Strengthening Organisational Work - More on Supervising 'Leading Officials' - Li's Nationwide Call on Market Entities - 'CIA-izing' the Origin Probe

Here are the stories and pieces from the People’s Daily’s June 3, 2021, edition that I found noteworthy.

Page 1: The front page leads with a long, long piece collating Xi’s comments over the years on building an ecological civilisation. The piece begins on the front page and then takes all of Page 2. Anyway, not reading this. What I am interested in is the brief note about the new regulations on the Party’s organisational work. The full regulations are printed on Page 5. Let’s look at these first.

Article 1 of the document tells us the objective that it aims to achieve, i.e., “These Regulations are formulated in accordance with the Constitution of the Communist Party of China and relevant laws in order to thoroughly implement Xi Jinping's thought of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era, implement the general requirements for party building and the party's organisational line in the new era...”

Article 3 then emphasises “political construction,” bringing together “high-quality cadres who are loyal and clean,” and who are patriotic and dedicated. This is sort of the red and expert emphasis. But it’s important to note that “political construction” has to be maintained as the lead factor. 以党的政治建设为统领.

Article 7 outlines the tasks of Party committees at all levels; and Article 8 talks about the tasks of the organisation departments at different levels. Interesting, even the responsibility of managing civil servants falls within the purview of these departments. I am unaware if this used to be the case before; but it clearly underscores how the Party exerts control over the state. 

Articles 11 and 12 tell us that the Central Committee, the Politburo and the PSC are the “brain and the center” 脑和中枢 of the entire system, with local Party committees required to “play a leading role in overall planning and coordination...comprehensively lead the economic and social development of the region, take overall responsibility for party building in the region, and fulfil their duties of taking the direction, managing the overall situation, making decisions and ensuring implementation.” 第十二条 党的地方委员会在本地区发挥总揽全局、协调各方的领导作用，全面领导本地区经济社会发展，全面负责本地区党的建设，履行把方向、管大局、作决策、保落实职责. 

Article 13 talks about the significance of grassroots organisations, and stresses on the need to “strengthen the construction of grassroots party organizations such as in enterprises, rural areas, government agencies, schools, hospitals, scientific research institutes, neighborhood communities, and social organizations…”

Article 15 tells us that in recruiting members, one should take into account general requirements about the structure of the organisation, quality of individuals, but what should be in the lead are “political standards.” 

“Party member education should take the study and implementation of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era as the primary political task, organize centralized education within the party and regular education for party members, insist on a combination of organizational training and individual self-study, and guide party members to not forget the original intention, remember the mission and unremitting struggle.” 党员教育应当把学习贯彻习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想作为首要政治任务，组织开展党内集中教育和党员经常性教育，坚持组织培训和个人自学相结合，引导党员不忘初心、牢记使命、不懈奋斗.

Article 18 makes it even clearer:

“Party organizations at all levels and all party members must resolutely safeguard General Secretary Xi Jinping's position as the core of the CPC Central Committee and the whole party, resolutely safeguard the authority and centralized and unified leadership of the CPC Central Committee, and insist that individual party members obey the Party organization, the minority obey the majority, subordinate organizations obey superior organizations, and all party organizations and all party members obey the Party’s National Congress and Central Committee.” 第十八条 各级党组织和全体党员必须坚决维护习近平总书记党中央的核心、全党的核心地位，坚决维护党中央权威和集中统一领导，坚持党员个人服从党的组织，少数服从多数，下级组织服从上级组织，全党各个组织和全体党员服从党的全国代表大会和中央委员会.

The next section on Cadre Work runs from Articles 19 to 30. They talk about the importance of political integrity, training, work style, ideological work, cadre selection system, developing an incentive system, Party’s control over civil servants and maintaining ideological line with regard to retired cadres, etc.

The fifth section is about Talent Work. Some bits here are intriguing. For instance, Article 31 says that “adhere to the principle that the Party manages talents, establish the strategic position that talents lead development, follow the laws of socialist market economy and talent growth, break down the ideological concepts and institutional and institutional obstacles that constrain talent development...第三十一条  坚持党管人才原则，确立人才引领发展的战略地位，遵循社会主义市场经济规律和人才成长规律，破除束缚人才发展的思想观念和体制机制障碍...”

The goal of this approach as mentioned later is to “cultivate a large number of high-quality talents with both ability and political integrity.” Article 34 then has another rather intriguing point:

“Establish a global vision and strategic vision, implement a more active, open and effective talent policy, adhere to the use-oriented principle, and gather talents from all over the world to use them...条 树立全球视野和战略眼光，实行更加积极、更加开放、更加有效的人才政策，坚持以用为本，聚天下英才而用之.

The final section of note after this is about supervision.

