influence over its neighbours is declining.
Despite latent mistrust between the US and India, ties will continue to strengthen, with New Delhi helping Washington contain China in exchange for greater geopolitical sway in and around the Indian Ocean.
The US will continue to encourage India both to decouple from China and Russia and to increase its technological, military and political dependence on the West. However, New Delhi is unlikely to relinquish its strategic autonomy and become a pawn of the US.
In future, India will continue playing the world’s major powers off against one another and provoking Beijing on sensitive issues.
Sino-Indian relations are set to evolve into a state of “cold hostility” and “non-violent, non-cooperative” coexistence.
The Author
Name: Hu Shisheng (胡仕胜)
Year of Birth: 1968 (age: 55/56)
Position: Director of the Institute for South Asian Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)
Research focus: South Asia (India, Pakistan and Afghanistan in particular) and Tibet
Other: Worked on projects for various Chinese ministries and commissions such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Civil Affairs and presumably China’s Ministry of State Security (to which CICIR is affiliated).
Education: BA-MA Peking University; PhD CICIR (2006)
Experience abroad: Visiting Scholar at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in 2004
IS THE DYNAMIC AND TENSION-FILLED DIPLOMACY OF MODI’S GOVERNMENT SET TO CONTINUE?
Hu Shisheng (胡仕胜)
Published by World Affairs (世界知识) in June 2024
Lightly edited machine translation
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Prime Minister's Office (GODL-India), GODL-India, via Wikimedia Commons
I. Introduction
The ten years of Modi in power have been a decade of significant developments in India’s diplomacy. Its self-identification as a "leading power" has driven Modi's diplomacy to flourish in multiple directions [四面开花]. At the same time, the strategic indulgence [战略纵容] of the US and the West has resulted in Modi's dynamic and tension-filled diplomacy. Whether India can maintain this type of diplomacy depends not only on the outcomes of the Indian and US elections but also on the trajectory of great power rivalry.
II. Features
Since Modi became Prime Minister in 2014, he has clearly articulated India's role as a "leading major power", promoting "reformed multilateralism" and practicing "multi-alignment" diplomacy. He has seized strategic opportunities such as the US-China rivalry, the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine crisis to create a strategic environment conducive to India's accelerated rise, aiming to realise the dream of becoming a developed nation by the centenary of India's independence. It is for these reasons that Modi's diplomacy is full of dynamism and tension.
This dynamism is evident in [India’s] diplomatic breakthroughs. Modi is the most travelled Prime Minister of India since its independence in 1947. From 2014 to 2019, Modi made 91 visits abroad, achieving multiple diplomatic breakthroughs. For instance, over ten years, Modi visited the US six times, becoming the only Indian Prime Minister to address a joint session of the US Congress twice. He made the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Israel and established summits between India and the South Pacific island nations, Central Asian countries and Europe’s Nordic countries. He initiated the online "Voice of Global South" summit, inviting leaders from 125 countries to participate. He has also actively pursued a "Neighbourhood First" policy, becoming the first Indian Prime Minister in 17 years to visit Nepal, the first in 28 years to visit Sri Lanka and the first in 11 years to visit Pakistan. Additionally, Modi has launched or actively participated in various development initiatives such as the "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework" (IPEF), the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), the Australia-India-Japan "Supply Chain Resilience Initiative" (SCRI), the India-Israel-US-UAE (I2U2) quadrilateral cooperation mechanism and the "Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation" (BIMSTEC). He has also become a core member of various minilateral security dialogues, including India's "2+2" (Foreign and Defence Ministers) bilateral dialogues with the US, Japan and Australia, and the US-Japan-Australia-India "Quadrilateral Security Dialogue" (The Quad). Additionally, India has collaborated with the US and other Western countries to turn their "Indo-Pacific Strategies" from concepts to reality, making this the most important platform for India to participate in great power geopolitical competition.
Dynamism and tension are also evident in [India’s] diplomatic "neutrality". Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar once stated that "we need to take risks" and that "[India's grand strategy] require[s] advancing national interests by identifying and exploiting opportunities created by global contradictions”.1 One can say that Modi's diplomacy is a high-stakes game.
