Xi on Discourse - Taming 'Top Leaders' - BRICS FMs Meeting - Corruption Remains 'Severe & Complex' Challenge - Wang meets Hungary FM
Here are the pieces and stories that I found noteworthy in the June 2, 2021, edition of the People’s Daily.
Page 1: Let’s begin with the group study session of the Politburo (English report), where Xi Jinping spoke about strengthening China’s “international communication capabilities,” and got much of Twitter buzzing. Much of the commentary around the speech has focussed on this quote: “We should focus on grasping the tone, be open and confident as well as humble and modest, and strive to create a credible, lovable and respectable image of China.” 要注重把握好基调，既开放自信也谦逊谦和，努力塑造可信、可爱、可敬的中国形象.
The debate has been whether this is an acknowledgement of the so-called Wolf Warrior style of diplomacy not paying dividends and a sign of a change in track. To me, if one reads the rest of the comments that Xi’s made, it’s clear that very little is going to change. Also, there are structural reasons, which I’ve argued in a Times of India piece some time back, that suggest a change in approach is unlikely.
Xi said that “telling Chinese stories, spreading the voice of China, and presenting a true, three-dimensional and comprehensive China are important tasks for strengthening China’s international communication capabilities.”
He further added:
“It is necessary to have a deep understanding of the importance and necessity of strengthening and improving international communication work under the new situation, make great efforts to strengthen international communication capacity building, form an international discourse right that matches China’s comprehensive national strength and international status, create a favorable external public opinion environment for China's reform, development and stability, and make positive contributions to building a community of human destiny.” 要深刻认识新形势下加强和改进国际传播工作的重要性和必要性，下大气力加强国际传播能力建设，形成同我国综合国力和国际地位相匹配的国际话语权，为我国改革发展稳定营造有利外部舆论环境，为推动构建人类命运共同体作出积极贡献.
Xi praised the work that’s been done since the 18th Party Congress, saying that China’s “international discourse power and influence have been significantly improved.” But he added, “the country faces new situations and tasks.” Therefore, it is necessary to “strengthen top-level design and research layout, build a strategic communication system with distinctive Chinese characteristics, and focus on improving international communication influence, Chinese cultural appeal, Chinese image affinity, Chinese discourse persuasiveness, and international public opinion guidance.” 必须加强顶层设计和研究布局，构建具有鲜明中国特色的战略传播体系，着力提高国际传播影响力、中华文化感召力、中国形象亲和力、中国话语说服力、国际舆论引导力.
Some see this comment about strengthening top-level design as an acknowledgement of the need to tighten up on loose tongues. I see it merely as a reiteration of policy continuation.
Xi called for “interpreting China's practices by its own theories” and new concepts, domains and expressions to explain the Party’s policies and approaches. “Xi urged greater efforts to help foreign audiences understand what the Party is pursuing is nothing but the Chinese people's well-being.” He also called for widely publicizing “China's propositions, Chinese wisdom, and China's plans.” He says that “China is getting closer to the center of the world stage. It has the ability and responsibility to play a greater role in global affairs and work with other countries to make greater contributions to the solution of the problems of mankind. It is necessary to hold high the banner of a community with a shared future for mankind…”习近平强调，要广泛宣介中国主张、中国智慧、中国方案，我国日益走近世界舞台中央，有能力也有责任在全球事务中发挥更大作用，同各国一道为解决全人类问题作出更大贡献.
“We must advocate multilateralism, oppose unilateralism and hegemonism, and guide the international community to jointly shape a more just and reasonable new international order and build a new type of international relations. We must be good at using all kinds of vivid and touching examples to show that China's development itself is the greatest contribution to the world and its wisdom in solving human problems.” 要倡导多边主义，反对单边主义、霸权主义，引导国际社会共同塑造更加公正合理的国际新秩序，建设新型国际关系. 要善于运用各种生动感人的事例，说明中国发展本身就是对世界的最大贡献、为解决人类问题贡献了智慧.