Also on Page 5 is a commentary around these regulations. It says that “as a Marxist party, our party must not only be politically mature, but also organizationally consolidated.” The writer then tells us what is apparent from the breakdown above:

“The most fundamental thing in studying and implementing the ‘Regulations’ is to uphold the party’s overall leadership over organizational work. We must adhere to the guidance of Xi Jinping’s Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, resolutely implement the spirit of General Secretary Jinping’s important instructions and the Party Central Committee’s decision-making arrangements, strengthen the ‘four consciousnesses’, strengthen the ‘four self-confidences’, and achieve the two safeguards.’ 学习贯彻《条例》，最根本的是坚持党对组织工作的全面领导. 要坚持以习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想为指导，坚决贯彻落实习近平总书记重要指示批示精神和党中央决策部署，增强“四个意识”、坚定“四个自信”、做到“两个维护”.

Anyway, returning to the front page, we have three pieces about Xi’s chats with foreign leaders. First, speaking to Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev (English report), he touched upon BRI-linked cooperation in fields like “industrial capacity, trade, agriculture and infrastructure.” He also talked about “green energy, artificial intelligence, e-commerce, digital finance,” and his desire to build “a green Silk Road, a health Silk Road and a digital Silk Road.” Finally, Xinhua’s report also mentions “cooperation in law enforcement, security, defense and other areas, so as to jointly maintain peace and tranquility in the region.”

PD reports Tokayev as saying that “Kazakhstan and China are permanent and comprehensive strategic partners. Under any circumstances, Kazakhstan will never do anything that harms China's interests.”

Speaking to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Xi said that (PD version) ties “now stand at a new historical starting point.” 

Okay, so here I am going to engage in some self-criticism.I think if I’ve been under-reading/underplaying this bit about “new historical starting point” in Xi’s comments. I’ve generally treated them as one of the many standard, repetitive lines in such reports. But if you think about it, he’s basically saying that China is not what it used to be; so one should not expect it to behave like it used to. That’s as clear as he can get, right? 

Anyway, Xi added that he “supports the development path chosen by the Azerbaijani people on the basis of their national conditions, and regards Azerbaijan as an important partner” for BRI. He promised to buy more Azerbaijani products and encourage Chinese firms to invest there. He also wants the two sides to work to “promote the building of Asia-Europe transport corridors.” He talked about providing COVID-19-related support and support with regard to China’s poverty alleviation experience.

Aliyev said that “China is Azerbaijan's true partner, and Azerbaijan has been, and will always be firmly supportive of China's position on issues related to Taiwan, Hong Kong and Xinjiang.” He also backed the Beijing 2022 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games. By the way, India’s also backed the Games, as per the BRICS communique that I discussed yesterday.

Finally, we have Xi’s chat with Luis Abinader (English version), president of the Dominican Republic, which established diplomatic ties with the PRC in May 2018, after switching away from Taiwan. Xi said that “China welcomes imports of specialty agro-products from the Dominican Republic, and supports Chinese enterprises in investing and launching business in the Dominican Republic.” He wants more cooperation on “international and regional issues” to “jointly safeguard international fairness and justice as well as the rights and interests of developing countries.” He also wants the Dominican Republic to “play a positive role in promoting relations between China and the Caribbean and Central American countries…” Abinader thanked Xi for the vaccines provided and reiterated that his country “sticks firmly to the one-China policy.”

Also on the page, we have a report about Li Zhanshu speaking with Solomon Islands’ parliament speaker John Patteson Oti. This too is a country that in 2019 switched from Taiwan to the PRC. Li said that “China appreciates the Solomon Islands’ adherence to the one-China principle and its firm support for China's core interests and major concerns, such as Taiwan, Xinjiang and Hong Kong.” He wants to “strengthen mutual political support” and work on dealing with the pandemic and deepen cooperation on “infrastructure, agriculture, forestry and fishing on the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).” He also wants to “promote exchanges among special committees through flexible means, and “approve and revise legal documents conducive to the development of bilateral relations, while providing legal guarantees for the joint construction of the BRI.”

Okay, finally on the page, we have a report on Li Keqiang speaking (short English version) at a nationwide teleconference by the State Council on “deepening reforms to streamline administrative approval, delegate power to lower levels, and improve regulations and services.” PD tells us that Han Zheng presided over the meeting. Vice Premiers of the State Council Sun Chunlan, Hu Chunhua, and Liu He, and State Councilors Wei Fenghe, Wang Yong, Xiao Jie, and Zhao Kezhi attended the meeting. Wonder why Wang Yi wasn’t in attendance. He’s the only State Councilor missing from the list.

Li said that while China had made a steady recovery after the COVID-19 shock of 2020, “the domestic and external environment remains complicated and grim.” He called for pressing ahead with reforms “to help market entities achieve further recovery.” This includes reforming finance, providing support for employment, and decentralization of regulation and service. 