During the Ukraine crisis, Modi walked a tightrope, publicly warning Russian President Vladimir Putin that "now is not an era for war" while also heavily criticising Western policies towards Russia. In addition, Modi’s government reduced the frequency and type of its high-level interactions with Russia yet became simultaneously the largest buyer of discounted Russian oil, indirectly helping Russia break Western economic sanctions.
Modi struck a balance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. When the newest round of conflict broke out, Modi was quick to condemn Hamas's attack on Israel. However, the large number of civilian casualties in Gaza and the widespread international attention led the Indian government to adjust its public stance in a timely manner, calling for an immediate ceasefire and dialogue to resolve the conflict.
In the Middle East, Modi engaged in a "love triangle". Ignoring US sanctions, the Modi administration signed a ten-year contract with Iran in May this year for the development and operation of Chabahar Port (the first time India has been granted the right to manage an overseas port). At the same time, India initiated a new chapter in India-Israel relations and significantly enhanced economic and strategic relations with Gulf Arab states.
In defence cooperation, India has sought to “have it both ways" [“两头要”]. It has continued to institutionalise and legalise defence cooperation with the US, signing the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Intelligence (BECA), making India a de facto "non-treaty ally" of the US. However, India continues to purchase large quantities of military equipment from Russia, including the S-400 missile defence system, despite the threat of US sanctions.
[In addition,] dynamism and tension are reflected in its diplomatic “verbal sparring” [“呛声”]. Since Modi came to power, Western countries have frequently and sternly criticised his government for “suppressing political dissent”, “restricting freedom of the press”, “discriminating against minority rights” and so on. However, Modi’s government has not only denounced this criticism as “imperialist hypocrisy” but has also taken countermeasures in response. For instance, in March this year, it arrested Arvind Kejriwal, the leader of the opposition party Aam Aadmi Party, on charges of corruption. In response, US and German officials made public statements, politely reminding India of the “importance of the rule of law”. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs called such remarks “totally unacceptable” and promptly summoned India-based US and German diplomats.
Dynamism and tension are also reflected in India’s diplomatic “adventurism and opportunism” [“冒进与投机”].
By “pushing the boundaries” [“擦边球”] on China-related issues. Modi’s government openly characterises Sino-Indian relations as a “competitive relationship” and no longer hesitates to intervene in sensitive China-related matters. This is especially true with regards to issues such as the South China Sea, Taiwan and the Sino-Indian border disputes, where it frequently “pushes the envelope”, echoing certain strategic expectations of the US and its allies.
By “assassinating” anti-India figures in Western countries. In 2023, India allegedly “assassinated” Sikh separatist leaders hiding in Canada and the US, which triggered diplomatic disputes. As a result, India and Canada expelled dozens of each other’s diplomats and US President Biden “politely declined” to attend this year’s Indian Republic Day celebrations at the last minute.
By carrying out cross-border airstrikes against Pakistan. In February 2019, a terrorist attack in Pulwama in the Indian-controlled Kashmir region killed 40 Indian paramilitary soldiers. India accused the Pakistan-based extremist group Jaish-e-Mohammed of orchestrating the attack and immediately dispatched its air force to strike “terrorist camps” within Pakistan.
By using host diplomacy to push its own agenda. For instance, in 2023, India, with the rotating presidency of the G20 in hand, held successively the G20 Science Conference in the southern Tibetan region of what India calls “Arunachal Pradesh” and the G20 Tourism Conference in the Indian-controlled Kashmir region, using the opportunity to assert its “sovereignty” over disputed areas and seek international endorsement.
III. Drivers
The reason why Modi diplomacy is “full of dynamism and tension” is mainly due to four factors:
It is due to the strategic indulgence of the Western camp towards Modi’s government. The US, in particular, views India as a strategic partner and a key variable in containing China’s rise. However, India has a tradition of “strategic duplicity” [“战略反骨”], so Western countries can only hope to achieve their strategic goals by practicing strategic tolerance or even connivance [战略包容甚至纵容] towards India. Naturally, this strategic tolerance will continue to encourage the Modi administration to pursue more confident and aggressive policies in international and regional affairs, thereby forming a self-reinforcing loop [一个自我加强的闭环].