The highlighted content in the previous two paragraphs tell us that contestation around norms and governance issues will continue to remain intense. There is absolutely nothing in them that suggest a change in approach.
“It is necessary to make more friends, unite and strive for the majority, and constantly expand the circle of friends of international public opinion. We should pay attention to the strategy and art of public opinion struggle, and enhance the ability to speak out on major issues. 要广交朋友、团结和争取大多数，不断扩大知华友华的国际舆论朋友圈. 要讲究舆论斗争的策略和艺术，提升重大问题对外发声能力.
This is an important comment. The bit about striving for the majority is significant. It is an indication that the current approach is not likely to change. Think about Hua Chunying’s comments with regard to the Pew Survey last year that showed China’s favorability tanking. She had said that “they only represent the western countries' perception of China, not the general view of the international community.”
Next, a short report about Xi congratulating Bashar al-Assad (English report) over his re-election as president of Syria. Xinhua reports that Xi said he “stands ready to work with Assad to take the 65th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic ties this year as an opportunity to strive for greater achievements in China-Syria relations.” He added that he “firmly supports Syria in safeguarding its national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and will provide as much assistance as its capacity allows for Syria in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic, revitalizing its economy and improving the people's well-being.”
Third, we have a commentary based on Xi’s tech speech last week. There’s been a commentary about this every day this week so far. It underscores the significance of the address within the propaganda ecosystem. This one says that while there has been significance advancement, “we should also see that the implementation of the task of reforming the science and technology system is not balanced, some major reforms are not advancing fast enough, the coordination of reforms in related fields is insufficient, and some deep-seated institutional obstacles have not been fundamentally broken.” 同时也要看到，科技体制改革任务落实还不平衡不到位，一些重大改革推进步伐不够快，相关领域改革协同不足，一些深层次制度障碍还没有根本破除.
The author emphasises the need for reform, promoting self-reliance, focussing on core technologies and choke point technologies, ensuring Party leadership over the system and the development of a national system by breaking down institutional barriers. He argues that: “Our greatest advantage is that my country’s socialist system can concentrate its efforts on major tasks. This is an important magic weapon…” 我们最大的优势是我国社会主义制度能够集中力量办大事. 这是我们成就事业的重要法宝.
He reiterates that the state should support “strategic” and “long-term” projects that involve high degrees of difficulties and risks, while allowing the market to play a “decisive role” in resource allocation. The last bit of the piece talks about evaluation standards, social contribution of technological development, talent cultivation, salaries, etc.
One cannot underscore the significance of this document. Read it in the context of the structural changes since October 2017 and the ongoing rectification campaign of the political and legal apparatus, but also in regard to recent propaganda around Party history, the Yan’an Spirit, the likeness drawn between Xi and Mao and, of course, in regard to the 20th Party Congress in 2022. Also, this is not simply about central leadership’s attempts to control local leadership. This is about Xi tightening control over the Party’s top leadership, including those in the Central Committee.
The document is dated March 27, 2021. It talks about the complex changes that are underway, arguing that these require “adhering to the centralized and unified leadership of the Party, consistently promoting the Party's great self-revolution, managing and using the ‘key minority’ with effective supervision…” 开启全面建设社会主义现代化国家新征程，向第二个百年奋斗目标进军，面临前所未有的复杂环境和风险挑战，只有毫不动摇坚持党中央集中统一领导，一以贯之推进党的伟大自我革命，以有效监督把“关键少数”管住用好，充分发挥党员领导干部的先锋模范作用和表率引领作用，才能团结带领广大干部群众战胜前进道路上的各种艰难险阻，不断取得中国特色社会主义事业新胜利.