He added that “we must strive to simplify administration, deepen the reform of the administrative approval system, remove unreasonable obstacles that restrict the development of enterprises, make market entry and exit more convenient, and promote market metabolism; innovate and improve market supervision, and treat all types of market entities equally. Oppose monopoly and unfair competition, protect the legal rights and development space of market entities, especially small and micro enterprises, individual businesses, and resolutely maintain the bottom line of quality and safety.市场化方面要力行简政之道，深化行政审批制度改革，破除束缚企业发展的不合理障碍，让市场主体准入退出更便捷，促进市场新陈代谢；创新和完善市场监管，对各类市场主体一视同仁，反对垄断和不正当竞争，保护市场主体特别是小微企业、个体工商户合法权益和发展空间，坚决守住质量和安全底线；推进政务服务优化，用制度和技术办法让市场主体依规办事不求人成为常态.

“Efforts should also go” he added “into creating a market-oriented, law-based, and internationalized business environment.”

Page 3: First up, we have a short report telling us that the China-Afghanistan-Pakistan FM’s dialogue will be taking place today. We learn that they will talk about “the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan, trilateral practical cooperation, and anti-terrorism security cooperation.” 

Next, we have a report (English version) on the call between Liu He and Janet Yellen. The report says that “in the spirit of equality and mutual trust, they conducted extensive exchanges on the macroeconomic situation and bilateral and multilateral cooperation, candidly exchanged views on issues of mutual concern, and expressed willingness to maintain communication.” Here’s WSJ’s coverage of the call. It’s not clear what was specifically discussed, but one assumes, based on reports, that currency valuation would have been part of it.

Finally, a forum on China-ASEAN media cooperation. For those watching China’s discourse power quest, this is a useful data point.

Page 6: We have a long piece drawing from the document regarding the supervision of the top leaders or as Xinhua English translates it, “leading officials.” It also translates “leading groups” as the “key few.” I’d done a breakdown of the document yesterday. The piece today interprets the document. It tells us that “this is the first special document formulated by the party for the supervision of ‘leading officials’ and the leading groups.” The piece says that this document is of “great significance” because these “leading officials” should “set an example and take the lead in enhancing the four consciousnesses, strengthening the four self-confidences, and achieving the two safeguards.” 

Also this:

“As the key of the ‘key few, ‘leading officials’ are endowed with important powers and shoulder the political responsibility of governing the party; they are also the top priority when it comes to inner-party supervision. Judging from the cases of violation of discipline and law that have been investigated, the violation of discipline and law by the ‘leading officials’ are most likely to produce catalytic and chain reactions, and even lead to corruption in a regional, systematic and cascading manner.” (连锁反应，甚至造成区域性、系统性、塌方式腐败).”

Also note this: “To administer the party strictly in an all-round way, we must first look at it politically. With regard to the issue of the supervision of ‘leading officials’ and the leadership team, we must first look at it politically before we can see it more clearly.” 全面从严治党首先要从政治上看。对“一把手”和领导班子监督问题，首先要从政治上看，才能看得更明白.

Anyway, the rest of the points mentioned herein I’ve covered yesterday.

Page 7: The only noteworthy piece for me was a Zhong Sheng commentary, the fourth in the series on COVID-19’s origin and traceability.

This one says that “recently, the US government issued a so-called statement regarding the investigation of the origin of the novel coronavirus. In this statement with only more than 300 English words, the term ‘intelligence agency’ appeared 6 times, but ‘science’ was never mentioned. From the use of such phrases as ‘assigning intelligence agencies to prepare an up-to-date analysis report on the origin of Covid-19’ and ‘requiring intelligence agencies to redouble their efforts to collect and analyze information,’ people can only draw the conclusion that the United States is trying to ‘CIA-ize’ the task of tracing the origins of the COVID-19.” 近日，美国政府发表了一份有关调查新冠病毒起源的所谓声明. 在这份仅300多个英文单词的声明中，“情报机构”出现了6次，“科学”却一次也没有被提及. 从“指派情报机构准备一份有关新冠病毒起源的最新分析报告”“要求情报机构加倍努力搜集并分析信息”等措辞中，人们只能得出这样的结论：美方正试图将新冠病毒溯源“中情局化”.

The piece then points to the Iraq WMD scandal, the Syria chemical weapons scandal, Pompeo’s comments about lying, cheating and stealing, which are staple in Chinese media, some comments by former CIA Director Allen Dulles about moulding people’s minds and shaping their values, etc. The author then accuses American politicians of underestimating the IQ of people around the world.

It concludes by saying that “the tracing of the source of the novel coronavirus should rely on scientists rather than intelligence agents, should uphold a fair stand and not engage in ‘presumption of guilt’, and should take the road of solidarity and cooperation rather than inciting opposition.”

Page 14: The Theory page today has a piece by Liu Qi, Party Secretary from Jiangxi discussing the modalities to estimate and realise the value of ecological products. Some interesting ideas in there.