It is the result of India’s growing overall power. In 2022, India surpassed the UK to become the world’s fifth-largest economy, significantly boosting India’s confidence in regional and international affairs. India no longer cares about China’s feelings and sells or gifts advanced military equipment to countries like the Philippines and other Southeast Asian nations, going so far as to support openly those countries’ erroneous [territorial] claims in the South China Sea. These are typical manifestations of this [new attitude].
It is the result of promoting [Modi’s] Hindu nationalist political agenda. During Modi’s ten years in power, Hindu nationalism and even populism have been prevalent in India. The toughness and adventurism displayed in Modi’s diplomacy cater to India’s rising nationalism, which in turn encourages Modi’s government to persist with its foreign policy regardless of what others think [“我行我素”].
It is due to the cultivation of Modi’s strongman image. Modi has always strived to portray himself as the “guardian” of India’s national interests. He has even presented himself to the Indian public holding a trident, imitating the image of Shiva, one of the three major Hindu deities, conveying a strong signal of his firm belief in the governing principle of “no construction without destruction” [“不破不立”].
IV. Negative Repercussions
However, Modi's dynamic and tension-filled diplomacy has also brought about obvious negative effects:
It has caused tensions in relations between major powers. On one hand, India advocates “reformed multilateralism” with emerging and developing nations, while on the other, it joins the US and the West in promoting camp-based multilateral diplomacy [阵营化多边外交] under the banner of “democratic values”. This opposition and competition between "inclusive multilateralism" and "exclusive multilateralism" have generated numerous internal tensions within the international community and other regional communities, thereby partially offsetting Modi's diplomatic achievements.
This type of tension undermines internal unity and cooperation among emerging powers. The Modi administration’s strategy to build [India] into a "leading major power" entails a vision of India as the “leader” [领头羊] among developing countries. However, due to its limited strength [实力有限] and obvious differences with major emerging powers like China and Russia in terms of the roles to be played, approaches to be used and objectives to be pursued when cooperating with one another, India faces friction and even conflict with these countries when it promotes forcefully its envisioned role [as the leader of the Global South].
This type of tension also affects to some extent India’s strategic interactions with the US and other Western countries. Modi's government aims for India to become a "major leading power" rather than a Washington-led military ally of the US. This goal conflicts fundamentally with the US’s intention to use India as a strategic tool to maintain American hegemony. Over the past decade, this tension [互斥的张力] has often manifested itself through diplomatic spats as well as minor trade sanctions and counter-sanctions between India and the US. However, if the US-China rivalry were to show any signs of easing or even going back [to more friendly times], these minor frictions between the US and India of the past decade might escalate into significant conflicts, thereby impacting strategic trust between the two sides. In recent years, the Biden administration has focused much of its efforts on the Western Pacific region, promoting minilateral security cooperation mechanisms with its allies. This indicates that the US has lowered its expectations of India in its strategy to contain and blockade China.
Regional and global governance are inevitably prone to falling into disarray. Tensions among major powers have put some minilateral mechanisms at risk of operating inefficiently or even failing. Among these, the BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) have increasingly been encountering operational difficulties. Particularly, India's constant attempts to be the leading voice and rule-setter [within these groups], with the intention of driving their agendas and operations according to its own plans, are making it increasingly difficult for these two mechanisms – which were originally intended to deepen Sino-Indian cooperation in regional and global governance – to function as they should.
Neighbouring countries inevitably harbour suspicion and fear towards India. Modi’s “Neighbourhood First” policy is characterised by a mix of wooing and pressure. It is essentially an “India First” [strategy]. Under the combined effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the crisis in Ukraine, India's neighbours have fallen into political and economic difficulties. Modi's government has taken advantage of this to divide and rule, leveraging the power of capital (large conglomerates) to strip these countries of their autonomy in resource development while weakening their domestic and foreign policy autonomy. Consequently, anti-India sentiment has surged in South Asian countries. Street movements demanding "India out" have occurred successively in Nepal, the Maldives, and Bangladesh. Bhutan and Sri Lanka have occasionally defied Modi's "diplomatic dictates" [“外交限令”] when it comes to their policies towards China. Nepal and Sri Lanka have also engaged in territorial sovereignty disputes against India. It is evident that in recent years, the effectiveness of Modi's diplomacy has shown a stark contrast domestically and internationally—while shining brightly [“大放异彩”] on the global stage, India's regional influence has declined significantly.