Xinhua English tells us that “many effective measures have been implemented and experience has been accumulated in this area of work since the 18th CPC National Congress in 2012, yet the oversight on chief officials at all levels remains a weak link.” In fact, the text in PD calls this an “urgent” task. It adds that Party leaders at all levels must understand the “extreme importance and practical urgency of strengthening the supervision of the ‘top leaders’.”
Xinhua English adds that “a focus of such oversight should be political oversight, which scrutinizes the performances of chief officials and leadership teams at all levels in staying loyal to the Party and acting in accordance with the Party’s nature and purpose.” The text in PD informs us that political loyalty assessment is partly done by assessing the “implementation of the party’s line, principles and policies” and the major decisions of the Central Committee, along with “the practice of the ‘two maintenance.’” It is also important to assess whether “officials in command...willingly accept (top-down) oversight and have the courage to shoulder responsibilities in work.”
In addition, “members of a leadership team should supervise each other and engage in criticism and self-criticism...” informs Xinhua English. Now in this context, read this bit from the text in PD below, which increasingly suggests that we are entering a much more tumultuous phase in Chinese domestic politics.
“The members of the Central Committee must strictly abide by political discipline and rules. If other members are found to violate the party constitution, undermine the party's discipline, or endanger the unity and unity of the party, they shall promptly report to the Party Central Committee or report to the Standing Committee of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in real time.” 中央委员会成员必须严守政治纪律和政治规矩，发现其他成员有违反党章、破坏党的纪律、危害党的团结统一的行为，应当及时向党中央报告或者实名向中央纪委常委会反映.
This is followed by a requirement of those found deficient to adhere to the system of the “democratic life” meeting and undertake criticism and self-criticism and taking feedback from other members. 坚持民主生活会和组织生活会制度，“一把手”要带头开展批评和自我批评，领导班子成员按规定对个人有关事项以及群众反映、巡视巡察反馈、组织约谈函询的问题实事求是作出说明。
A later point talks about placing limits on the powers of members and groups by preventing “thematic meetings from making decisions in place of standing committee meetings, resolutely prevent collective violations in the name of collective decision-making by party committees, and never allow members of the leadership team to turn their work and areas into ‘private territory’ free from collective leadership and supervision.” 坚决防止以专题会议代替常委会会议作出决策，坚决防止以党委集体决策名义集体违规，决不允许领导班子成员将分管工作、分管领域变成不受集体领导和监督的“私人领地”.
This further says that “important matters must be submitted to the leadership team meeting for discussion. Leadership team members should fully express their opinions. Voting should be postponed when there are large differences of opinion. The voting results and different opinions of the meeting should be truthfully recorded and archived for future reference.” 完善领导班子议事规则，重要事项须提交领导班子会议讨论，领导班子成员应当充分发表意见，意见分歧较大时应当暂缓表决，对会议表决情况和不同意见应当如实记录、存档备查. This is an interesting glimpse into how the CCP system operates.
Also note this for lower levels of the Party and bureaucracy: “The organization department shall, jointly with the discipline inspection organs, supervise, inspect and guide the democratic life of the leading bodies of subordinate units, and focus on checking whether the ‘top leaders’ carry out criticism and self-criticism with a clear attitude, and whether the meeting really leaves people red-faced and sweating. 组织部门应当会同纪检机关对下级单位领导班子民主生活会进行督促检查和指导，重点检查“一把手”开展批评和自我批评是否态度鲜明，民主生活会是否真正红脸出汗。
There’s lots more in the document about say the management of the behaviour and business linkages of leading cadres’ spouses and children; with regard to a mechanism to assess the “political ecology” of regions; calling on the CCDI to ensure timely and “truthful” reportage of leading cadres; standardising supervision mechanisms; cadres assessment system; etc.
Page 3: The BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting gets plenty of coverage on the page today. One piece talks about Wang Yi’s comments at the meeting. PD says that Wang made four proposals, but provides no details. Xinhua English has much more detail.
First, promote global solidarity to fight the epidemic and be the guardian of human health. In this regard, Xinhua English tells us that Wang basically backed the vaccine IPR waiver proposal, and he also wants to “accelerate the construction of the BRICS vaccine research and development center, support domestic vaccine companies to transfer technology to other developing countries, carry out cooperative production, and provide assistance for the global elimination of the ‘vaccine divide’.” He also proposed “to establish an international forum for vaccine cooperation, with the participation of BRICS countries and companies.” - That sounds like an idea that I would like India to get on board with. Let’s see this happens.
Second, practice true multilateralism and be the defender of the international order; this for him, has to have the UN as the core, with “the international order” being “based on international law.”
Third, help the recovery of the world economy and be a contributor to global development. He said, “China supports the formulation of an action plan for BRICS cooperation in science and technology innovation with an aim to form new development momentum with technological innovation and digital transformation. China has established an innovation base for the BRICS partnership on new industrial revolution in the city of Xiamen, Fujian Province, and looks forward to the active participation of the BRICS countries.” He also spoke about cooperation in green technologies, calling for expanding the BRICS+ cooperation model and the BRICS New Development Bank.
resolve regional conflicts and confrontations, and be a builder of world peace. In this regard, he meant “the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Iran nuclear deal, Afghanistan, the disposal of nuclear contaminated water from the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan, and terrorism.” But he also said that BRICS countries “should resolve differences through dialogues and consultations, and carry out more preventive actions.”
Also on the page, we have the BRICS press communique (English version) and the joint statement on Strengthening and Reforming the Multilateral System (English version here).
There are many issues addressed in both these documents for me to summarise, but from the communique, this piqued my interest.
“The Ministers reiterate the need for all countries to cooperate in promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms under the principles of equality and mutual respect. They agreed to continue to treat all human rights, including the right to development, in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing and with the same emphasis. They agreed to strengthen cooperation on issues of common interests both within BRICS and in multilateral fora including the United Nations Human Rights Council, taking into account the necessity to promote, protect and fulfill human rights in a non-selective, non-politicized and constructive manner, and without double standards.”
The latter begins like this:
“the Ministers espoused their shared values of peace, freedom and rule of law, respect for human rights and democracy as well as a more fair, just, inclusive, equitable and representative multipolar international system, based on international law and the UN Charter, in particular sovereign equality of all States, respect for their territorial integrity and mutual respect for interests and concerns of all.”
There’s a lot in there about “non-interference” and “non-intervention” in internal affairs of states. It also says that “the Ministers reaffirmed the sole authority of the UN Security Council for imposing sanctions and called for further consolidation and strengthening of the working methods of UN Security Council Sanctions Committees to ensure their effectiveness, responsiveness and transparency.”
And this is noteworthy:
“The Ministers reaffirmed their support for a transparent, rules-based, open, inclusive and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system, with the World Trade Organization at its core, and in this regard reiterated their support for the necessary and urgent reform which would inter alia, preserve the centrality, core values and fundamental principles of the WTO and consider the interests of all members, including developing countries and LDCs, recognizing that the majority of the WTO members are developing countries. It is critical that all WTO members avoid unilateral and protectionist measures that run counter to the spirit and rules of the WTO.”
Also, Wang and Sergei Lavrov spoke at a think tank forum celebrating the “20th anniversary of the signing of the China-Russia Treaty of Good-neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation.” Wang said (English version) that:
“the two countries will be responsible major countries that take the lead in upholding equality, integrity, cooperation and compliance with law. They will march toward their great rejuvenation side by side, and constantly inject new impetus into the building of a community with a shared future for mankind.”
While on the China-Russia relationship, do listen to this Sinica podcast episode with Ali Wyne. He does a really good job of helping one think through the dynamics of the relationship.