V. Whither Indian Diplomacy?
Over the next five years, one can expect Modi’s government to make full use of the rivalry between great powers, striving both to maintain and extend the current “period of strategic opportunity” conducive to India's rise as a major power. It will focus especially on creating a favourable external environment [for India] based on three main needs: ensuring access to global strategic resources, completing domestic political projects as efficiently as possible and controlling the process of reshaping the order in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.
First, US-India relations will continue to strengthen. The next five years are critical both for the US to win in its competition with China and for India in its bid to “replace” China [“替代”中国]. Even if both countries undergo leadership changes following their general elections, US-India relations will continue on their current path. As long as the US-China rivalry does not show signs of increasingly tilting in China’s favour, India will continue to bet on "joining hands with the West to counter China" [“与西谋华”]. Furthermore, to further its focus on the strategic competition in the Western Pacific region, and in exchange for New Delhi’s support of the US's strategy to contain China in the Western Pacific, the US may provide more explicit support to India’s leadership in the Indian Ocean region.
Of course, there are also latent concerns on both sides of the US-India relationship. Given the "painful lesson" of failing to prevent China's rise, the US will undoubtedly keep a card up its sleeve as it “pulls India in to counter China” [“拉印制华”]. The US is set to accelerate the implementation of a “four-pronged decoupling” strategy [“四去”战略] vis-à-vis India:
Helping India accelerate both the decoupling of its supply chains from China and the country’s [objective] of substituting Chinese industries [对华产业替代];
Encouraging India to "decouple from Russia" when modernising its military and become militarily dependent on the US and other Western countries;
Through technological cooperation, locking India into a path that will lead it increasingly to decouple technologically from itself [i.e. to “de-Indianise”], thereby preventing the emergence of a "second China";
Under these three decoupling strategies, maximising the weakening of India's will and ability to preserve its "strategic autonomy" – which amounts to “[India’s] decoupling from its own strategic autonomy” [“去战略自主化”] – ultimately turning India's rise into a "harmless economic boom" [“无害繁荣”] as desired by the US. At the same time, the US's strategic suppression and containment [打压与遏制] of Russia and China serve as a reminder to India, which is pursuing its dream to become a great power, to always safeguard its "strategic autonomy".
Second, India will continue to navigate the strategic rivalries among the major camps in the “East, West, South and North”, continuously building its status and influence as a "major leading power”. Under the "Indo-Pacific strategy" framework [Note: India has not published a formal Indo-Pacific strategy], India will take advantage of the US's focus on its strategic rivalry in the Western Pacific region (especially its strategic containment of China) to increase its management and control of both the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean, while continuously curtailing [压制] China's visible presence in the region.
Third, New Delhi will continue to dip its finger in sensitive issues related to China. To maintain the West’s strategic support for India’s rise, and to increase the country’s leverage in its rivalry with China, India’s new government will probably continue "pushing the envelope" on China-related issues. However, considering the significant disparity in power between China and India, New Delhi will neither want to break relations with China completely nor will it be willing to serve as 'cannon fodder' for the West’s containment of China. In future, Sino-Indian relations may continue to be characterised by “cold hostility” [冷暴力] or “non-violent non-cooperative” coexistence [“非暴力不合作”共存].
Last, India's Middle East policy may fall into a state of disarray. The latest round of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its spillover effects continue unresolved, making it increasingly difficult for India to continue its deft manoeuvring between Israel, the Arab states and Iran.
It is foreseeable that in the next five years, the Indian government's dynamic and tension-filled diplomacy will continue to operate as it has recently. However, it will strive for a better balance between geopolitical considerations and the demands of long-term national interests.