Anyway, Wang also met with his Hungarian counterpart Peter Szijjarto in Guiyang. PD has a very short report, devoid of all the interesting bits. Xinhua English tells us that they talked about bilateral cooperation, Wang backing “Chinese enterprises to explore joint filling and production of vaccines with Hungarian enterprises.” On the broader relationship with EU, Xinhua has Szijjarto saying that “China is a cooperative partner of Europe, and Hungary firmly supports the development of EU-China relations and the cooperation mechanism among Central and Eastern European Countries.”
The Chinese foreign ministry said that:
“on the level of China-Europe relations, China’s cooperation with Hungary was never, and will never be, about dividing Europe. Instead, it is to boost mutual understanding and tolerance, to stand against moves that destroy China-Europe cooperation and to stand against conspiracies that divide the world.”
Also interesting that after the meeting, at a press conference, Wang spoke about the visits by foreign ministers of Poland, Serbia, Ireland and Hungary, and how this is an indication of “strategic communication between China and the EU.” He said that “current challenges in China-EU relations deserve attention and should be calmly reflected upon.” SCMP’s report also has Wang as saying:
“The current difficulties between China and Europe is something China does not wish to see, and it does not serve the fundamental and long-term interests of both sides.”
Page 4: Just one report to note. We have new Party secretaries in Shaanxi and Henan. Lou Yangsheng has been appointed secretary of the Henan Provincial Committee, and Lin Wu has been appointed secretary of the CPC Shanxi Provincial Committee.
Page 6: The two historical figures discussed today are table tennis star Rong Guotuan and opera star Chang Xiangyu.
Page 13: The lead piece today is by NPCSC member and Chairman of the NPC Supervisory and Judicial Affairs Committee Wu Yuliang. He argues that discipline has been critical to the Party ever since its founding. In this context, he says that:
“The Fifth National Congress of the Party clearly stated that internal party discipline is very important, and ‘political discipline should be emphasized’...The party constitution adopted by the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China emphasizes the basic principles of democratic centralism, clearly put forward the ‘four obedience,’ and set up a special chapter for ‘party supervision organs’...In the revolutionary war years, in harsh environments, without strict discipline, the party could not survive and develop.” Essentially, this is about looking at the pre-PRC years to say that what was done was necessary. The author glosses over the first three decades of the PRC to then quickly jump to 1978.
We go through this period very quickly to get to Xi’s time. And here the author emphasises that:
“In the Party’s discipline, political discipline is the first and the most important discipline. With strict political discipline, the party has the foundation for unity and prosperity; if political discipline is abolished, the party is in danger of falling apart and falling apart.” 在党的纪律中，政治纪律是打头、管总的，是最重要、最根本、最关键的纪律. 政治纪律严明，党就有团结统一、兴旺发达的基础；政治纪律废弛，党就有四分五裂、分崩离析的危险.
In the next section of the piece, he talks about the Party’s work style. For the current moment, he writes that it is important to keep the big picture in mind while addressing specific problems, to be “persistent” and “unremitting,” emphasise the role of “leading cadres” as examples, and tackle both “symptoms and root causes” of problems from a long-term perspective. 一是从具体问题入手，以小见大、以点带面. 二是发扬钉钉子精神，持之以恒、常抓不懈. 三是从领导机关、领导干部抓起，抓住“关键少数”，以上率下、层层示范. 四是建立长效机制，破立并举、标本兼治.
Finally, he talks about the anti-corruption campaign. Wu says that:
“the Party Central Committee's judgment that the situation in the fight against corruption remains severe and complex has not changed, and the attitude, determination and strength to unswervingly punish corruption cannot change. It is necessary to stick to the main tone of strictness for a long time...and resolutely win the tough and protracted battle against corruption…”党中央对反腐败斗争形势依然严峻复杂的判断没有变，坚定不移惩治腐败的态度、决心和力度就不能变. 要把严的主基调长期坚持下去,保持战略定力，坚定必胜信心，知难而进、迎难而上，坚决打赢反腐败这场攻坚战、持久战，使党永葆清正廉洁的政治本色.